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The continuing Third United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference, which met at Caracas, Venezuela, during the
summer of 1974, has focused the attention of the community
of nations on sovereign rights over coastal seas in
international law# Littoral nations have become concerned
with their potential right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
for various purposes as far seaward from their coastline as
200 miles# Such a broad expanse of high seas as this 200
mile belt has traditionally been subject to the lawful
exercise of high seas freedoms, especially navigation and
fishing by all nations* It is the limiting of present high
seas freedoms within the proposed 200 mile belt which has
caused a problem for the United States# As a matter of
municipal law, the right to exercise jurisdiction and
retrieve resources within the seas adjacent to the coastline
of the United States Is allocated between the several states
and the federal government#
The federal government and the states have been
disputing the property rights and jurisdictional rights
over the coastal sea since at least 1947 when the United
States Supreme Court handed down its decision in United
States v» California,*- That decision determined that rights
of the federal government seaward of low-water mark were
paramount to any rights of the states# Further, the
(2)
justices stated that rights held over this area of
coastal seas, or adjacent seas, were held by virtue of
the ability of the federal government to exercise the
rights of the nation in international law. Therefore the
Court determined that the exercise of those rights over
portions of the coastal seas mist as a matter of existing
municipal law be an exclusive exercise of jurisdiction by
the United States. This exercise of sovereign rights
over the coastal sea was described as the product of an
exercise of "external sovereignty" by the federal
2
government.
Because of the federal system of government in the
United States the individual states were able to contest
property rights and jurisdictional rights of the federal
government seaward of low-water mark. Such contest did
not challenge the California decision to the extent that
coastal waters were described as held by the exercise of
external sovereignty or sovereign authority of the nation.
Rather the states attacked in a series of litigations
which claimed that as a matter of "internal sovereignty",
that is, the allocation of governmental rights between
the states and the federal government, it was the states
and not the federal government, which held the right to
exercise jurisdiction and retrieve resources within the
coastal seas, even though those seas were held by
(3)
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authority of the national exercise of sovereignty* The
states were unsuccessful in achieving the objective of
such litigation, but nonetheless in 1953 Congress enacted
the Submerged Lands Act which essentially quitclaimed
property rights in the coastal seas to the states within
4
the area of the territorial sea* However, both the State
of Florida and the State of Texas were able to establish
historic rights over resources in the Gulf of Mexico out
to nine nautical miles from the coastline of the United
States and their grant extended to these historic areas
as a matter of municipal law* Other states along the Gulf
of Mexico were unsuccessful in attempting to establish
5
similar historic rights*
Control over resources out to nine nautical miles
from the coastline gave the State of Florida and the State
of Texas a valuable property right over oil deposits out
to nine nautical miles from shore, and eventually the grant
came to include a Jurisdictional right to control valuable
offshore fisheries, especially shrimp through the exclusive
right to exploit resources beyond the boundary of the
territorial sea out to nine nautical miles from the
coastline* Prompted by the success of the State of Florida
and the State of Texas, as well as by the discovery of oil
deposits in the continental shelf under the Atlantic Ocean
and a desire to manage valuable offshore fisheries, now
(4)
over-fished, the states of the Atlantic seaboard in 1969
entered into litigation with the United StatesThat
litigation was primarily an attempt by most of the original
states, former British colonies, to establish that they
held exclusive property rights and jurisdictional rights
over their coastal seas since colonial times. The
establishment of those alleged historic rights encompassed
arguments that English law and international law of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries recognized such
exclsuive rights over coastal sea resources as inherent
in the sovereign status of a nation in the community of
nations. When these rights were argued for in the seas
adjacent to the American colonies the position taken by
the states was that colonial charters transferred the
rights of exclusive exploitation of resources and jurisdiction
over the coastal seas to the colonies, and that these rights
remained with the states at the time of the revolution, 1776,
and were not granted to the federal government in the 1789
Constitution,
It is the purpose of this dissertation to analyse the
historical evidence as to the seventeenth and eighteenth
century rights of Great Britain over fcts adjacent seas.
By examining international law of this two-century period
not only will the rights which Great Britain could have
claimed in the seas adjacent to the British Isles be
(5)
identified, but also identified will be those rights
which could have been exercised in the seas adjacent to
the American colonies. Moreover, this dissertation will
examine English law of the period to determine whether
rights were claimed as a matter of municipal law in the
seas adjacent to the British Isles as well as those
adjacent to the American colonies. Then it must be resolved
whether such rights were passed to the colonies through
their charters or whether they were reserved in Great Britain
and thus subsequently applied by the United States, not the
individual states, after the War of the American Revolution,
1776-1783.
Two analytical tools have been adopted in order to
carry out this analysis and they are presented at this
point in order to familiarize the reader. The first tool
of analysis is the "possession standard". This standard
is employed in order to determine the degree of control
exercised in the area of the coastal seas by Great Britain
and the American colonies so as to determine whether a
claim of ownership or some lesser claim of a limited
jurisdiction can be supported in fact and law. Hie second
analytical tool is analysis according to the "protective
jurisdiction test". This is a test which when applied to
municipal law and international law of this period reveals
whether there was an implicit intent to claim exclusive
(6)
general jurisdiction or ownership over the coastal seas,
or whether there was only a limited exercise of littoral
national jurisdiction for the peace, order and safety of
the nation#
Employment of both these tools presents an analysis
which will accurately identify the authority and rights
of Great Britain over coastal seas during the seventeenth
century and eighteentlx century# With respect to the United
States, and the problem of allocation of these rights under
its municipal law and its application of such rights in
international law, this analysis will determine whether
the individual coastal states have historic rights to
exclusive exploitation of property and resources in the
adjacent sea as well as general jurisdiction over the seas
adjacent to the coastline of the United States, If such
historic rights do not exist the claims of the Atlantic
seaboard states to the exclusive right to manage and
extract resources of the continental shelf mast fail# Thus
the rights of these states will not be able to conflict
with the exercise of the foreign affairs power under the
United States Constitution by the federal government now
formulating policy for exploitation of the world's ocean
resources to be presented at the continuing Third United




The first part of this dissertation is offered to
establish that governmental power was applied by Great
Britain over its coastal seas as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
That governmental power was exercised under authority of a
sovereign in the community of nations. Such exercise of
protective jurisdiction is reflected by application of
contemporary customs laws, admiralty jurisdiction, criminal
jurisdiction and general common law jurisdiction over
citizens and others.
This paper is concerned with only English law which
came to form the basis for the various state legal systems
and bodies of law. English law is therefore often referred
to as municipal law, a term which is not inclusive of the
law of Scotland or any other jurisdiction within today's
United Kingdom. The law of Scotland would be important for
an analysis of colonial law in provinces such as the
Province of Nova Scotia, which was initially granted
under the Scottish Crown unlike the group of colonies
forming today's states and referred to herein as the
(8)
American colonies*
Analysis of the protective jurisdiction exercised by
Great Britain reveals that such jurisdiction encompassed
allocation of property rights recognized by municipal
law. These property rights accrued in the high seas
according to the criteria set out in municipal law,
because as sovereign in international law Great Britain
held the authority to take cognizance of various property
rights arising under the municipal law of Crown prerogative
right, although accruing upon or within the high seas which
were subject to international law*
Analysis of the writings of international law jurists
and Crown prerogative right applied under protective
jurisdiction indicates & common test of "possession", that
is, exclusive control, being applied as the standard for
vesting of ownership under seventeenth century and eighteenth
century international law and municipal law* Ho property
right vested over any object within the coastal sea during
die seventeenth century and eighteenth century unless the
object was intended to be possessed, was capable of being
possessed, and was then actually possessed*
Possession was a test which applied to ownership
generally during this period* Thus ownership of objects
within the sea and claims of ownership of the sea itself
may be evaluated by a "possession standard". The requirement
(9)
of such a standard for analysis is clear because as a
matter of governmental policy during the Stuart period
(1603-1688), the Crown considered that the high seas
could be owned, through possession, by the activities of
7
commercial fishing vessels and military vessels.
Although contrary to contemporary precepts of international
law, this theory of possession of the high seas by vessels
was offered by the Crown to bolster its foreign policy
objectives, for example, restraint of Dutch fishing
activities.
Seeking foreign policy objectives, including ownership
of large portions of the high seas to secure exclusive
control of fisheries, the British government sought to
influence existing international law during the Stuart
period. Imposition of treaty terms on losers in war, and
reliance upon the works of writers in international law
with a patriotic bent were tactics employed by the Crown
to back its claimed ownership of the high seas. Elaborate
legal arguments were offered by these British writers to
substantiate the proposition that possession and ownership
of the high seas was possible and had been achieved. Such
ownership was equated with ownership over land territory.
However, unlike the sea, ownership over land territory in
the seventeenth century was comprised of control over,
(10)
administration of, and usually settlement in the
territory concerned#
It is clear that regardless of Stuart pretensions,
at no point did the claimed high seas meet these criteria
for ownership so as to be considered appurtenant to
national territory as a matter of municipal law or
international law. The attempt was made by Charles I to
claim ownership over the high seas based on the Stuart
8
claims of exclusive fishing rights. That effort failed
as a matter of international law because it was impossible
to possess the high seas and thus there could be no
ownership of the high seas. If sovereignty had been
established it would have contained a full panoply of
rights, including full rights of jurisdiction and control
over, along with a valid title to the sea. However, at
most, the Crown was able to exercise only limited protective
jurisdiction on the high seas by government vessels. All
instances of the exercise of such protective jurisdiction
show it to be limited to the preservation of property
rights, or for defense and national security. Certainly
no sovereignty was actually established over the high seas,
nor was ownership of those seas ever accepted as a matter
of international law, although there is some indication
that Selden and Hale writing in the Stuart period thought
that certain areas of the sea came to be owned by the Crown
(11)
because those areas had been claimed, occupied and thus
possessed.
Constant assertion of British claims to ownership
in portions of the high seas Airing the seventeenth century
pressed international law to refine the concept of
possession in ocean areas, Eventually application of
various national rights in the coastal sea were acknowledged
to be legally undertaken, but only through limited qualified
possession of the sea near the shore. As a result, prompted
by British understanding of the need to extend protective
jurisdiction over coastal waters, during the eighteenth
century international law came to recognize that the
exercise of protective jurisdiction was a governmental right
to the extent it could be exerted effectively from shore.
But not until the nineteenth century did the concept of
territorial sea, a sea appurtenant to the adjacent territory
of a sovereign and subject to the same full sovereign rights




Crown, Public, And Private Property Rights
Arising Within The Coastal Sea
Under Municipal Law
Seventeenth and eighteenth century municipal law is
examined in this section to isolate the domestic standard
for possession governing ownership of res within the
coastal sea* Possession is a useful analytical tool to
determine an object's physical capability of being owned.
When possession is applied as a test of ownership, it
eliminates theories of property rights to the sea based on
seventeenth century Stuart claims to ownership of the sea
without actual possession thereof* That elimination results
because the sea could not be possessed and therefore owned
by subjects as a matter of municipal law or the nation as
a matter of international law. Thus municipal law never
recognized possession of the sea as within the capacity of
a subject, and correspondingly international law prevented
perfection of the Stuart ownership claim as an act of the
nation. The sea could not be possessed because it was
physically incapable of possession due to the absence of
bounds and the fluid and uncontrollable nature of its
(13)
component waters# Itereover this escaraination of
prerogative property rights and governmental rights is
important because colonial charters purported to convey
various prerogative property rights and governmental
rights# Whether such conveyance included ownership of
the sea adjacent to the colonics can only be determined
by understanding the rights accruing to the Crown through
its prerogative and those which could have been granted
to the colonies as a matter of municipal law#
A# Prerogative Ri^ht of the Crown
Prerogative right was a term of art which# applied
in the seventeenth century and eighteenth century# was
used to describe the special rights and capacities which
9
the Crown as sovereign alone enjoyed# While no one other
than the Crown could enjoy prerogative right# the Crown
10
did grant franchises under that right. Franchises vested
a present legal right in the grantee which enabled him to
receive the benefits of royalties which were the various
proprietary rights held by the Crown under prerogative
right to property# Some of these franchises included
rights to title over ownerless property, both personal
property and real property# For example» waste land# the
foreshore# and lands taken by escheat or forfeiture all
(14)
case to the Crown as ownerless property -under the
prerogative right to such property and were royalties
which could be granted to subjects by franchise » Among
objects of personal property coming to the Crown through
the prerogative right to property were salmon, swans,
©strays, waifs, escheats, wreck, fines, amercements, and
12
deodands. These also could be granted to a subject by
franchise. Moreover, not only ownerless property was
within the Crown prerogative right and capable of being
granted, but also granted were various commissions of
employment such as judgeships in the admiralty courts and
even the office of king' o printer. These commissions of
employment were issued pursuant to governmental power under
13
the prerogative right.
The Crown could not divest itself of prerogative right
and therefore the prerogative right itself could not be
granted to a subject or lesser domestic government. Also
property of the Crown could not be granted in derogation
of the jus publicum and thereby destroy the paramount
territorial title of the state. Thus part of the realm
could not be granted away by the Crown acting under
prerogative right. As with property, so also many
national governmental rights of the Crown could not be
divested in derogation of the jus publicum. For example,
the governmental power could not be absolutely granted.
(15)
It could only be granted so that •when exercised such
exercise was subject to national authority thus enabling
prevention of an exercise of governmental power in
derogation of the law or the constitution# Thus as early
as the year 1340 an opinion of the justices was issued
which set out that the Crown could not itself be delegated,
nor could parts of the kingdom, the crown jewels, power to
pardon treason or felony within the realm, power to create
judges, justices of the peace, sheriffs, nor any other
14
thing pertaining to government in any essential way#
Therefore lands and governmental powers held by prerogative
right could not be granted by franchise so as to lessen the
realm or lessen the governmental power of the nation or
sovereign# A general rule governing Crown grants under
franchises was that nothing held in trust for the nation
by prerogative right and protected by the 1us publicum,
could be derogated by grant of the Crown under the 1us
15
privatum, that is, by franchises#
The prerogative governmental right of the Crown gave
rise to certain other rights• These other rights were
rights of purveyance which superseded even vested private
property rights, if reasonable compensation was paid for
property taken# Thus, for royal pleasure but justified
as done for the public benefit, woods could be afforested,
(16)
which did not affect the underlying fee in the land,
wines and food taken for the king*s table, and timber
1 6
taken for the Icing*s castles. Execution of prerogative
governmental purveyances such as these of necessity
required delegation, but the purveyance right itself-which
allowed such takings and the goods taken under that right
could not be delegated to a subject.
One prerogative governmental right is of interest
for analysis according to the possession standard because
it was often conveyed in colonial charters. That right
is the right to royal mines. This was an absolute right
to the very unextraeted gold and silver in the earth
within the realm. According to the prerogative governmental
right, only the Crown had the status or capacity to possess
royal mines within the realm. Hie important aspect is that
gold and silver of royal mines was exclusively and totally
controlled by the Crown through location in the national
territory. Because royal mines in the North American
colonies were not within the nation they were probably
held by prerogative right to property, and thus not limited
by the .jus publicum which gave rise to the prerogative
right to such mines within the realm. Therefore such mines
could be conveyed as franchises to a colony as a governmental
right of that colony without damage to the jus publicum
(17)
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right of the nation to royal mines within the nation.
This right to royal mines within the nation has been
poorly analogized to the Crown right to treasure trove.
Actually treasure trove was ownerless property and came
to the Crown under prerogative right to ownerless property.
The right to royal mines within the realm came to the Crown
under prerogative governmental right ancillary to the
18
governmental power to coin money.
While gold and silver could be possessed by the
national sovereign as a prerogative right because such
minerals were located within the nation, objects in the
coastal sea could not be so constructively possessed.
The coastal sea itself was not within the nation and thus
it could not be possessed as gold and silrver mines were
possessed by simply being within a territorial boundary.
However, though the coastal sea was not within the nation,
the Crown claimed possession of the sea as a matter of
municipal law under prerogative right. But that prerogative
right to the sea as a matter of municipal law was merely a
tool or legal fiction for allocation of property rights in
emerged lands, as is shown by the decisions of municipal
courts, and did not create any claim to the sea as a matter
19
of international law.
Certainly natural resources of the sea and other
objects in the sea were subject to possession under
(13)
prerogative property right once they were extracted or
appropriated, but no Crown property right has been shown
in the decisions of municipal courts to actually have
existed in the sea or seabed itself as a matter of
municipal law or international law* At best, the Crown
held prerogative property right to actually possessed
objects and extracted resources of the sea such as flotsam,
20
jetsam, ligan, royal fish, wreck, oysters and coral*
Hie abstract prerogative property right allowed the
granting of present franchises to such royalties creating
a legal right, but no property right or ownership vested
in the franchise holder over the objects until objects or
21
resources were possessed or extracted*
By applying the standard of possession to each
incident of governmental right or property ri^xt under
the Crown prerogative right it has been demonstrated that
the Crown's grant of franchise conveyed only a right to
the benefits of the prerogative right# It was the grantee's
legal right under the franchise which became the contested
point in litigation of the period, and it is in such
litigation that the common law gave its attention to
benefits which accrued under the prerogative right* At
that point some res was possessed and any general iaation
in the court's decision about abstract Crown ownership of
(19)
the sea under prerogative right merely served as make-
22
weight argument#
In one sense the sea was in fact possessed by
prerogative right# That sens© was possession for a
limited governmental exercise of jurisdiction with a
protective nature# The exercise of such "protective
jurisdiction" was for preservation of national order#
23
safety# peace and good government♦ Unlike the seventeenth
century# the exercise of protective jurisdiction in the
eighteenth century became identified with a narrow belt of
coastal waters as opposed to the earlier exercise over wide
areas of high seas. By the eighteenth century such limited
possession of the coastal sea for the exercise of protective
jurisdiction# rather than the complete possession required
for ownership, was in accord with the recognized precepts
of contemporary international law# In fact municipal law
placed defense of the realm under governmental prerogative
right as a Crown responsibility# and thus such defense
became a strong domestic basis for the exercise of
24
protective jurisdiction.
B. Municipal Law, Real Property and Personal Property
Rights Arising Within the Coastal Sea
1. Cqaaaoa law real property rights within the coastal
(20)
sea. — Common law often recited Crovm ownership of the
sea and seabed under the prerogative right to waste in
cases dealing with property rights to the foreshore or
derelict lands. At common law when possession of a res
was a mere possibility no one was able to have actual
possession of the res and thus could not own the res. In
the case of real property this test for actual possession
was referred to as seisin. As a result of the inability
to actually possess no one could have seisin at common
25
law over the sea and seabed. Apparently avoiding the
requirement of seisin at common law, the Crown was alleged
to hold the sea and seabed by prerogative right, which was
26
not part of the common law though acknowledged by it.
No litigation ever evaluated such prerogative
ownership according to the possession standard in order
to determine whether the Crown was actually seised of the
sea and seabed. That is, no litigation ever determined
as a contested issue whether there was exclusive control
and thus possession of the sea and seabed by the Crown.
Since at common law no property right could be held of an
object which could not be possessed, no one could hold a
property right to the sea and seabed, and thus no one had
a property right which could have been asserted against
tiie Crown prerogative right. For that reason, litigation




Real property rights in the coastal sea which were
litigated and could be evaluated by the possession
standard involved the foreshore, derelict lands and newly
28
emerged islands, The foreshore was that area of shore
inundated by tides but considered capable of being
possessed at common law and therefore a proper object of
grant# Large marsh areas used as salt pans for the
evaporation of sea water provide an example of the
foreshore capable of being possessed and made the object
29
of Crown grant through a franchise#
Derelict lands were areas composed of formerly
submerged soil along the coast where suddenly the sea
retreated and left the submerged soil dry# Derelict lands
were a proper subject of grant because they could be
identified and possessed# They were often granted, and
even special commissions were issued to encourage the
discovery of such areas* Similarly, submerged soil which
came to form a new island, once emerged, was also capable
of present possession at common law and thus could be the
30
proper subject of grant#
Frequently litigation over property rights in the
foreshore or derelict lands occurred when occasionally
soil on the shore was subjected to erosion by the sea, or
submerged soil was cast upon the shore, or the sea receded
exposing as waste land areas that had been formerly
(22)
submerged. Ownership in soil emerging or submerging
depended on whether the process was one of accretion,
reliction or avulsion# The slow addition of submerged
soil to the adjoining estate on the shore was termed
accretion and the reversed process of slow erosion was
termed reliction# When removal of soil from one estate
to another was by accretion or reliction, an imperceptible
process over time, a prior owner not immediately recognizing
his loss of possession was not permitted to later assert his
claim against the new possessor# Avulsion was the sudden
change of submerged soil to dry soil, or of dry soil to
31
submerged soil# When soil was subject to avulsive
change, it was sometimes possible to continue to identify
it as a particular area although submerged• Therefore the
owner could still demarcate such area and common law
32
recognized continued possession by the original owner#
Common law as a legal fiction ascribed ownership of
submerged soil in the coastal sea to the Crown, and in the
case of soil adjacent to the shore such ownership could
probably withstand the test of actual possession. However,
the only actual evidence of the granting of submerged soil
near the shore in the open sea was for erection of fishing
33
weirs #
When submerged soil of the coastal sea became dry
through avulsion the property of the soil remained in the
(23)
king through the legal fiction, deferred to by common law
though never tested, that the Crown held and possessed the
sea and seabed by the prerogative, This result is
consistent with the upland owner's demarcation of his
estate once submerged and thus continuing in possession
and ownership. It is also a result consonant with common
law recognition that the Crown could actually possess the
seabed in shallow water close to shore. Therefore property
ri$it to the newly emerged soil did not pass to the adjacent
littoral owner as it would have if the change was the result
of accretion. Rather the derelict land was ascribed to
34
the Crown under prerogative right.
Aside from the area of seabed adjacent to the shore ,
which could be possessed sufficiently to grant limited
property rights in the submerged soil, common law deferred
to the legal fiction ascribing general ownership of the
sea and seabed to the Crown, The affect of that legal
fiction, as has been shown, was to give the Crown a primary
right of possession over derelict land and newly emerged
islands, thereby preempting the opportunity of others to
establish opposing possession of such real property before
it was discovered and claimed by the Crown, Hie fiction
served its function and ownership of derelict lands was
fixed in the Crown pursuant to prerogative right because
litigation never tested the possession of the Crown in the
(24)
coastal sea.
Application of the possession standard shows that the
common law required present possession, that is, seisin,
before a grantee could legally hold a property right to
real property along the coast# Almost exclusively the
real property rights forming the subject of litigation
during the seventeenth century and eighteenth century
involved dry land which was occupied and .possessed or
capable of being occupied and possessed by s subject#
Apparently submerged soil of the coastal sea could not be
possessed at common law unless it was in shallow water
close to shore , and then only to the extent that it could
be demarcated, the alleged Crown prerogative right to
the sea and seabed as waste was not a matter created by
or tested by common law# 'Ihat right served only as a
fiction to allocate other ownership rights among subjects
whom actually possessed real property# As a matter of
municipal law It cannot be shown that the Crown actually
possessed and owned the high seas around the British Isles
during the seventeenth century and eighteenth century#
2# Municipal law personal property rights within the
coastal sea# —<• Municipal, that is, common lav and admiralty
lav as well as other bodies of municipal law applicable to
citisens and their rights on the sea, recognised personal
(25)
property rights of grantees to objects and resources
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within the coastal sea* Such rights were dependent
upon underlying Crown grants of franchise, or upon
prescriptive rights which presumed a grant, because all
objects within the coastal sea as a matter of municipal
law belonged to the Crown as ownerless property under
prerogative property right applied through protective
jurisdiction* Aside from objects in the sea, all
resources, such as minerals, belonged to the Crown under
the prerogative property right* Present legal right
to such objects and resources could be granted to
subjects by franchise. Municipal law would protect the
legal right of the grantee in the grant and in the
property right to the objects once secured pursuant to
the grant* But prior to possession of the object or
extraction of the resource, a grantee held only a legal
interest to have a property right to the object once it
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was possessed ar extracted.
Among the property rights developed in coastal
waters as a matter of municipal law, pursuant to the
underlying Crown prerogative right to property were
fisheries, oyster beds, mussel beds, sand and gravel
deposits, seaweed, flotsam, jetsam, ligan, wreck and royal
Og
fish* Each of these items of property were "royalties"
under Crown prerogative right which were granted as
(26)
franchises, and in some eases by lease* Such grants are
best defined as licenses to possess objects and extract
natural resources described in the grant. Thus, a grant
to a fishery was not a grant of property right over fish
but rather to the legal right to carry on an exclusive
fishery, that is, the activity of fishing with the right
to possess and own whatever fish were caught • Likewise,
oyster beds were made the object of lease for the removal
of oysters, and as well the benefits of Crown prerogative
right to flotsam, jetsam, ligan, wreck and royal fish
were often granted by franchise * These franchises allowed
the grantee to hold the legal right to subsequently possess
and own a particular object on the basis of the present
legal ri^ht created by the grant. However, right to
particular objects which were not natural resources, such
as flotsam, jetsam, ligan and wreck, were subject to any
prior ownership because the right to these items was based
on their status as ownerless goods* Thus if a prior
ownership were asserted, within a year and a day from the
taking of possession such prior ownership would prevent
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the vesting of the franchise grantee's ownership.
Because the Crown did not hold prerogative right over all
objects and resources in the sea the Crown was able to
allocate property rights only to those objects or resources
which had been appropriated or extracted. This allocation
(27)
of. property rights to objects and resources in the sea
and seabed demonstrates that the Crown did not have a
general property right to the sea and seabed, although
as a matter of municipal law it could allocate legal
rights to a particular res before it was possessed based
on jurisdiction over citizens and subsequent to possession
protect the vested property right under municipal law.
Katural resources present the best example of Crown
prerogative right used as a means for allocating future
grantee property rights in the coastal sea. "She Crown was
able to grant presently vested legal rights to resources
when no possession of the resources was possible until
some future technological feasibility allowed extraction
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and then possession. Undersea coal as one such resource
claimed by Crown prerogative right, but technologically
incapable of extraction and possession, except in small
quantities, until the late eighteenth century.
Although a matter of the law of Scotland, one example
of the grant of a franchise where the resource could not
be extracted until much later in time, and the sustaining
of the franchise as a vested legal right, occurred with
litigation concerning the baronial charter to the Estate
of Grange, which was granted in 1643. Under that charter,
a grant was made of the specific legal right to remove
coal from the manor and adjacent seabed within and without
(28)
the tidal flow, that is from the foreshore as well as
below low-water mark and such grant was made before it
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was technologically possible to extract such coal.
There is no record of coal being removed at Grange prior
to the nineteenth century when litigation over the content
of the baronial charter determined that the grant of
undersea coal pursuant to the charter was a valid and
proper conveyanceThe conveyance was proper and
remained in the grantee because the right to carry on the
activity of extracting coal had been conveyed and vested
in subsequent grantees. The Estate of Grange is more than
ample evidence that municipal law viewed such grants as
validly vesting legal rights and applied no theory of
lapse where the rights were consistently maintained and
conveyed to subsequent owners. In fact, undersea coal at
Grange was rained in 1860 on the basis of the 1643 grant,
regardless of the nonoccurrence of actual mining in the
interim.
The seabed to which this right extended was an arm of
the sea, the Firth of Forth, and as an arm of the sea the
seabed thereof was regarded as inter regalia, that is,
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property of the Crown within the prerogative right. Most
likely the Crown could have granted such legal right as a
franchise to extract coal from the seabed even outside the
realm, as a matter of prerogative governmental right to
<29)
order the activities of citizens* there are two cases
of undersea coal being mined prior to the nineteenth
century which evidence that even the extraction and
possession of undersea minerals was not a matter of
fantasy* although certainly beyond the knowledge and means
of most people at the time* Prior to 1625 the extraction
of seabed coal was carried on through an undersea mine
which extended a mile from shore at the Estate of Culross*
also In Scotland. Hi is mine could be entered by land as
well as through an artificial island* the Culross mine
ran out to a depth of five fathoms of water and forty
fathoms of seabed, with drainage achieved by a horse-drawn
chain carrying thirty-six buckets emptying a central well
in the mine* Certainly Culross evidences a limited ability
to mine undersea coal* but apparently it was unique in the
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seventeenth century*
In the eighteenth century, 1715, Thomas Hewcomen rented
his recently invented steam pump to James Lowther to be
installed at a mine in Whitehaven, England, This pump was
used to drain the Saltdom mine shaft, which was sunk above
high-twafcer mark in 1729 and by 1731 vast at a depth of 456
feet extending seaward and extracting coal from beneath
the Solway Firth, But, like the mine at Culross, the




Both Culross and Saltdom witness a limited ability
to extract undersea minerals and coal from the seabed
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is
not by terms of the grants but probably only by chance that
both mines were under an arm of the sea and not under the
open sea. thus these mines were within the bodies of
counties. Common law recognized that the bottom soil and
minerals of arms of the sea within the bodies of counties
were possessed and owned by the Crown under prerogative
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right. This Crown ownership of the bottom soil and
minerals of arms of the sea is substantiated by the national
possession of such areas through their location within the
nation and thereby subject to control by the nation} much
the same as the Crown ownership of gold and silver in the
territory of the realm discussed earlier. But even in the
mining of coal within an arm of the sea, the subject
grantee*s only legal rights were the grant or franchise to
mine the resources and the property right to resources
actually removed. The subject grantee was incapable of
possessing the resources before extraction.
While it is coincidental that the coal at Culross and
Saltdom ran under an arm of the sea, be it the Firth of
Forth or the Solway Firth, the Crown grant for these mines
did not limit the right to extract resources by the bounds
of counties. Thus the right was not restricted within the
national boundaries. Arguably, if these mines had been
(31)
beneath the open coast* it is most likely that the same
grant would have been made. However, if such mines ran
under the coastal sea the Crown would not thereby possess
the sea or seabed* Hie most that could be possessed of
the seabed and its resources by an undersea mine would
have been the general area within which the shaft penetrated
the seabed and mining activity was carried on*
Moreover, a Crown grant of such uaextraeted seabed
coal would have actually been only a license allocating
property rights among subjects, which license allowed one
subject to carry on coal mining in a particular place and
prevented others from conducting that same activity in the
same place* Extraction of resources under claims of
prerogative property right evidence© no vested property
right in the sea and seabed as a matter of municipal or
international law# Bather such extraction demonstrates a
limited capacity to possess, sufficient only to allocate
rights through the exercise of protective jurisdiction by
the sovereign over activities of its subjects, even though
ordering their individual rights and activities external to
the nation*
therefore for ownership of objects or resources the
possession required was such that the object or the resource
be appropriated or extracted and exclusively controlled
before any property right of the grantee would vest over
the res* The fiction of an underlying Crown prerogative
(32)
right to property of unextracted resources and objects
in the coastal sea beyond the bodies of counties is the
same fiction as that which claimed Crown possession of
the sea and seabed as prerogative right. As a matter of
municipal law sufficient possession and control has not
been shown to support claims of ownership of the bed or
water of the coastal sea. In short what the Crown did
hold over the coastal sea and seabed was not a property
right but a governmental right. That governmental right
gave the Crown the primary or paramount authority to
grant and allocate legal rights and property rights to
appropriated objects and extracted resources possessed by
subjects. This governmental right and authority should
not be confused as evidence of ownership of the coastal
sea and seabed. There is no evidence of the ownership
rights of subjects being allocated as a matter of general
jurisdiction applied over the coastal sea such that rights
of foreigners would be affected, but only as a matter of
limited and specific jurisdiction of a protective nature
to guard certain interests of citizens,
C, Municipal Law Allocation of Public Rights in Coastal
Waters
Municipal law, that is, common law and admiralty law
protected public rights of fishing and navigation in all
(33)
inland navigable waters incltiding ports, harbors, havens,
arms of the sea, as well as in the coastal sea. These
rights were vested in the public much the same as
prerogative rights were vested in the Crown, and neither
the Crown nor individuals were able to place any unreasonable
restriction upon the public*s full enjoyment of either
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fishing or navigation. But neither of these public rights
was based on ownership or possession of the sea or other
navigable waters. The protection of such rights in the
coastal sea was merely a matter of application of protective
jurisdiction over the activities of citizens without regard
to "ownership",
1• The public right to navigation, — Navigation was
the highest priority public right in the sea and inland
navigable waters at common law. Although circumstances and
usage might ultimately determine what constituted navigable
waters, waters within the flux and reflux of the tide were
prima facie navigable. Because a navigable waterway was
considered to be in the nature of a highway, all riparian
and littoral owners of real property could have their
property rights subjected to public activities conducted
pursuant to the navigation servitude. Thus, even when
there was no public right to a towpath along riparian real
property and littoral real property at common law, if such
I
(34)
a path were made through custom and it was essential to
navigation the common law would protect the public right
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to the towpath•
Another public activity, but one which could be
established by grant as well as by custom, was the digging
of ballast on the foreshore# This digging of ballast
withstood the attacks of adjacent private property owners
because of its connection with the public right to
navigation. The reason these public activities were allowed
to exist under the aegis of the navigation servitude was
that the public good depended upon the unimpeded exercise
of the right to navigation. Therefore, once an established
public activity was connected with the right to navigation,
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no private property right could hinder it.
Hot only were individuals unable to overcome established
public rights to digging of ballast or usage of a towpath,
but no individual, group, or town could place restrictions
on navigation by way of tolls, harbor duties or other
charges unless some reasonable needed benefit to the public
right to navigation would be created or maintained with the
proceeds. Among the needs of navigation which were
considered to form a reasonable basis for levies against
vessels in navigable waters were the construction and
maintenance of aids to navigation such as anchorage areas,
beacons and buoys."*®
(35)
Most problems with the navigation servitude resulting
in litigation were created by impedements to navigation
through fishing operations using weirs or other obstructions
fixed in the submerged bottom soil or the foreshore. But
no exercise of the right to fish, either public or private,
was permitted to interfere with navigation. Thus
encroachment from the foreshore or below low-water mark
which impeded the public right to navigation could be
attacked under the navigation servitude as a purpresture
or nuisance and by action at common law could be ordered
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abated by removal.
Relying on the possession standard as a tool of analysis,
what appears from the above examination of navigation as a
public right is that the navigation servitude enforced at
common law was merely an application of protective
jurisdiction for the ordering of the maritime activities of
subjects. The navigation servitude was in no way connected
with any ownership of even inland waters such as harbors,
havens, rivers and arms of the sea, let alone with
possession and ownership of the coastal sea and seabed.
The jurisdiction which was exercised over activities in
the coastal sea harming free exercise of the public right
to navigation was protective in nature because it was
maintained to establish order and peace among citizens.
In fact there is no evidence that such jurisdiction was
(36)
applied an any basis other than eifcisenship, or personal
jurisdiction aver foreigners within die bodies of counties#
2* Hie public riftht to fishing* *** Generally the
public right to fisheries existed In all inland navigable
waters as well as in the coastal sea, bat there were also
several or private rights to fisheries which in some cases
were appendant to tlx© bottom soil* Appendency of the
private fishery right to the property right of die bottom
soil occurred in non-navigable waters where the riparian
owner possessed and owned the bottom soil to the midline
or thread of the stream or beyond as part of the riparian
estate* Hie exclusive right to a fishery in ton-navigable
waters was said to be appendant because a grant of the
riparian estate would include ownership of the non-navigable
river bottom and without specific words would also grant
ownership of the fishery to the riparian estate* In inland
navigable waters the Crown held the possession of the bottom
soil* and the public right to fisheries was neither
appendant to that bottom soil* nor based upon continuing
Crown ownership of it. thus the Crown could grant the
bottom soil of harbors to the harbor towns without any
affect upon the public right to fisheries* In coastal seas
the seabed was not actually owned* except by the uncontested
fiction of prerogative right* As within inland navigable
waters the public right to the fishery was maintained by
(37)
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the Crown through the exercise of protective jurisdiction#
If a river was navigable above the tidal flow, riparian
owners in some cases could establish a prescriptive fishery
right based on their adjacent real property right which
included a ri#it to exclusive quiet possession of riparian
property* Prescription, however, did not lie within the
tidal flow against the public right to fisheries in anas
of the sea, harbors, havens and beyond the tidal flow in
the coastal sea, the public right to fish in those bodies
/
of wafer was in fact so strong that the public could cross
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private real property to exercise the right* Evidently
the more navigable waters approached the public nature of
til© coastal sea, that is, as the capacity of individuals
to possess navigable waters and the fish therein diminished,
the less cossaon law was willing to allow the establishment
of private property rights to the exclusion of the public
right to fish. Apparently this result was arrived at
because the more the waters containing a fishery approached
the nature of the ocean the less the fishery was contained
or controlled and consequently the weaker became any claim
to possession of the fishery according to common law
standards. After Magna Carta such fisheries could not be
granted by the Crown without Parliament*s consent within
navigable waters and the coastal sea outside the boundaries
of counties, that is, beyond rivers, harbors, havens and
(38)
arms of the sea,^
Coxmon law had vested in the public the right to
fish in navigable waters as well as in the coastal sea#
and then protected that right by exercising its municipal
jurisdiction* Thus disputes over fishing rights in inland
navigable waters and the coastal sea were resolved under
that municipal jurisdiction of common lav? when the public
right was encroached upon by private activities. As
against foreign nationals fishing on the high seas admiralty
jurisdiction was exercised to enforce Stuart claims to high
seas fisheries, but consnon law had jurisdiction to settle
disputes under Crown grants to several fisheries such as
monopolies to whaling granted by Elizabeth, which restricted
the public fishery right in the coastal sea. That exercise
of common law jurisdiction and admiralty jurisdiction
constituted an exercise of protective jurisdiction by the
national sovereign not a claim of ownership of the high
seas.
Analysis of these fisheries rights, both public and
private, suggests that private rights obtained by
prescription were established over time, in waters which
could be exclusively controlled by one individual or group
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to the exclusion of others. Private individuals were
not capable as a matter of municipal law of acquiring a
fishery in the coastal sea by prescription because they
(39)
did not have the capacity to possess the sea and thereby
establish the prescriptive right. Private fishery rights,
in inland navigable waters and the coastal sea, when gained
by Crown grant arose immediately and required no exclusion
of others over tin® from the bottom soil or the matrix
water. Although in inland waters the Crown possessed that
water and bottom soil through the prerogative right to
property, fishery rights granted in the coastal seas were
not based on possession of the sea in a property sense,
such as would be required for ownership at common law.
Rather, beyond the shallow waters close to shore where weirs
were erected, that possession was in fact an exercise of
protective jurisdiction over citizens for the ordering of
their activities and the allocation of property rights
under municipal law,
Therefore, an exclusive fishery in the coastal sea
as a matter of municipal law at best could only provide
possession for ownership within the limited area where the
fishery was conducted, in the fishery for the time it was
conducted, and of the fish actually caught. No ownership
of that sea or seabed resulted from the exercise of
exclusive fishery rights as a matter of international law
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because the possession was transient and, other than
during the reign of Charles I, did not include a claim to
ownership or an intent to claim ownership of the seas as
(40)
a matter of international law. Thus no general ownership
of the sea, seabed, or their resources formed the basis
for Crown grants of exclusive fisheries in coastal waters
or the high seas#
D# Summary, Chapter I
Examination of prerogative right, municipal law real
property rights and personal property rights, as well as
public rights in the coastal sea has demonstrated that the
Crown did not actually possess the coastal sea within the
prerogative right to property. The Crown regulated
activities and allocated property rights in the coastal
sea through the prerogative governmental power to control
activities of citizens to the extent that those activities
were occurring, and limited to the place where they were
occurring# Such control of citizens external to the nation
was an exercise of protective jurisdiction to maintain order,
safety, peace and good government•
Prerogative property right applied in the coastal sea
was based on abstract theories of a general property right
to waste and ownerless goods# The prerogative property
right when applied to the coastal sea was useful as a legal
fiction which created constructive primary or paramount
interest in the Crown to res from the sea possessed by
(41)
appropriation or extraction. By such fiction the Crown
was able to allocate ownership among citizens over
extracted resources and appropriated objects in the
coastal sea* Ho indication is given that a foreigner
traversing the coastal sea* finding a floating locker,
and continuing on his voyage, without entering within
the territorial jurisdiction of Great Britain, would
discover that he did not own the locker because of some
metaphysical property right of the Crown* Thus the Crown
prerogative right to property in the coastal sea applied
as a legal fiction only under protective jurisdiction to
those persons and res coming within the governmental
jurisdiction of the Crown# Citizens, and only foreigners
entering within territorial jurisdiction with res possessed
by them, became subject to the exercise of protective
jurisdiction through the fiction of Crown ownership of the
sea under the prerogative right to property.
It is clear fro© the use of franchises granted under
the prerogative right that jurisdiction of a protective
nature was exercised by the Crown over citizen® so as to
allocate their property rights to extracted resources and
objects taken from due coastal sea. Such ordering was the
act of a sovereign, not with a view to possession of the
coastal sea, but to provide for the order, safety, peace
and good government of the nation. Hone of the interests
(42)
in the coastal sea, including public rights to navigation
and fisheries, as well as the extraction of resources and
appropriation of objects, suffices alone or cumulatively
to show sufficient Crown possession of the coastal sea
for national ownership. The reason is that during the
seventeenth century and eighteenth century none of these
activities showed exclusive control of the sea and seabed
coupled with the intent to claim ownership of the sea.
At best the ownership right which is shown was restricted
to infrequent localized activities, and even those
activities were not carried on in order to gain possession
of the coastal sea but with a view to the possession of
particular identified resources and objects.
<43)
CHAPTER II
Great Britain, Exercised Protective Jurisdiction
External To The Nation
Great Britain exercised limited jurisdiction of a
protective nature over the sea external to the nation
during both the seventeenth century and eighteenth century#
This limited jurisdiction was an extension of national
power for defense and regulation of activities on the high
seas which tended to affect the well-being of the nation#
Such jurisdiction in fact constituted protective jurisdiction*
but for political purposes was often described by
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contemporaries — for example John Selden — as a claim
of sovereignty over the sea# Perhaps because the initial
seventeenth century attempt at distant application and
exercise of protective jurisdiction was a national act at
the direction of James X, contemporary writers thought it
proper to refer to that extension as a claim of sovereignty#
But, insofar as "sovereignty" brings to mind territorial
rights, ownership rights or rights to exercise general
jurisdiction, the word only serves to obscure the fact that
the Jurisdiction actually asserted was limited and
protective in nature being directed toward safeguarding
a national commercial interest in the North Sea herring
fishery#
(44)
In the previous chapter the concept of possession was
used as an analytical tool to isolate whether the sea was
capable of ownership as a matter of municipal law. That
analysis demonstrated that the sea was not considered
capable of being owned because it could not be possessed.
Now a similar analysis is made of the exercise of national
jurisdiction over the coastal sea external to the nation
in order to establish whether this extended jurisdiction
was intended, as both a matter of municipal law and
international law, to include a claim of ownership over
the high seas. Through the use of protective jurisdiction
as an analytical tool, the exercise of jurisdiction by the
sovereign in the forms of customs, admiralty, and criminal
jurisdictions, will be shown not to have been an
assertion of ownership or an attempt to claim exclusive
possession of or general jurisdiction over the coastal sea,
A, Protective Jurisdiction as the Basis for Exercise of
Customs Jurisdiction External to the Nation
Britain as an island nation benefited greatly from
maritime commerce« As a means of controlling that commerce
for protection of domestic industries, customs regulations
were enacted to prohibit importation of various foreign
goods and exportation of various domestic goods. Customs
duties were levied on the permitted importation and
(45)
exportation of other goods. The evasion of such customs
regulations and customs duties became a serious problem
during the seventeenth century and eighteenth century as
a result of rather extensive smuggling operations. In
order to protect the integrity of municipal customs laws
during the seventeenth century, vessels were ordered to
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cruise the coast to discover smugglers. By the eighteenth
century the effort to control smuggling became more
sophisticated and enforcement of customs laws was applied
for delimited distances into the coastal sea pursuant to
Parliamentary enactment of "hovering acts".
Hovering acts, a peculiar type of customs statutes,
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were first enacted in 1719. Under provisions of these
hovering acts certain defined activities carried on in the
coastal sea within a certain distance of shore, usually
two to four leagues, were considered violations of the
customs laws. For example, the act of breaking bulk within
two leagues of the shore, or the breaking of bulk and
transfer of goods from one vessel to another within four
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leagues of the shore were prohibited actions. The basis
of this prohibition was that such acts usually occurred
only as part of a smuggling operation. Likewise, vessels
holding customable goods not marked by customs officers,
found at anchor or hovering, that is, cruising off the
coast without proceeding on their voyage, would be subject
(46)
to seizure and condemnation of both the goods comprising
gl
the cargo and the vessel# Not only were the goods and
vessels subject to seizure, but a heavy fine was to be
assessed against toe vessel's captain for his part in toe
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smuggling operation#
The Exchequer Court dealt with application of
municipal law to customs violations, whether those
violations were in port or within toe defined statutory
distances into the coastal sea# When violations occurred
outside toe boundaries of counties, toe Exchequer Court
jurisdiction was applied prior to toe jurisdiction of the
Admiralty Court# Thus primary customs jurisdiction in
toe Exchequer Court eliminated any secondary jurisdiction
in the Admiralty Court* For example, if customable goods
were taken to sea without payment of toe duty, the customs
statutes were violated and ownership of toe goods was
forfeited so that they took on the nature of flotsam and
came within admiralty jurisdiction# But when duty had not
been paid on customable goods, toe Exchequer Court
jurisdiction was primary and existed over the goods from
toe comraenceraeiit of the voyage thereby excluding any
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secondary jurisdiction in the Admiralty Court. Therefore
the Earchequer Court held exclusive jurisdiction over
violations of the customs laws, which controlled toe flow
of goods into and out from the nation, regardless of where
(47)
they occurred. Such jurisdiction was not connected with
any ownership of the coastal seas because only goods
destined to enter the nation legally or illegally, and
not goods simply carried in innocent passage through
coastal waters, came within the jurisdiction of the customs
laws. Only those vessels involved in the proscribed
activities of hovering, breaking bulk, or transferring goods
within four leagues of the shore, or in other actions
directed against the national customs laws, came within
municipal law customs jurisdiction.
Application of the provisions of hovering acts for two
to four leagues into the coastal sea was an extension of
municipal law external to the nation on the basis of
jurisdiction designed to guard the integrity of municipal
law. Such protective jurisdiction was asserted by the
sovereign because the coastal waters were an area wherein
the municipal law would be evaded and subsequently violated
by the illegal entry into or exit from the nation of
proscribed goods as well as acceptable goods. Ihese customs
statutes presented the first instance when Great Britain
defined and delimited the extent of any national governmental
interest within an area of coastal water seaward to a specific
distance beyond low-water mark. Each instance of customs
legislation was based on the governmental need to regulate
activities on the coastal sea for the protection of municipal
(48)
law. Customs laws applied as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction accomplished that regulation. Without the
governmental need to protect the integrity of municipal
law there would have been no basis for an exercise of
jurisdiction upon the coastal sea which restricted high
seas freedoms such as navigation, or subjected foreign
nationals to municipal law upon the high seas. The
application of municipal customs statutes, restricting
high seas freedoms by searches and seizures, required that
the restriction be limited to a particular identifiable
governmental need of the littoral sovereign. Protection
of the municipal laws therefore was the governmental need
which allowed Great Britain to exercise the limited
protective jurisdiction over activities in the coastal seas
set out in the hovering acts.
Many examples of the activities resulting in prosecution
for violation of the customs laws appear in the Exchequer
Court Rolls. Several of these provide an insight into the
need of the national sovereign to exercise protective
jurisdiction on the coastal sea. One vessel was caught
illegally loading wine within four leagues of the coast
with the result that she was seized and both goods and
05
vessel were forfeited. A second vessel, The Endeavor,
was seized because she did not disclose to customs officials
an illegal cargo of proscribed goods, including muslin,
(49)
china and earthenware after reaching the first port in
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Great Britain. Hie goods on board The Endeavor had
been loaded at a foreign port, but at the trial the
Exchequer barons applied the customs regulation of loading
goods within four leagues of the coast to the voyage of
The Endeavor, because approaching a British port with such
goods was considered a continuing violation of the law
which lasted after entering the customs zone at a distance
of four leagues seaward from the coast enabling the
assertion of customs jurisdiction. A third vessel, the
Uffro Anna, was described in another case report as having
been "hovering within a port of this kingdom". That
hovering resulted in her seizure and forfeiture when she
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was discovered to have illegal goods on board. Two
other vessels were seized and forfeited; the Willing Mind
was discovered at anchor within two leagues of shore with
illegal goods in her hold, and the N. S. Concerio was caught
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in the act of smuggling rum. These seizures show that
the customs laws applied to the coastal sea were directed
at activities designed to evade the law and had no relation
to sovereignty or ownership of the coastal sea. In fact
the act of illegally loading goods within four leagues of
the coast was constructively applied to The Endeavor simply
as a means to describe when the intent, and the act,
directed at evasion of the municipal law would come within
(SO)
the customs law of Great Britain applied under an
exercise of protective jurisdiction.
Customs laws applied to all persons regardless of
citizenship. Because customs laws were penal in nature,
they appear to be a general application of municipal
criminal law over the coastal sea. However, the activities
to which the customs laws applied were not criminal because
they occurred within any general jurisdiction enabling their
classification as such. Rather the proscribed activities
were within the criminal jurisdiction because they were
directed at violation of municipal law within the national
boundaries. No territorial interest or ownership was
claimed over the coastal sea in order to support the
application of customs laws as a matter of general criminal
law. All that appears is that the sovereign's exercise of
protective jurisdiction over customs laws violations was to
control illegal smuggling activity aimed at avoidance of
municipal law. Enforcement of customs laws in coastal
waters was based on a strong awareness that the municipal
law could be flaunted within the boundaries of counties by
operations from the coastal sea using the very character of
the coastal sea as a highway to the shore• Vessels using
those shores for access to the nation with illegal goods
were therefore properly subject to municipal law as an
exercise of protective jurisdiction.
(51)
B# Protective Jurisdiction was the Basis for Exercise of
Admiralty Jurisdiction
Admiralty courts dealing with criminal offenses, civil
disputes, and matters of prize reflect the application of
admiralty jurisdiction as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction. The application of such admiralty
jurisdiction was a function of the sovereign1s power to
exercise protective jurisdiction and apply municipal law
to events occurring within the coastal sea and beyond#
Admiralty protective jurisdiction was not intended to be
an exercise whereby the sovereign would possess the coastal
sea. As with the jurisdiction exercised for customs laws,
admiralty law had no foundation in territorial or general
jurisdiction and was exercised solely for the protective
purpose of maintaining the public safety, order, peace
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and good government.
Admiralty jurisdiction was historically intertwined
with common law jurisdiction. In fact, a running
jurisdictional dispute kept admiralty judges and common
law judges at loggerheads for several centuries. The
disputes arose when the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction
intruded on the territorial jurisdiction of common law,
which was limited to the geographical area of the nation#
Among the main reasons why admiralty jurisdiction was
rebuffed by the common law courts was that admiralty
(52)
civil law, which was a rival, although sometimes more
desirable, body of law. Thus, exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction tended to encroach on common law subject-
matter jurisdiction on inland coastal waters within the
bodies of counties, that is, within the nation. As a
result common law courts took every opportunity to gain
exclusive cognizance of matters arising within maritime
areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the common
law, such as ports, harbors, havens, arms of the sea and
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navigable rivers.
Admiralty jurisdiction was by nature a subject-matter
jurisdiction concerned with matters having a maritime
"essence". That subject-matter jurisdiction of admiralty
law was restricted to events occurring on the seas outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the common law. But
admiralty*s application of subject-matter jurisdiction
to events and dealings having a maritime essence, that is,
directly affecting maritime matters, presents an excellent
example of protective jurisdiction exercised without any
element of ownership of or general jurisdiction over the sea,
1, Jurisdiction of the Instance Admiralty Court, —
The Admiralty Court when applying its instance jurisdiction
took cognizance of all events, exclusive of criminal acts
and prize matters, having the essential maritime nature,
(53)
Thus the Admiralty Court under instance jurisdiction, held
subject-matter jurisdiction in all civil suits arising from
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"all Sea-faring, and in all Sea-faring Causes".
The Admiralty Court was a desirable forum for plaintiffs,
often more attractive than common law courts, because of
the advantage of being able to prosecute a cause of action
by proceeding directly against a vessel through use of a
libel in rem. Such suits to a large extent involved matters
which were based in contract and tort. Suits in tort
usually pertained to damage to cargo, vessels, and persons
while suits in contract usually pertained to seamen's wages
and hypothecation bonds.
The application of admiralty jurisdiction to suits in
contract and in tort must be examined In light of admiralty's
jurisdictional relationship to common law. Generally, (hiring
the seventeenth century if it appeared that admiralty
jurisdiction could be eliminated, the common law courts
would issue a "prohibition" preventing the admiralty courts
72from continuing to hold jurisdiction of the suit. Such
interaction between the admiralty courts and the common law
courts is important to this analysis because it will
demonstrate that the Admiralty Court applied a subject-matter
jurisdiction founded upon the exercise of protective
jurisdiction rather than on general jurisdiction over the
coastal sea based on its inherent appurtenance to national
territory or ownership by the littoral sovereign.
(54)
Suit© in contract possibly involve the most confusing
assertion of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction* Thus,
such suits required that contracts not dealing with
furtherance of a voyage , and therefore non-maritime in
nature, be distinguished from contracts which were for the
furtherance of a voyage ami therefore having an essence
or nature which was maritime. The test to determine whether
admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction applied to a contract
was to ascertain whether the purpose of the contract was
for the furtherance of a voyage. Even if a contract was
signed and sealed on land within the territorial jurisdiction
of the common law courts, admiralty law subject-matter
jurisdiction over matters for the furtherance of a voyage
and having a maritime essence was so strong as to exclude
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common law subject-matter jurisdiction.
Bottomry bonds and hypothecations are perhaps the best
examples of contracts the essence of which was maritime.
In a bottomry bond contract the vessel's master in effect
pledged the keel of the vessel for the value of repairs and
supplies required in the course of a voyage and absolutely
necessary to continue the voyage• Similarly, in an
hypothecation contract the master pledged the vessel for
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the repairs or supplies. The vessel's master could give
a bottomry bond or hypothecate a vessel only outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the common law. Within the
<55)
territorial jurisdiction of the common law die vessel was
not considered to be on a voyage, and repairs done to the
vessel or supplies obtained for her therefore could not
be necessary to the continuation of a voyage. Because
such a contract could not be for the continuation of a
voyage it failed to have the maritime nature or essence
which was required for application of admiralty subject-
matter jurisdiction. Further, when credit was extended
to the vessel*© master within the territorial jurisdiction
of the common law, the common law subject-matter jurisdiction
was asserted over the contract by describing it as one of
personal obligation first, with security in the collateral
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second. Admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction required
a contract with a maritime essence or nature, and without
that maritime essence no subject-matter jurisdiction could
be raised to rebut such characterisation of the contract
bringing it within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
common law,
When goods were purchased for a vessel in a foreign
port which were not required by necessity for the voyage,
the contract was not one of hypothecation and lacked the
maritime nature essential for admiralty subject-matter
jurisdiction. Initially, although such contracts did not
have a maritime nature, common law courts did not have
jurisdiction over such foreign contracts, that is, contracts
(56)
made "beyond seas", because they were made outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the common law# Later, by
pleading locus of the contract as within one of the
counties of the realm, common law courts were able to
assert subject-matter jurisdiction over such contracts#
By the eighteenth century, when common law had assumed
full subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign contracts,
any attempt by the admiralty courts to assert jurisdiction
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was met with issuance of a writ of prohibition.
Charter party contracts, as well as contracts for
insurance, are also examples of agreements where maritime
matters were involved, but the essence of the contract was
not maritime in nature# Still another example occurred
when the admiralty courts required a majority group of
owners to post a bond for the security of a vessel when
the minority group of owners protested against sending
the vessel on a hazardous voyage# This posting of bond
was for the furtherance of a voyage, but the enforcement
was not. Attempts made to enforce these bonds in the
Admiralty Court under instance jurisdiction, usually in
order to avoid a jury trial, were met by common law courts
jealous of their jurisdiction# Therefore, prohibitions
were issued against attempts by the admiralty courts to
enforce these bonds. Common law courts obtained
jurisdiction to enforce such bonds by denying admiralty
(57)
subject-matter jurisdiction, and asserting common law
subject-matter jurisdiction thereby allowing an action
on the case if the vessel was lost. Admiralty subject-
matter jurisdiction was not applicable to enforcement of
these contracts because enforcement was not essential to
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the furtherance of a voyage.
Suits by seamen for wages present an example where
the admiralty courts and the common law courts held
concurrent jurisdiction. Seamen were obviously essential
to furtherance of any voyage, indeed their wages were
earned by furthering the voyage. So on the one hand
admiralty law allowed seamen a remedy for wages owed, in
rem against the vessel on which they sailed. That remedy
was allowed because of the maritime nature of their work.
And on the other hand common law allowed the seamen a
remedy by subjecting the vessel owner to liability in
personam on the basis of the employment contract. Common
law courts could thus describe the seamen's employment
contract as within common law subject-matter jurisdiction.
By so doing a common law court could then issue a writ of
prohibition against any attempt by the Admiralty Court to
assert jurisdiction over such contract. The justification
for issuance of a writ of prohibition was that the attempted
assertion of admiralty jurisdiction was in derogation of
substantive contract rights under common law. However,
(58)
most times common law courts did not issue prohibitions
because it was perceived that admiralty courts were
beneficial to seamen. One benefit was that admiralty law
allowed seamen to proceed directly against a vessel,
thereby eliminating the need to find an elusive owner.
Another benefit was that the admiralty courts allowed
class suits which enabled the crew to sue for wages at a
time when most sailors could not have afforded to bring
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suit individually.
By the eighteenth century the jurisdictional dispute
between the admiralty courts and the common law courts
quieted. Hie common law courts then interfered with
application of admiralty law only when the action of the
admiralty court appeared to infringe upon common law
subject-matter jurisdiction and thus affect rights created
and protected by substantive common law. Therefore a
prohibition would be issued against the admiralty courts
when they entertained suits for seamen's wages which were
under seal or which deviated from accepted maritime
standards by inclusion of special agreements which involved
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substantive common law rights.
This analysis reveals that only contracts which
contained the essential maritime nature came within the
exclusive subject-matter of admiralty instance jurisdiction.
Hie place where the contract was negotiated, signed, or
(59)
performed had a bearing on whether the contract would be
allocated to either admiralty or common law subject-matter
jurisdiction only insofar as it affected the nature of the
contract. Once the maritime essence or nature of the
contract was identified, the admiralty subject-matter
jurisdiction applied and was not affected by the location
of the parties to the contract within the territorial
jurisdiction of common law. For example, if a vessel were
hypothecated on the high seas or in a foreign port out of
necessity of the voyage, the vessel could be libeled in
rem when later found within the boundaries of a county
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regardless of common law territorial jurisdiction. The
negotiation, signature, and performance all tended to
establish a maritime nature in the contract but hypothecation
due to the necessity of the voyage gave the contract the
maritime essence which allowed the admiratly court to hold
continuing jurisdiction.
Matters of contract which were not initially within
the subject-matter of the Admiralty Courts instance
jurisdiction, such as a crewman's or a shipwright1 s claim
for the value of work done within the boundaries of counties,
remained within the subject-matter jurisdiction of common
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law. At one time even contracts without a maritime essence
entered into "beyond seas" were within the jurisdiction of
the admiralty court because the contract had a foreign locus
<60)
and was therefore not within common law territorial
Jurisdiction# Later the use of fictional pleading brought
such contract® within territorial Jurisdiction of the common
law courts so that they could be allocated to common law
subject-matter jurisdiction. Clearly this allocation
points to the fact that the only territorial Jurisdiction
involved was that of the common law# It appears therefore,
that as to matters arising in contract the instance
Jurisdiction applied on the basis of personal Jurisdiction
over the parties or their property which thereby enabled
the court to proceed on the libel and grant the appropriate
relief, there was no general jurisdiction or claim of
ownership over the high seas which sustained application
of admiralty Jurisdiction#
When this analysis of Jurisdiction is applied to suits
In tort the same result is reached, and admiralty
Jurisdiction clearly appears to be a subject-matter
jurisdiction which was not dependent on any general
Jurisdiction over or ownership of the sea# Torts having
a maritime nature or essence were within the subject-matter
of admiralty instance Jurisdiction* Torts differed from
contracts only in feat the territorial jurisdiction of
common law immediately determined which torts would be
considered to be of a maritime nature. For example, a
tort situation such as collision between two vessels on a
<61)
navigable river was not considered to be within admiralty
subject-iaatter jurisdiction because a river was infra
corpus cocgaitatis» that is, within projecting headlands
and thus within the body of a county# For admiralty
subject-matter jurisdiction to apply the vessel must have
reached the high seas before it would be considered to
have begun its voyage and the seaward boundaries of
counties separated the high seas from inland waters#
Thus it was only when the event of the collision occurred
on the high seas beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the common law, outside the body of a county, that a
collision would have the maritime, nature necessary to come
within the subject-matter of admiralty instance jurisdiction
Usually torts involving damages to persons, cargo or
vessels caused in the course of a voyage on the high seas
come within the admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction.
Tortious damage to persons, cargo or vessels while not on
the high seas In the course of a voyage came under common
law subject-matter jurisdiction, solely because the tort
occurred within the common law territorial jurisdiction#
Personal injury and other torts not resulting from
navigation of the vessel but occurring on the high seas,
were treated the same way as charter party contracts, that
is, as being connected with maritime matters by happenstance
and therefore not within the subject-matter of admiralty
(62)
instance jurisdiction. For example, assault and battery
on the high seas came under caramon law subject-matter
jurisdiction# The exercise of common law subject-matter
jurisdiction over such a case was achieved by a fictional
description of the locus of the incident as within a county
thereby giving the common law courts a basis on which to
assert territorial jurisdiction on the face of the
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pleading.
Analysis of matters in tort reveals continuing
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court when a tort with a
maritime essence occurred outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the common law, and the parties or vessel
subsequently entered within that territorial jurisdiction#
Thus a vessel becoming derelict on the high seas was within
admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction for the damages it
might cause while adrift# Such a vessel remained within
admiralty jurisdiction after causing damage even if it
drifted within common law territorial jurisdiction. In
contrast, if a vessel became derelict in a port, or otherwise
within the body of a county, the common law had subject-
matter and territorial jurisdiction. So a vessel at anchor
infra corpus commitatis was not within the subject-matter
of admiralty instance jurisdiction for damage caused after
becoming derelict and drifting into other vessels# For
torts occurring outside the boundaries of counties having a
(G3)
maritime essence or nature an arrest could be made of the
vessel throu^E* a libel In rm» For torts caused within
territorial jurisdiction of common law the obligation was
personal and against the vessel owner, although the vessel
could also be seised and attached for the value of the
damage.
What this analysis demonstrates, about the interaction
between admiralty and common law subject-matter jurisdictions
over torts and contracts, is that the territorial jurisdiction
of the common law was often the determining factor as to
which subject-matter jurisdiction governed. The caramon
law territorial jurisdiction in effect became the test for
"raaritimcness" when the event or contract did not occur
on the high seas with some essential connection to the
conduct of a voyage. Further, while the subject-matter
of admiralty instance jurisdiction was not limited by
territory as was common law jurisdiction, concomitantly
admiralty jurisdiction did not have the advantage of a
territorial basis to determine what matters would come
within its subject-matter jurisdiction.
Admiralty subject-matter .jurisdiction applied to
citizens, as well as to all those whose conduct brought
them within the Admiralty Court's power to assert instance
jurisdiction over them or their property# The in rem
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court required only that the
(64)
property arrested be within the power of the sovereign
to exercise jurisdiction# Hi is analysis has established
that no ownership of or general jurisdiction in the sea or
coastal sea was indicated by the exercise of jurisdiction
/j
in application of the instance subject-matter jurisdiction
of the Admiralty Court,which jurisdiction was protective in
nature.
2. Admiralty Court criminal jurisdiction. — During
the seventeenth century and eighteenth century criminal
activities came within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Court when a commission was issued to that Court under the
great seal. Such commission conferred criminal
jurisdiction on the court. Hie crimes included within that
jurisdiction involved offenses committed on the high seas
outside the boundaries of counties. But admiralty criminal
jurisdiction was a subject-matter jurisdiction which also
extended into harbors, havens, ports, arms of the sea, and
navigable rivers below the first bridges. At this time
the criminal jurisdiction exercised by the Admiralty Court
in those maritime coastal areas, within the boundaries of
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counties, was limited to acts of murder and mayhem#
Beyond the boundaries of counties, seventeenth century
and eighteenth century admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction
was exclusive over crimes having a maritime essence or
nature, particularly over acts of piracy. Within the
boundaries of counties admiralty criminal jurisdiction was
<65)
restricted by the same jurisdictional dispute with the
common law that limited the Admiralty Court instance
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jurisdiction to things done upon the sea. Hie
restriction in criminal matters was achieved by slow
elimination of the exclusivity of admiralty jurisdiction.
Ihus, in Lacy's Case a murder committed on the submerged
foreshore in 1583 was within the exclusive subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court because the common
law territorial jurisdiction, at that time, had not been
able to assert a superior common law subject-matter
jurisdiction. By the eighteenth century, common law
territorial jurisdiction enabled the county coroner to
investigate deaths in these areas where formerly admiralty
criminal jurisdiction had been exclusive of any common law
subject-matter jurisdiction. In fact, when a death occurred
aboard a man-of-war anchored in Portsmouth harbor in 1738,
a criminal information was issued against the vessel's
captain for refusing the coroner access to investigate the
incident#®^
Common law territorial jurisdiction also allowed the
common law to characterise criminal acts which constituted
acts of piracy as felonies and thus assert subject-matter
jurisdiction over these acts within the bodies of counties.
Thus if a man died within a county, regardless of the fact
that the fatal wound had been received on the high seas,
(66)
the coroner could investigate the death# The coroner*s
power in such a situation was founded upon the common law
conception of murder, which placed the locus of the crime
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where the man died and not where the wound was received.
In case of goods taken by pirates, the Admiralty
Court held jurisdiction over such goods when initially
taken by piratical act, and later when brought ashore these
goods remained within admiralty criminal jurisdiction.
Because piracy was a crime of a maritime nature, goods
taken by pirates took on the maritime nature of the crime.
As a result, the Admiralty Court had the initial jurisdiction
over the goods and the common law courts could not intervene
when the goods came within common law territorial jurisdiction.
If, subsequent to landing, the goods were sold in a market
overt the common law would assert its subject-matter
jurisdiction to protect property rights created by its
substantive law when such a sale occurred. When goods were
taken by pirates within maritime areas of counties, such as
the River Thames, common law courts would assert jurisdiction
over the property and the crime through characterization of
the act taking the goods as a felony. Any attempt by the
Admiralty Court to assert jurisdiction over these goods
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would result in the issuance of a prohibition.
Therefore acts which would constitute the crime of
piracy if committed on the high seas when coimnitted within
(67)
the boundaries of counties were treated as felonies or
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as acts of high treason. When tried as felonies or as
acts of high treason such criminal activities again
demonstrate the common law territorial jurisdiction being
used to define common law subject-matter jurisdiction and
thereby reducing application of admiralty subject-raatter
jurisdiction. The result was that the common law, by
constant pressure against exclusive admiralty criminal
jurisdiction in maritime areas within the bodies of counties,
was able to restrict admiralty jurisdiction over criminal
subject-matter within those areas.
The coimnon law courts applied criminal subject-matter
jurisdiction within the geographical area of the nation.
Common law criminal jurisdiction was a general jurisdiction
based on territory and therefore applied to all persons
regardless of citizenship, and regardless of the
citizenship of the victim or owner of the property receiving
injury from the criminal act. Therefore common law
applied its criminal jurisdiction not only to citizens, but
to all persons who had sufficient contact with the
national territory and laws of the sovereign to allow
personal jurisdiction to be asserted over them. For
example, common law applied to the aliens residing within
the realm, or traversing the national territory. Aside
from the personal jurisdiction which could be forcibly
(68)
asserted over aliens within the national territory, such
aliens were considered to be under an obligation of "local
obedience" which supplied the justification for application
of municipal law to them# By the theory of "local
obedience" aliens coming within a nation were under the
protection of the laws of that nation and could be
prosecuted for violation of the law from which they
benefited,^
Admiralty criminal jurisdiction, however, was not based
on territory| and although not a general criminal
jurisdiction, it applied to citizens and non-citizens♦ The
distinction is that admiralty criminal jurisdiction was
applied on the basis of protective jurisdiction exercised
by the sovereign which required that some criminal act be
directed against the nation, its citizens, or their property.
One example of an act on the high seas against the sovereign
which brought the offender within the exercise of protective
admiralty jurisdiction was the failure of an alien to give
the flag salute to the King's vessels in the narrow seas.
Requirement of such flag salute was historically an act of
protective jurisdiction enabling the King's vessels to
determine the nature of the saluting vessel, although in
the seventeenth century it involved claims of ownership of
the sea. Thus enemies and pirates slowing to give the
salute would presumably be discovered, and those fleeing
the salute were presumably pirates or enemies. There is no
(69)
evidence that the flag salute was ever given as an
acknowledgement of ownership, general jurisdiction, or
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sovereignty over the sea or coastal sea.
Generally, aliens became subject to admiralty criminal
jurisdiction in two instances. First, aliesis could commit
crimes on board a British vessel while proceeding on a
voyage outside the boundaries of counties. Vessels flying
the British flag were thought to be within admiralty
jurisdiction through the legal fiction that vessels were
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extensions of the sovereigns territory outside the nation,
but not subject to the territorial jurisdiction of common
law because they were beyond the boundaries of counties.
Criminal jurisdiction applied to these vessels met the
requirements of territorial jurisdiction in that it was
general, effective and exclusive, but to characterize a
vessel as territory was an egregious legal fiction. The
jurisdiction over vessels outside the boundaries of
counties was actually an exercise of protective jurisdiction
by the sovereign based on citizenship of the owners and
crew for the safety, order, peace, and good government of
the vessel, its crew, passengers and cargo. Aliens,
through their contact with the vessel, were under the
authority exercised by the sovereign under the exercise of
protective jurisdiction applying municipal law.
In three cases of murder on British vessels in 1709,
1799 and 1806, the sovereign exercised protective
(70)
jurisdiction under admiralty criminal jurisdiction to try
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the offenders for murder. In all three cases both the
victim and the murderer were aliens. The reason for
application of municipal law by the exercise of such
protective jurisdiction was that the national sovereign's
interest in preserving public tranquility and security
on the vessels of its citizens was violated by the criminal
acts of the aliens. The contact with the British vessel
provided the basis for application of the admiralty
criminal jurisdiction over the offending aliens. The test
for application of that admiralty criminal jurisdiction to
aliens was not based on the fiction of the vessels being
an extension of the sovereign's territory. Rather
disruptive contact with national governmental interests
of the sovereign in maintaining safety, order, peace and
good government was sufficient to apply municipal law to
these activities. Such application of admiralty criminal
jurisdiction was especially necessary as an exercise of
*
protective jurisdiction when damage caused by the criminal
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act was inflicted upon a citizen.
Second, acts of piracy subjected aliens to admiralty
criminal law; acts of piracy even when perpetrated by one
alien on another far from the shores of Great Britain were
within the admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction. The
reason that all pirates were subject to the exercise of
(71)
protective jurisdiction was because they were considered
to be the enemies of all nations. Piracy was an
international criminal offense and the courts of all
nations, as an exercise of protective jurisdiction, had
criminal subject-matter jurisdiction over them. The
protective jurisdiction exercised by the sovereign was
exercised for the benefit of all persons, aliens as well
98
as citizens. No other sovereign would be offended by the
exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over pirates, and
such jurisdiction was totally in keeping with the law of
nations but unrelated to any claim of ownership over the
high seas.
The international nature of the crime of piracy, and
its international suppression through the exercise of
protective jurisdiction by the community of nations,
support the position that national exercise of jurisdiction
over pirates was without any territorial basis. Thus,
while under municipal law acts of piracy were within the
admiralty criminal subject-matter jurisdiction, only
personal jurisdiction over the offenders was required to
bring the pirates to trial. After conviction for piracy,
all admiralty courts holding a commission to try criminal
offenders were empowered not only to execute such offenders
but also to confiscate their property which was located
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within the area of the court's authority,
Piratical acts by citizens, or aliens owing the duty
(72)
of "local obedience", were also acts of high treason#
Between the conflicting jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Court and the common law courts, if the act of piracy was
committed by one not a citizen or not owing a duty of
"local obedience" the offender could not be tried at
common law for high treason# In such situation the common
law had no territorial or general jurisdiction over the
offense and no personal or citizenship jurisdiction over
the offender# therefore the isolated crime of piracy on the
high seas did not come within the common law subject-matter
jurisdiction over acts constituting high treason# In
contrast, when acts of piracy were committed by a citizen,
or one owing the duty of "local obedience", there first
could be a trial for high treason# If the accused was
acquitted, he could then be tried by the Admiralty Court
for piracy because acquittal on the charge of high treason
was not dispositive of the elements of the crime of piracy#
However, where an offender was tried by the Admiralty Court
and acquitted on the charge of piracy, he could not then be
tried for high treason because the subject-matter
jurisdiction had been destroyed by removal of the treasonable
offense #*^ Common law did not need territorial jurisdiction
to assert its subject-matter jurisdiction where citizenship
was present, or where the alien owed the duty of "local
obedience", because in those cases there was a continuing
personal jurisdiction over the offenders# Thus the
(73)
application of common law to try an offender for high
treason does not support any claim of ownership to the
high seas and was simply based on citizenship
jurisdiction, an accepted precept of international law.
Admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction over acts of
piracy arose from the maritime nature of the criminal
act. The consistent thread for admiralty subject-matter
jurisdiction in criminal cases is therefore identical
with that in tort and contract. Thus admiralty
jurisdiction included criminal acts when the act interfered
with a voyage on the high seas or otherwise outside the
bodies of counties, or with some other matter arising from
and dependent upon a voyage. An example is presented by
the practice of seizing a vessel and holding her for
ransom, or taking her captain or a crewman as hostage for
ransom. Such acts as the seizure of vessels and taking
of hostages for ransom were acts of piracy and triable
as such. However, ransom ordinarily would not have a
maritime nature but it gained such a maritime nature when
the hostage entered captivity in order to ransom the ship.
Therefore because of the ransom to further the voyage the
hostage was accorded a remedy in admiralty law against
the vessel, an action in rem, in an amount up to the value
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of his ransom.
In the sixteenth century, common law courts forced
(74)
enactment of a statute which required the Admiralty
Court to adopt common law rules when trying pirates#
The reason for the statutory imposition of common law
rules on the Admiralty Court was due to frequent failure
of the admiralty courts to obtain convictions of pirates
under civil law procedures. Those procedures required a
confession, or the testimony of two witnesses for
conviction. Needless to say, pirates seldom gave
voluntary confessions and witnesses were difficult to
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find after a piratical attack. Nevertheless, the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court was not
affected by imposition of such common law rules, and that
jurisdiction continued to be applied as an exercise of
protective jurisdiction.
In the eighteenth century a statute was enacted which
eliminated the need to return pirates to Great Britain
for trial. Commissions were then issued to vice-admiralty
courts in the colonies. As a result trials of pirates
pursuant to the commissions were moved from Great Britain
to any of the colonial vice-admiralty courts. Beyond the
nation the common law rules did not apply to admiralty
criminal proceedings and the trials were held according
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to the traditional civil law procedure. It Is clear
therefore that the statutes which constricted admiralty
jurisdiction, or directed the procedural rules to be
(75)
applied in certain instances, had no affect upon the
application of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction as
an exercise under the national protective jurisdiction.
Moreover, the purpose of extending commissions to colonial
vice-admiralty courts was not to restrict the application
of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather to
facilitate the trial of pirates by eliminating the long
journey back to Britain. Trial of pirates in the colonies,
as well as In the nation, was pursuant to an exercise of
protective jurisdiction by the national sovereign to ensure
safety, order, peace and good government. In fact,
admiralty court jurisdiction over pirates was always a
subject-matter jurisdiction, applied as an exercise of
protective jurisdiction. The only territorial jurisdiction
which might be involved was that of common law, but then
the act of piracy was tried as a felony when committed
within the nation or capable of being construed as an act
of high treason as was described earlier.
Apparently at one time the Admiralty Court claimed
jurisdiction over all vessels and persons within the
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narrow seas around England, Such jurisdiction was never
based on territory or ownership of the seas. The admiral's
subject-matter jurisdiction was always applied on the
basis of an exercise of protective jurisdiction. In the
seventeenth century such protective jurisdiction was
extended beyond the narrow seas by the attempts of James I
(76)
and Charles I to assert an exclusive ownership right over
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high seas fisheries. But during the seventeenth
century, even in the Stuart era, and eighteenth century
it is certain that criminal jurisdiction as applied to
aliens required some interference with the integrity of
the sovereign's law, or on the sovereign's citizens or
their property. As the attempt by Stuart kings to claim
exclusive rights in the high seas fishery faded, admiralty
criminal jurisdiction in the late seventeenth century, as
well as in the eighteenth century, became primarily
concerned with the activities of pirates. The assertion
of criminal jurisdiction over pirates or over those in
some way harming the sovereign, its citizens or their
goods, was never abandoned with the Stuart claims of
property in high seas fisheries, nor was it ever limited
by territorial boundaries to any sea or distance into the
sea, especially to the sea adjacent to the coast,
3, Admiralty Prize Court jurisdiction, —• The Admiralty
Court held exclusive prize jurisdiction, which was a subject-
matter jurisdiction over all goods and vessels taken from
an enemy in time of war, or by authority of letters of
marque. The only prerequisite to be met before coming under
this court's subject-matter jurisdiction seemed to be that a
naval force take the prize. Even when such force operated
by land and seized real property, as long as the seizure was
<77)
performed by a naval force the issue of the validity of
the taking was properly within the subject-matter of
admiralty prise jurisdiction.*^
Condemnation of a vessel, cargo, or other res as a
prise by the Admiralty Court affixed validity to the act
of taking such goods so that the taking was not open to
being prosecuted as an act of piracy# When a vessel or
goods were captured from the enemy the only property
interest to change, at the time of taking and before the
Admiralty Prize Court condemned the res, was that of the
enemy. Hie enemy's property over the res ceased as of the
time of capture. After condemnation of the res as prize,
the property rights to the res vested in the captors and
any conflict among the captors over moiety property
interests to the res were brought in proceedings at common
law. Similarly a suit by the former owners of the res
for wrongfully condemning the res as prize was brought
against the captors as a suit in trover at common law.
An exception to common law jurisdiction over such property
right disputes occurred when the condemnation proceedings
included the property disputes under ancillary or appendant
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jurisdiction of Admiralty Court prize jurisdiction.
For the most part the common law courts would try to
assert jurisdiction over property disputes about prize,
that is, the captured res. The common law Interest in such
(78)
property disputes was that the property rights of captors
were a matter of substantive common law once the prize
108
was declared to be validly taken. But in matters of
prize, even the common law territorial jurisdiction, which
usually served to bring matters within the common law
subject-matter jurisdiction, could not characterize the
taking as within that common law subject-matter jurisdiction
in order to dislodge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
Admiralty Prize Court.
Goods and vessels coming within the admiralty prize
jurisdiction remained within that jurisdiction even if
landed and sold. The only basis for a common law court
to obtain jurisdiction over the prize goods, before the
prize was declared valid, was when such goods were sold
by the captors in a market overt. Such a sale created a
change of property interest and allowed the common law
courts to assert subject-matter jurisdiction and issue
writs of prohibition to the Admiralty Court. The
prohibition was to prevent admiralty law from infringing
the substantive common law theory which accorded vested
rights of property to purchasers of goods in market overt.
Thus the common law courts continued to consistently
prevent the admiralty courts from acting contrary to the
vested rights of citizens which were created by statutes
or established by substantive principles of common law.
(79)
When possible, the common law would allow only its legal
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theories to establish property rights over a res.
The Admiralty Court applying prize jurisdiction was
a municipal court, though its subject-matter jurisdiction
was distinct from that of Admiralty Court instance
jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction. Like the other
admiralty jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Court over matters in prize depended on the sovereign's
exercise of protective jurisdiction. The body of law
which the Admiralty Court applied under the exercise of
that protective jurisdiction was an international prize
law, similar to that which was being applied by the prize
courts of other nations. As a municipal court, the
Admiralty Court was subject to the sovereign's interest
in enforcing municipal law. Thus, although international
law was applied by the Admiralty Court in matters of prize,
that application was constrained in that it could not avoid
requirements of municipal law. ^ However, this constraint
required only that the Admiralty Court, when dealing with
prize law not act in derogation of municipal law. It was
merely a requirement of protective jurisdiction so that
application of essentially international law would not harm
the national interest in the integrity of municipal lav?.
A point which tends to confuse the issue of general
jurisdiction over or ownership of the coastal sea is that
(80)
no vessel could be condemned as prize which was captured
in neutral waters. Neutral waters were merely areas of
the coastal sea, such as the King's Chambers, where a
littoral sovereign exerted protective jurisdiction to
prevent hostile actions which would endanger citizens and
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their property. By refusing to condemn vessels
captured in such neutral waters as valid prize, the
Admiralty Court did not recognize any ownership of, or
general jurisdiction over the coastal sea area which had
been declared neutral. What was recognized by such
declaration of neutral waters was the international law
right and obligation of a neutral littoral sovereign to
protect its coastal sea from potentially harmful hostilities
by vessels of other nations against its own citizens and
aliens with whom the littoral sovereign was at peace.
This right and obligation to enforce neutrality under
international law was superior to the interest of citizens
or foreign nationals in allocating property rights to
goods and vessels taken from enemies. As a consequence,
the rule adopted internationally was that no property
right would be vested by prize courts in the captors of
vessels which were captured in neutral waters. That rule
was a matter of protective jurisdiction and did not
acknowledge or claim ownership of or general jurisdiction
over the neutral waters.
(31)
C, Summary, Chapter II
Elizabeth I had described the admiralty jurisdiction
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as one of things foreign as well as maritime. But
that admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction was eventually
limited to things maritime, and only to things foreign
which could not be brought before the common law courts
by alleging a fictional locus of the matter within a
county. When the admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction
began to encroach on the subject-matter jurisdiction of
common law, admiralty courts were restricted by statute
to "things done upon the sea", A further enactment removed
wreck and all matters arising within the bodies of counties
whether by land or water, from admiralty jurisdiction.
Also, the admiral#s criminal jurisdiction on navigable
rivers was to extend no further than the first bridge. By
these enactments the common law courts were able to limit
admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction to things maritime
and to characterize matters within the maritime areas of
counties so as to bring them within common law, not admiralty
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subject-matter jurisdiction.
Restriction of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction
by common law territorial jurisdiction Indicates that,
while admiralty Jurisdiction was concerned with matters of
maritime essence, the occurrence of such matters on the
sea merely raised a presumption of their maritime essence.
(82)
That presumption was not based on any theory of right of
general jurisdiction over or ownership of the sea* In
contrast, common law subject-matter jurisdiction relied
on general territorial jurisdiction in the maritime areas
of counties which enabled characterization of matters
occurring there as being without a maritime essence, thus
negating the presumption*
The jurisdiction of the admiralty courts was therefore
similar to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Exchequer
Court in customs matters* Because there was no ownership
of or right of general jurisdiction over the coastal sea,
the littoral national sovereign exercised only that subject-
matter jurisdiction which was required because of national
protective need# The basis of application of such subject-
matter jurisdiction by both the Exchequer Court and the
various admiralty jurisdictions has been shown by analysis
to be protective in nature#
(83)
CHAPTER III
Seventeenth Century And Eighteenth Century Exercise
Of Jurisdiction In The Coastal Sea From
The Perspective Of International Law
This chapter applies the possession standard and
protective jurisdiction analysis in an examination of
seventeenth century and eighteenth century writings in
International law by British experts and experts of other
nations on national interests in the sea. That analysis
is also applied to actual state practice concerning
ownership of or general jurisdiction over the sea by
examining the terms of treaties to which Great Britain
was a signatory# This analysis is presented to demonstrate
that as a matter of international law, ignoring the rhetoric
of the Stuarts, notably Charles I, legally there was only a
British claim to the right to exercise protective
jurisdiction on the high seas external to the nation#
A# Works of Seventeenth Century and Eighteenth Century
Jurists Describing International Law on the Possession of
the Sea
John Selden published Mare Clausula in 1635 under his
own signature at the behest of Charles I# Charles I
(84)
intended to use the book as support for his claim of
possession over wide areas of ocean. This work and its
projected use were aimed at opposing Hugo Grotius'
scholarly work entitled Mare Liberusu which was written
in 1609 to support Dutch contentions to the effect that
the sea was incapable of possession. These two views
were elaborated upon and attacked for the remainder of
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the seventeenth century. But neither attack nor
elaboration affected the basic propositions of either
work, with the result that near the end of the seventeenth
century the two views were merged in the concept of
possession of the coastal sea for limited governmental
purposes through the exercise of national jurisdiction of
a protective nature from shore.
Many eminent eighteenth century experts in international
law discussed the activities carried out on the high seas,
such as fishing and commerce. The municipal bodies of law
applied to those activities have been shown to have been
applied through exercises of protective jurisdiction.
Contemporary international law experts also saw municipal
law being applied over activities on the coastal sea as an
exercise of jurisdiction with a protective nature. For
example Barbeyrac, Bynkershoek, Valin, and especially Wolff,
agreed that jurisdiction exercised beyond the coastal sea
would fail to create possession of the high seas. Analysis
(85)
reveals that the jurisdiction which they considered as
properly exercised upon the high seas was protective in
nature. These eighteenth century jurists also formulated
the theory of limited possession of the coastal sea in
accord with the analytical concept of protective
jurisdiction. Views of both seventeenth century and
eighteenth century writers are examined at this point in
order to isolate what national interests international
law came to recognize as acceptable when developed in the
high seas and maintained through the exercise of protective
jurisdiction,
1• Seventeenth century treatises. — Hie first jurist
to assert that the Crown held the seabed by prerogative
right, as a matter of municipal law, was Thomas Digges
in 1569, Digges wrote in support of the Crown's
attempt to claim ownership of the foreshore around England.
To bolster the proposition of Crown ownership of the
foreshore Digges advanced the theory that the Crown held
the seabed and the sea by prerogative right, and therefore
by its intimate connection with the seabed the foreshore
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also came within the prerogative right. Apparently the
Crown did not claim ownership as a matter of international
law, and allocation of property rights in the sea and
seabed by prerogative right was only a matter of municipal
law providing the Crown with a prior right in newly emerged
(86)
lands*
Later, in the seventeenth century, Robert Callis
followed Bigges* theory of foreshore ownership* Writing
in 1622 Call is evolved that ownership into a prerogative
property right, that is, a proprietary right to new
islands and waste land, as well as a general property
interest in the bed of the sea* Callis reasoned that the
Crown could be seised of the sea and seabed because under
municipal law only a view of part of the real property was
required to pass ownership* This partial view of the real
property was sufficient to pass even submerged lands
when the superjacent water could be viewed* Thus, there
was no need to view the seabed when the sea was viewed
with the intent to take possession of both the sea and the
seabed* However, there is no indication that Callis
understood the sea to be owned by the Crown as a matter
of international iaw**"^
For Callis, the prerogative property right over the
sea formed the basis for the ancient prerogative right to
wreck, royal fish, flotsam, jetsam, and ligan* These
lesser proprietary interests arising under prerogative
right were maintained by the exercise of jurisdiction by
the sovereign which enabled the admiral to exercise
jurisdiction over objects found in the sea. Because the
prerogative proprietary rights were enforced by jurisdiction
(87)
exercised under authority of the sovereign, Callis
reasoned that proprietary rights coupled with sovereign
presence through such exercise of jurisdiction must mean
that the sea and seabed were infra regnum Angliae and
thus held by the Crown prerogative right# The same
prerogative property right to the seabed was then offered
by Callis as the basis for Crown ownership of seabed and
soil of the seabed which might be cast up and become
foreshore, waste land, or a new island#*"** ^
Earlier analysis by use of the possession standard
established that the Crown property right to an object
or resource within the coastal sea accrued under
prerogative right only when that object was appropriated
or a resource was extracted* Moreover, that analysis brought
out that allocation of property rights by the Crown through
franchises to royalties was controlled by the exercise of
protective jurisdiction# Analysis by the possession
standard, when applied to Callis* attempt to bring the sea
and seabed infra regnum Angliae * causes his argument to
fail by the limited nature of his purpose in making that
argument • Thus, Call is wrote not to claim possession and
ownership of the sea for the Crown as a matter of international
law, but to support the jurisdiction for the Commissioner
of Sewers over the foreshore, waste lands and other lands
newly emerged from the sea. Califs like Digges, employed
the prerogative right of the Crown to establish a prior
(88)
property right in the sovereign for possession of such
lands once they were part of the territory of the realm.
The argument advanced by Callis demonstrated no actual
property of the Crown over the sea and seabed, nor was the
argument intended to do so. Such possession and prior
ownership enabled extension of the jurisdiction under the
Statute of Sewers to such lands. Thus the prerogative
right of the Crown in the sea and seabed was offered as
axiomatic and never was subjected to critical legal
examination by Call is, in ouch the same way that such
prerogative property right of the Crown was never tested
by litigation,
Digges obviously wrote to please the Tudor monarch
Elizabeth I and support the Queen's claim to the foreshore.
Also because Call is wrote with a purpose in achieving
broad application of the Statute of Sewers he conveniently
relied on Digges' theory of prerogative ownership of
the English seas. But the main interest of the
seventeenth century Stuart monarchs was not initially in
any prerogative property right to the sea such as Call is
and Digges described. It was rather an interest in claims
to diverse high seas fisheries. Later arguments for Crown
ownership of the sea by the prerogative right were offered
merely to support claims of Stuart ownership of fisheries
in the Worth Atlantic and the North Sea, The British
(89)
position claiming such ownership was initiated by James I,
and most strongly insisted upon by his successor
1 y 118Charles I*
Stuart claims to ownership of high seas fisheries
were first confronted in 1609 by Mare Liberum, the work
of Hugo Grotius mentioned earlier* The arguments of that
book supported the political and legal position of the
Dutch shipping in the East Indies. Thus Grotius insisted
that the seas were free to all, and because the sea was
simply not capable of being possessed, no national sovereign
could claim ownership over it* Relying on his own possession
analysis, Grotius argued that in order to establish
ownership of the sea there must be exclusive possession*
But for Grotius the sea was conceptualized as having a
communal status* Such communal status made the sea subject
to the use of all nations but incapable of being the
property of any one nation. Even were a nation able to
possess some one element of the sea, such as a fishery,
once the arbitrary exclusive possession of that element
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was released it returned to its status as res communis»
The result of Grotius1 analysis was that fish might
be possessed permanently whereas a fishery might be
possessed only for a time. The element of the sea, be it
a res or a right, which was possessed either permanently
or for a time according to Grotius must be capable of
"exhaustion". Assumedly he meant total exclusive possession
(90)
capable of being maintained for a period of time. Certain
elements pertaining to the sea could not be so held and
were so recognized by Grotius, for example, high seas
freedoms such as the freedom of navigation as well as the
very waters of the sea. Those elements of the sea which
could not be exhausted could not be possessed and under
Grotius argument therefore could not be subject to national
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claims of ownership.
Among the first British writers responding to Grotius
were William Welwood in 1613, and Sir John Burroughs in
1633. William Welwood, a Scot, in response to Grotius'
arguments initiated the British argument for ownership of
the British seas as a matter of international law by listing
possession by occupation through fisheries activities; and
regulation of those activities as the product of British
possession. Referring specifically to the ability to
possess, Welwood stated that the sea was as traversable as
land, and because ownership of the land did not include
being everywhere at once neither did ownership of the sea.
He suggested that bounds were plentiful from landmarks
such as islands and rocks, which used together with a
compass to ascertain position, enabled a national sovereign
to determine, identify and delimit that portion of the sea
subject to its interest. Occupation and possession of the
sea area claimed occurred by identification of the area
through delimiting its bounds as well as through the
(91)
fisheries activities. But even Welwood recognized that
claims of ownership in the sea mist be limited to portions
of the sea which were properly the object of national
interest. Welwood thought that mare vastum was by definition
beyond the just bounds of any national interest for
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ownership. That view was essentially the view adopted
in the eighteenth century which was to the effect that the
littoral nation could possess the coastal sea as an area
in which to apply protective jurisdiction.
Burroughs made his argument against the theories of
Grotius by pointing out that the natural law arguments
made by Grotius as a means of identifying the sea as res
communis were mere theories and did not coincide with state
practice. Therefore Burroughs affirmed the legality of
Stuart claims to ownership over unbounded areas of sea as
an acceptable matter of state practice and labeled that
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ownership as one based on "sovereignty" over the sea.
The ultimate respondent to Grotian theories was John
Selden. When pressing their claims against the Dutch, to
the utmost the Stuarts relied upon Mare Clausum written
by John Selden in 1618 but not published under Selden's
signature until 1635 when it received official approval
by Charles I. Selden first of all presented a case for
British sovereignty over the English Channel. That
argument was simply that because the Channel was controlled
(92)
from both shores by the same sovereign it was occupied
and possessed# The English control of the French shore
was based on Crown claims to several French dutchles, In
1663 Richard Zouche confirmed this theory of Selden by also
asserting that jurisdiction would accrue over a channel
when both shores were held by the same sovereign# But
Zouche asserted only jurisdiction not "sovereignty" arising
from such control of the water# Selden had claimed
sovereignty from that control, and in Mare Clausuro he
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extended that claim of sovereignty to whole oceans.
Second, Selden argued for sovereignty over the sea,
although his argument was directed at support of Stuart
claims of ownership of high seas fisheries# Selden cited
control of those fisheries by Creafc Britain as indicative
of the underlying dominium held by the Crown of the sea#
Selden concluded that, Grotius to the contrary, such right
to sovereignty over the sea was lawful because he understood
it to be the custom of nations# Thus he relied upon the
example of Denmark and Norway receiving tolls from
navigation of the Baltic Sea, Henry III of France receiving
the Crown of Poland with dominion of the sea, and the
licenses given by France to Turkey allowing fishing and
the removal of coral off the coasts of Tunis and Algeria#
But none of these examples offered by Selden to establish
a custom of nations contrary to the Grotian theories, in
(93)
fact, shows any ownership of or general jurisdiction over
the high seas, Each esanapie -merely presents an incident
of some form of protective jurisdiction over the Baltic
Sea, which was almost a closed sea, or some identifiable
and individual interest allowing removal of a resource of
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the sea such as fish or coral,
Sclden relied on occupation, which produces possession
as the test to determine when ownership of the sea accrued
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to the national sovereign, ~ lie argued that Great Britain
met that test and held ownership of the sea because the
area claimed as "British seas" could be identified within
boundaries and was occupied by active fisheries endeavors
and naval power, When Bel den advanced the proposition that
the British seas had been so occupied he offered as
evidence of that occupation the Crown's requirement that
foreigners obtain fishing licenses. Such licenses to fish
on the high seas of the North Sea restricted the number of
vessels and their size, but the requirement to purchase
these licenses was enforced only from 1633 to 1635 and not
generally but primarily against the Dutch, As other
indications of the occupation, ownership and consequent
"sovereignty" Great Britain held over the sea Selden listed
homage to the flag and enforcement of neutrality in the
narrow coastal waters known as the King's Chambers, It has
already been demonstrated by analysis under the protective
jurisdiction standard that neither homage to the flag nor
(94)
enforcement of neutrality were or support assertions of
"sovereignty" over the sea*
Upon examination most of Selden's arguments for Crown
ownership of the sea amount to no more than exercises of
protective jurisdiction* But Selden argued for ownership
of the sea based on occupation as a matter of international
law and not simply with regard to municipal law as earlier
British writers had done* ^ Although Selden did not show
full sovereignty to be legally obtained over the sea, he
did show an apparently legal but unsuccessful attempt to
claim exclusive property in a high seas fishery. However,
even Selden's theory of occupation of the sea providing a
basis for the establishment of sovereignty did not admit
the power to restrict navigation without some overwhelming
national interest in the enforcing littoral nation. Thus
high seas freedoms were not excluded by national activities
in the high seas fisheries, or by limited exercise of
protective jurisdiction* Such jurisdictional exercise at
best constituted acts of occupation for possession of no
more than the coastal sea, and not possession for ownership
but merely as an area in which to apply particular aspects
of municipal law* Eventually Selden's argument that the
sea could be possessed by occupation developed into a
modification of Grotius' unlimited freedom of the sea with
the result that international law began to accept the
(95)
premise that there could be an effective occupation,
control or possession of the coastal sea based on national
interest for limited objectives of a protective nature.
Writing about 1667 Matthew Hale followed Selden's
argument that the sea was owned by England, but he
understood that ownership to apply only to the "narrow
seas" around the coasts, and not the broad high seas areas
Selden claimed. Hale's writing demonstrates that he
understood national interests as limited to the coastal
sea. Thus in Hale's understanding the sovereign's
jurisdiction over the sea contained two main components.
First, jurisdiction was applied in the public interest for
safety of the realm by land and sea. Second, jurisdiction
was applied because of the need to allocate ownership of
objects appropriated from the sea and made the subject of
grant by franchises issued under the Crown prerogative
property right. These components were distinct in Hale's
understanding# Jurisdiction for national safety might
range over considerable sea areas quite distant from shore
and varying in area from time to time. Jurisdiction for
the allocation of ownership over objects in the sea accruing
under prerogative right was applied only to objects possessed
within coastal sea areas. Hale understood that the national
sovereign exercised protective jurisdiction over various sea
areas as a function of various public purposes which were
for protective purposes as shown through this analysis.
(96)
Analysis of the need and obligation to provide for order
and safety on the coastal sea, in Hale's second level
of jurisdiction, reveals the protective nature of that
127
jurisdiction#
However, Hale considered that the English seas were
held as more than a part of the Crown's prerogative right
because the sea was actually occupied through fishery
activities and the presence of commercial and naval
vessels. By such occupation Hale regarded the coastal
seas as possessed and owned by the Crown. Therefore the
coastal seabed was the proper subject of grant by franchise
where it was capable of possession under municipal law,
for example, where seabed was granted for the erection of
fishing weirs.
bike Callis and Digges, Hale relied upon the
prerogative right of the Crown in order to argue for
paramount rights of the sovereign over those parts of the
seabed which were newly emerged or which could be possessed
near shore. But again, this prerogative right of the Crown
was a matter of municipal law. Insofar as the general
prerogative argument for sea ownership is offered, that
argument appears as one Which is raake-weight and offered
solely to lend support to the author's limited purpose of
showing a primary Crown right to the newly emerged seabed.
Hale, therefore, considered that as a matter of international
(97)
law the littoral state could exercise exclusive but
limited protective jurisdiction in its coastal sea.
Ownership of the sea was another matter and even
according to Hale's understanding that the coastal sea
was occupied, it certainly could not be claimed even as
a matter of municipal law as being possessed more than a
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short distance from shore.
None of the British writers, other than Selden and
Hale, present arguments which demonstrate any actual
indication of ownership of the sea. That is, they have
not shown actual occupation sufficient for possession and
dominium of the sea. It has already been established that
the limited imperium which the Crown exercised over the
coastal sea was merely the application of municipal law
on the basis of need for the exercise of protective
jurisdiction. The British writers cannot be offered to
show that"sovereignty" was established over the sea,
although that term was used it has not been shown to refer
to more than the exercise of protective jurisdiction. The
sea was simply not part of the nation, nor was it subject
to the sovereignty of the nation, and no metaphysical
argument by Selden, or even Hale, would make it such.
The Dutch were the main source of concern for British
fisheries interests in the high seas of the North Atlantic
and the North Sea. As a result, the Crown over-reacted in
(98)
presentation of its claims after Grotius' Mare Liberum.
Thus the Stuarts had characterised the British interests
in fisheries as based on "sovereignty" over the sea. The
Crown stubbornly upheld its asserted maritime sovereignty
right In the high seas in order to protect its claim to
the high seas fisheries against Dutch intrusion. The
result was that three wars were fought between Great
Britain and the Netherlands during the seventeenth century.
Hie North Sea herring fishery, which was the focal point
of these wars ironically declined bringing the whole issue
of rights over the fishery to naught. Moreover, British
claims of ownership over the seas ceased to be voiced
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after the fall of the Stuarts in 1688,
Analysis of arguments for sovereignty of the sea, using
the protective jurisdiction analysis, reveals that what
was in fact argued for was much less than sovereignty.
These writers argued for an exclusive right to the fisheries
or ownership of emerged lands both of which were distinct
rights which once asserted were protected by the exercise
of the sovereign's powerj protective jurisdiction. Hie
exercise of the sovereign power was only for protection
of the national interest in such economic ventures as the
high seas fisheries, or appropriation and extraction of
particular objects and resources subject to a municipal law
property right. Although "sovereignty" was identified as
(99)
the right applicable over the seas by the writers arguing
for ownership of high seas fisheries, such alleged
sovereignty was again merely overstatement of the case in
order to bolster the lesser objectives of possession and
protection of the fishery.
In the 1688 edition of De Jure Naturae et Gentium
Samuel Pufendorf presented an analysis which merged the
views of Grotius and Selden with regard to sovereignty
over the coastal sea. Pufendorf wisely recognized that
a coastal zone of sea as a matter of state practice was
becoming subject to exclusive jurisdictional exercises by
littoral sovereigns* However, Pufendorf prescribed a
rigorous test which must be met before any littoral nation
could claim an exclusive interest in the coastal zone of
sea. That test required first, that there be an intent
to possess the zone, second, actual possession of the zone,
third, divisdon of that zone from the high seas by
delimiting its bounds, and fourth,assertion of exclusive
sovereignty over the zone. Although he did not know the
extent to which an area of sea cohld be subjected to the
littoral nation's governmental interest Pufendorf assumed
that actual practice of states and agreements with neighbors
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would determine the bounds.
It is apparent that Pufendorf marks a transition from
arguments in support of Grotius and Selden in theoretical
development of international law on possession and ownership
(100)
of the coastal sea, Pufendorf refined theories advocated
both by Selden and by Grotius and eventually projected
his own theory of coastal zone ownership which in fact
accorded with state practice. At the close of the
seventeenth century British writers, represented by Sir
Philip Meadows in his Observations Concerning the Dominion
and the Sovereignty of the Sea, written in 1689, were in
accord with the precepts of international law, as described
by Pufendorf, Generally they recognized that while
Selden1s outlandish claims could not be supported, his
theory of occupation did give rise to limited possession
and that limited possession could be actually established
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only over the coastal sea,
2, Eighteenth century writers, — In the eighteenth
cnetury, rather than questioning whether fishing,
commercial, naval and other activities provided sufficient
occupation to create possession of the sea, writers began
to consider precisely what possession was acquired by such
activities and accompanying exercises of protective
jurisdiction.
Although Grotius' theory of freedom of the sea, taken
in the extreme, was criticised by continental writers the
general theory continued to carry much weight with those
same writers, Jean Barbeyrac voiced what appears to be
the central criticism of Grotius' theory. Barbeyrac's
(101)
criticism was essentially that Grotius offered a natural
law theory which, although sound in the abstract, as a
matter of international law it was undeveloped because it
did not involve considerations of state practice in coastal
seas. Barbeyrac gave much authority to the custom of
nations as a source for international law, whether that
custom was overt or tacit:, Barbeyrac understood the
natural law theories of Grotius, positing freedom of the
seas, to be moderated by state practice. He thereby
understood exclusive national interests and rights to be
applied only in coastal waters as a matter of international
law.132
Cornelius van Bynkersoek was another writer who
recognized the importance of international conditions in
formulating rules of international law. For Bynkershoek
the high seas could not be occupied, but coastal waters
could be occupied from shore. However, possession of the
coastal sea required acts of occupation. According to
Bynkershoek a prerequisite to acts of occupation giving
possession was the intention to occupy and possess.
Pufendorf in the seventeenth century, had also
prescribed the requirement of an intention to possess.
Bynkershoek wrote that this national intention to possess
the coastal sea should be declared expressly though it
could be implied from activity such as fortification of
the shore and military as well as commercial navigation
(102)
in the coastal sea. Such activities must be capable of
characterization as exercises for exclusive control of
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the coastal sea area being occupied.
Once possession of coastal waters was recognized as
an achievable fact, writers examined the elements of
occupation supporting possession. Vattel described any
sea areas as subject to sovereignty when the sovereign's
exercise of jurisdiction was coupled with possession of
the sea. Vattel recognized that no nation was able to
possess the high seas because navigation and fishing were
not sufficient activities to occupy it. Navigation and
fishing were, however, sufficient activities to occupy
the coastal sea. Thus he inserted a test of sufficiency
for the occupying activities. Because of the limited
number of activities which could be carried out on the
sea Vattel posited that national ownership might be
asserted only over coastal seas. According to Vattel
exclusive possession would grant the sovereign an
interest identical to that held in land by similar
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occupation, which according to this analysis would be
general jurisdiction.
Vattel based the right to possession on the sole
criterion of defensive need. It is not surprising
therefore that his theory of possession required the
sovereign to have adequate power to protect the coastal
(103)
sea area claimed on the basis of defensive need. He
acknowledged only one sea area where the sovereign's
power could be actually exerted for defense and
possession, and that was within cannon range of the shore.
There can be no doubt that Vattel understood the national
exercise of protective jurisdiction to be comprised of
activities which constituted the intention and capacity
to enjoy exclusive possession over the coastal sea. Hie
occupation of the coastal sea by various exercises of
protective jurisdiction for defense, became a continuous
possession along the entire coast by the legal fiction of
constant occupation exercised from shore by military means
such as fortification. Slowly protective jurisdiction
exercised under national power and authority was evolving
into an activity which, as a matter of international law,
subjected the coastal sea to paramount national interest
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of the littoral sovereign.
One of the foremost eighteenth century writers, Christan
Wolff, also postulated that a littoral nation may occupy and
possess only those parts of its coastal sea which it could
protect. Occupation of the coastal sea under Wolff's theory
was based on national defense as well as protection of
economic interests. It was the use and appropriation of
things in the coastal sea which eventually gave rise to
economic interests and consequent acts of occupation in
(104)
coastal waters. According to Wolff through the extension
of jurisdiction, based on acts of defense and economic
appropriation, sovereignty was asserted in the coastal sea
1.36
when the coastal sea was owned throtigh possession.
Ownership of the high seas was impossible under Wolff's
theory because he was convinced that such areas were common
to all nations and therefore not subject to establishment
of any individual national proprietary interest, that is,
property right. Because the high seas were res communis
Wolff did not conceive of them as being a proper object
for ownership. The theory of res communis for Wolff meant
that the seas could not be possessed by any one nation.
Without possession there could be no ownership, and
©wnership was a necessary element to Wolff's theory for
assertion of sovereignty of the coastal sea. Since only
the coastal sea could be owned, sovereignty could not be
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extended beyond that area, and under this analysis
general jurisdiction was not asserted over the coastal sea,
Valin was another writer who agreed with the concept
of littoral state possession and exertion of sovereignty
over coastal seas. However, he reasoned that civil law
and international law recognized rights of navigation and
fishing antedating and supetrior to any individual national
assertion of sovereignty over the coastal seas. Thus
navigation and fishing could not be unreasonably restricted
(105)
either by jurisdictional exercises on the high seas or
by assertions of sovereignty. For Valin no sovereign held
sovereignty over the high seas because there was no legal
right to ownership of the high seas. Those nations
asserting ownership over areas of the high seas according
to Valin, did so not by the law of nations but by the force
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of arms.
Arthur Browne, an Irish writer, wrote in the civil law
tradition concerning ownership of the coastal sea. Browne
understood force to be an adequate act of occupation and
support for claims of ownership by establishing possession.
But Browne pointed out that if the exercise of force was
to be terminated, the act of occupation also terminated
and possession was lost with the result that ownership
would cease. The only exception Browne saw to the use of
force for possession of the coastal sea, was where an
agreement or treaty allowed ownership over the coastal sea,
However, Browne indicated that he did not know of any
international treaty or rule of international law at the
time he wrote which would support a claim of ownership
over the coastal sea without the application of force. The
force which was understood to support a claim of ownership
in Browne's theory was comprised of naval power and coastal
fortification which he understood to limit automatically
the seaward extent of the area owned to a narrow band of
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coastal waters. Browne's theory was similar to those
(106)
of both Selden and Hale, whom had relied on the exercise
of naval power to establish occupation and possession of
the seas which they claimed ownership over as a matter of
international law*
Although their various arguments had favored divergent
interests over areas vastly different in size, writers of
the eighteenth century were almost unanimous in disagreeing
with any pretension to ownership of the high seas#
Generally only the coastal sea was considered by them to
be an area which could be occupied and possessed# Such
possession was by both coastal fortification and naval
presence together with other maritime activities. Such
possession was the result of the exercise of protective
jurisdiction for defense and maintenance of maritime
activity# When protective jurisdiction was exercised with
an intent to possess the coastal sea, that exercise took
on the character of an act of occupation which eventually
provided possession and ownership enabling littoral nations
to assert sovereignty. However, whatever "sovereignty" was
asserted over the coastal sea was restricted by historical
fishing rights and rights of navigation. Moreover, as a
matter of international law it was not until the nineteenth
century that sovereignty over the coastal sea was recognized
and as a matter of municipal law it was late in the nineteenth
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century when general legal jurisdiction tvas at last asserted.
(107)
In the eighteenth century no definite area of coastal
sea was recognised as within exclusive control of the
littoral sovereign# Tne cannon range rule was usually
offered as a suggestion of the least extent seaward which
a national sovereign could claim as subject to such
exclusive control but that was not commonly adopted until
the nineteenth century# Actually it was not until 1782
that an Italian, Galiani, suggested cannon range as the
measure for the outer boundary of exclusive control in
international law# He standardised cannon range as three
miles. However, disagreement on the distance persisted
so that in 1805 Aauni was prompted to propose a treaty to
be signed among all maritime powers settling the issue.
this proposed treaty would have adopted the cannon range
rule from among the various rules offered# It was
acknowledged by Azuni to be the most practical means to
determine the seaward extent of national jurisdiction#
Within that seaward boundary the littoral sovereign was to
have rights identical to those held in its land territory
by the extension of sovereignty and therefore, by this
analysis, the application of general jurisdiction. Similar
to those theories of Valin and other earlier writers Asuai
understood littoral state sovereignty over coastal seas to
be subject to the exercise of rights to fishing and
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navigation guaranteed by international law.
Hall, writing in the early nineteenth century, was the
(108)
last writer who can properly be connected with the
eighteenth century conceptualizations regarding the
essence of ownership of the coastal sea. By looking to
municipal law, Hall ascribed ownership of the British
seas to the Crown. Hie writings of Callis and Hale
helped him to maintain conceptualization of the sea
and seabed of the British seas as property of the Crown.
Although Hall never defined the extent of the British
seas, the question of ownership in other than a coastal
sea area had certainly been settled before he wrote and
assuraedly he did not consider the broad seventeenth century
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British seas claimed by the Stuarts to be so owned.
Regardless of the sea area which Hall thought to be owned
by the Crown, his position was that any interest of the
Crown in the coastal sea and seabed was not mere usufruct,
but actual possession and jurisdiction.
The important aspect of Hall's work for this dissertation
is that he argued for possession of the sea and exercise of
jurisdiction over it as a national act which brought that
possession within international law, and not as a
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prerogative right according to municipal law. Thus while
the Crown held prerogative rights within the coastal sea as
a matter of municipal law, the coastal sea was not possessed
by tiie prerogative. This perception is confirmed by Call is'
discussion of prerogative property rights which indicated
(109)
that such right was subject to the jus publicum right of
the nation. And it was the right of the nation which was
later exorcised to claim possession of the coastal sea#
Therefore the prerogative right argued for by Selden and
others was not sufficient to itself to hold ownership of
the coastal sea as a matter of international law. In order
to appreciate the nature of Great Britain's governmental
interest in the coastal seas of her North American
colonies, when compared with grants in the colonial
charters, it is important to understand the property rights
involved both as a matter of municipal law and international
law# Thus it was through the exercise of protective
jurisdiction as an act of the sovereign, rather than as
an act of the Crown under the prerogative right, that the
coastal sea was eventually possessed by Great Britain#
Because such national possession did not occur until after
1776, no possession was held over the coastal sea adjacent
to the American Colonies, Colonial coastal seas, as the
coastal seas around Great Britain, were not possessed by
an act of the sovereign until the late eighteenth century
or early nineteenth century# Prior to that possession only
various prerogative rights were applied to the coastal
seas and as a matter of municipal law under the national
exercise of protective jurisdiction#
The long interval from Selden in the seventeenth century
to Vattel and Valin in the eighteenth century Retarded the
(110)
evolution of international law concerning possession and
ownership of the coastal sea. That interval was largely
the result of political considerations# thus, in the
seventeenth century especially, abstract problems of
international legal theory were far from the sole reasons
for roach of the argument offered by the international law.
writers with regard to possession and ownership of the sea#
Evidently patriotism inspired many of these writers and
clouded their analysis with bias resulting in the
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unnecessary delay.
While political considerations had a delaying affect
on the evolution of international law regarding possession
of the coastal sea, state practice had a positive affect
on t±re direction of international law in recognizing that
the coastal sea could be subject to the jurisdiction of
the littoral sovereign# Examination of state practice
through treaties, such as those with the Barbary states
which dealt with neutral waters and the taking of prizes
off their coasts as well as off the coasts of British
possessions in the Mediterranean, will indicate Great Britain's
governmental policy toward possession of coastal seas.#
B# Constitutional Control of Foreign Policy and
Protective Jurisdiction in Treaties
The exercise of protective jurisdiction by the sovereign
in its coastal seas is evidenced by state practice# For
(Ill)
example, Norway, Denmark and Great Britain each asserted
various governmental rights over coastal seas by executive
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authority as a matter of governmental policy. Among
such governmental rights were defense, protection of
maritime industries, delimitation of neutrality zones to
protect citizens from warring neighbors, suppression of
piracy, creation of customs zones for the prevention of
smuggling, and the placing of aids to navigation along
coasts as well as near harbors.
Because the sea is an area where commercial and
governmental interests of many nations overlap, it is not
surprising that conflict arose in the seventeenth century
as a result of the assertion by Great Britain that its
rights in the sea were exclusive. Conflict was an
inevitable result of disregard for interests and rights
of other nations, especially with regard to uninhibited
fishing and navigation on the high seas. Early Stuart
policy caused this clash by claiming exclusive ownership
of high seas fisheries in the North Sea, and later, ownership
of the North Sea as part of the British seas. In fact the
three Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century were a
direct result of such conflict, but by the eighteenth
century British claims to ownership of the sea had
1 / C
disappeared and the fishery controversy had subsided,
Eater, when eighteenth century international law writers
(112)
faced the problem of a littoral state's right to exercise
commercial and governmental interests in the sea, they
argued that the international law rights of navigation and
fishing should not be impeded by the national interests of
littoral states. However, it was not until the close of
the eighteenth century that any resolution was approached
between the governmental and commercial interests of the
littoral state and those of the international community•
Aside from state practice, actual governmental policy
concerning the coastal sea is evident in the terms of
treaties. Treaties present the national sovereign's
understanding of the acceptable interests which could be
asserted in the coastal sea by executive authority as a
matter of governmental policy. Three treaties point to
what was essentially the Crown's foreign -policy respecting
acceptable governmental rights to be exercised within the
coastal sea for safety, order, peace and good government.
In a 1654 treaty Great Britain opened harbors to Swedish
vessels and exempted those vessels from certain customs
levies. As a defensive measure the Swedish treaty excluded
warships from British waters and harbors, without notice
of innocent intent prior to arrival• Harbors and coastal
waters were apparently considered to be proper areas for
the exercise of protective jurisdiction not only for
enforcing customs regulations over foreign vessels but also
(113)
for provision of defensive measures against foreign
warships.147
Sweden was again favored in 1656 when fishing rights
were extended to her on the "coasts which are In the
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domain" of England. At this time the Crown considered
that the nation had the ri^it to exclude foreigners from
fishing in coastal waters in order to protect the domestic
commercial interests in coastal fisheries. Although
appearing as a concession here, actual enforcement of
claims to exclusive coastal fishery rights never came
about in the seventeenth century. This treaty also
included a restriction on the Swedish right to fish by
limiting Sweden to 1,000 vessels. That limitation in the
number of vessels was for protective purposes. The right
to fish in coastal fisheries was extended by Great Britain
In 1761 to Denmark by a treaty which also acknowledged a
mutual right of navigation through the Danish and English
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seas. Thus control of coastal waters through the
exercise of protective jurisdiction proved to be an
effective bargaining tool for negotiated concessions in
foreign affairs and treaty making.
The liberal treatment of Sweden and Denmark in treaty
terns, in relation to the exercise of protective Jurisdiction,
may be contrasted with the British treatment of the
Netherlands. In 1654 England and the Netherlands signed a
treaty which required homage to be paid by Dutch vessels
(114)
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to the English flag on the high seas* Only the
Netherlands was subjected to such a treaty requirement,
and then only before the eighteenth century. Originally,
as described above, homage was developed as a means for
detecting pirates and enemies, and thus was a defensive
governmental exercise under protective jurisdiction.
Enforcing homage to the English flag, or making such homage
the requirement of a treaty does not without more make
homage to the flag a recognition or acknowledgement of
ownership of or general jurisdiction over the sea. Homage
in these treaties was merely a political ritual imposed by
the winner in war on the loser.
Treaties signed between the years 1661 and 1776
demonstrate a reduction in the coastal sea area within
which protective jurisdiction was being exercised. The
term "British seas" which referred to the area wherein
Great Britain considered itself to have authority to
exercise protective jurisdiction, was used frequently.
Originally the term encompassed a broad high seas area.
Selden used that meaning of British seas in the seventeenth
century, but the definition changed by the eighteenth
century. The changed definition was a narrowing so that
British seas referred to a margin of coastal sea where
protective jurisdiction was exercised to protect acknowledged
national governmental interests of safety, order, peace and
(115)
good government under municipal law. Although British
seas was used as a term to indicate the area subject to
the exercise of protective jurisdiction, no precise
definition of the area was made in either the seventeenth
century or the eighteenth century.
Other treaties evidence a continued governmental
policy of Great Britain to apply municipal law by
exercising protective jurisdiction over some area of
coastal sea. For example, when Portugal transferred the
Island of Borabain to Great Britain in 1661, the treaty
described Great Britain as receiving all territories of
the island with full sovereignty of the "Port, Island,
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and the Premises", That Whitehall treaty ceding Bombain
probably carried a right of protective jurisdiction in the
coastal sea as included in the term "Port" because the
common understanding of the term "Port" included an
adjacent area of coastal sea. Other treaties used the
term "dominion" or "florainions" to indicate an area where
foreign navigation would be allowed, but only subject to
the authority of a littoral sovereign1s protective
jurisdiction. Thus "dominion" or "dominions" were used in
the sense of meaning an area of coastal sea sufficiently
possessed to be subject to national authority through the
exercise of protective jurisdiction. Use of the term
dominion is never precise but the Treaty of Breda, between
Great Britain and the Netherlands, is representative in
(116)
allowing a freedom of navigation in the sea and other
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dominions» The implication of "other dominions" is
that ports, harbors, rivers and arms of the sea were also
included*
Up to 1664 the Netherlands continued to agree to
afford homage to the English flag* However-» succeeding
treaties between the Netherlands and Great Britain became
more like commercial agreements with commercial not military
concessions. Among such concessions was the reciprocal
right to navigate coastal seas with a vessel passport.
Such document required protection of a vessel by the
littoral nation while the vessel was In coastal waters of
that nation, reserving a right in the littoral sovereign
to examine a vessel1 s passport while in those coastal
waters• A passport was a great advantage to commercial
vessels because the document afforded the vessel holding
the passport immunity from attack by die littoral nation,
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privateers and pirates under a guarantee of safe conduct.
The idea that protective jurisdiction was exercised
in coastal sea areas, described by treaties as within the
"dominion" of a littoral sovereign, was reinforced when
Great Britain received Gibraltar from Spain In the Treaty
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of Utrecht, 1713. All property and jurisdiction over
the Island of Minorca as well as over Gibraltar were
transferred to Great Britain by Spain. Probably the best
(117)
interpretation of Great Britain's perception of the
seaward extent of the coastal sea area for the exercise
of protective jurisdiction received with Gibraltar and
Minorca may be seen in a contemporary series of treaties
with the Barbary States. In 1716 separate peace treaties
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were signed with Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria. By
these treaties vessels of the Barbary States could not
cruise within sight of the ports of Gibraltar or Minorca.
In the treaty with Tunis, it was specified that no prize
was to be taken within ten miles of Minorca or Gibraltar.
Through treaties such as these Great Britain was
establishing jurisdiction with a definitely protective
nature over a body of coastal water adjacent to the ports
involved, and apparently without regard of whether the
right to exercise protective jurisdiction was included in
the original cession of the port. Therefore it appears
that Great Britain perceived the exercise of this
protective jurisdiction to be an inherent power of
sovereignty. Broadening of the area covered by the
exercise of protective jurisdiction developed later so as
to apply along the entire coast.
In the Treaty of Utrecht by which Great Britain
received Gibraltar and Minorca, Spain was allowed to
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retain her fishing rights off Nova Scotia. By such
retention Great Britain acknowledged that an interest
(118)
could be held in a fishery without ownership of the matrix
sea. Thus the interest in the fishery could be held by
one sovereign while the right to exercise protective
jurisdiction over the matrix sea was held by another
sovereign, but the treaty does not show that either
sovereign considered that it owned the matrix sea. The
treaty actually ceded or quit-claimed to Great Britain the
right to apply municipal law by the exercise of protective
jurisdiction over the Grand Banks and coastal waters off
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, where Spain had formerly
asserted a weak claim to the land and the fisheries.
Passing of the land territory to a succeeding sovereign
did not entail passing any inherent right to ownership of
the sea and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
would only have enabled that sovereign to apply municipal
law as an exercise of protective jurisdiction over the
adjacent coastal sea.
Treaties with Tripoli and Tunis in 1751 reassert the
neutrality of coastal waters within sight of Minorca and
Gibraltar, again applying the "no prize within ten miles
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of a port" rule in a treaty with Tunis. In 1762, Great
Britain acknowledged by treaties with Algeria and Tunis
that she had no right to carry on hostilities against
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Christian princes within cannon range of their shores.
This was a recognition of the right of those states to
(119)
apply municipal law as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction not just near ports but in the broad area
of their coastal waters to enforce neutrality for the
safety of their citizens and vessels and to meet their
treaty obligations with other nations* These treaties
went on to recognize that no ship of a "Mohatmetan prince"
was to be attacked within sight of the Alerian or
Tunisian shores* By agreeing to such restriction on the
right to engage in hostilities on the high seas, in a
negotiated treaty term, Great Britain was accepting the
exercise of protective jurisdiction by other littoral
sovereigns which enabled them to establish neutral waters
adjacent to their coasts* The point is that Great Britain
was acknowledging the right of a foreign power to apply
its municipal law as an exercise of protective jurisdiction
over its coastal sea in a fashion which would entail
restriction on the activities of British ships within
coastal sea areas*
When dealing with her own coastal waters Great Britain
reserved the right to apply domestic law to Russian and
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Swedish vessels. The area where such right would apply
off the coast of Great Britain was undefined according to
these treaties which was apparently in keeping with British
policy at that time. Therefore domestic law would apply
when a foreign vessel came in sufficient contact with
(120)
British coastal waters so as to require the application
of municipal law to that vessel as a national exercise of
protective jurisdiction* Treaties of commerce with both
Russia and Sweden had opened British harbors to their
merchant vessels and allowed them freedom of navigation
in the coastal seas* Application of municipal law to the
vessels of either power demonstrates the British intent
to govern and assert protective jurisdiction in her
coastal waters* The treaties also present the recognition
by Russia and Sweden of the British right to exercise such
protective jurisdiction over coastal waters through the
application of municipal law to vessels under their flags*
Finally, in preparation for the end of the Seven Years
War (1756-1763) in 1762 Great Britain presented France and
t fin
Spain with preliminary terms of peace at Fontainebleau•
By terms of the preliminaries France was to quit her
interests in Canada and Acadia in favor of Great Britain*
France was allowed to retain her interest in the
Mewfoundland fishery, including & right to dry nets ashore.
Further the French were to also have fishing rights in the
Gulf of Saint Lawrence, but were riot to come within three
leagues of British territory or fifteen leagues of Cape
Breton Island* All rights which Spain held in the
Ifcwfoundland fishery were terminated. In the final peace




By allowing France to retain fishing rights in the
North Atlantic fisheries off Newfoundland and Cape Breton
Island, as well as in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, Great
Britain again demonstrated that her governmental policy
agreed with the concept of high seas fisheries as an
interest separate from any territorial right in or
ownership of the sea. The distances set offshore, to
restrain legal approaches toward shore under the French
right to fish, were set as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction and incorporated in the treaty term. Thus
potentially hostile foreign fishermen were prevented from
entering coastal waters where they were a threat to the
safety of British citizens and their property.
Notably the issue dealt with by those drafting the
1763 Treaty of Paris was not whether jurisdiction for
protective purposes could be exercised, but rather the
distance into the coastal waters over which such authority
would be exercised. Certainly recognition of the national
right to exercise protective jurisdiction in coastal seas
underlined several of the treaties just described. Only
a general rule limiting the extent seaward to which
coastal waters were subject to application of such
protective jurisdiction was left largely unresolved at the
close of the eighteenth century.
(122)
C. Summary, Chapter III
Stuart claims to ownership of broad areas of sea were
shown to be without foundation. Analysis of seventeenth
century works on international law both supporting and
contesting Stuart claims to the sea through the possession
standard demonstrated that the high seas were physically
incapable of being exclusively occupied and possessed.
That analysis also brought out that the high seas were not
capable of legal possession under international law because
of their res coirenunis nature. Analysis under protective
jurisdiction of those same international law works
demonstrated that authors writing to support Stuart claims
were actually describing a national economic interest in a
high seas fishery. Both James I and Charles I had protected
these interests through the exercise of jurisdiction applied
to the two bases of occupation described by Selden and Hale,
fishery activity and naval power. In fact neither base
continued, and for the short time when they occurred they
were insufficient to support any exclusive rights as a
matter of international law. Eventually in the eighteenth
century experts in international law indicated that
municipal lav? applied through acts of protective jurisdiction,
when intended to be acts for occupation and possession, could
provide a basis for possession of the coastal sea within
(123)
cannon range of shore* What precisely might be possessed
was not resolved* Some argued for sovereignty with full
rights similar to those in national territory. But only
paramount rights to identified personal property and real
property were shown to have actually accrued on behalf of
a littoral sovereign. That accrual was by application of
municipal law creating limited possession of the coastal
sea under an exercise of protective jurisdiction as a
national act*
By the time of the War of the American Revolution#
1776-1783# the right of a sovereign to apply municipal
law# as an exercise of protective jurisdiction over the
coastal sea# was well established* Store than that was not
established# except that the governmental rights and
property rights of a littoral sovereign within the coastal
sea were paramount and exclusive under international law
from the rights of other sovereigns• Although discussed
by writers no right of general jurisdiction or other
general rights such as those held over territory were
established in the coastal sea during this period# and
thus general high seas freedoms such as a right of
navigation were not restricted*
(124)
Conclusion, PART A
Seventeenth century and eighteenth century international
law did not recognise that a littoral sovereign held a right
of ownership over Its coastal sea. Similarly, municipal
law did not recognise that the coastal sea was owned by
the nation, although the legal fiction that the Crown hold
the coastal sea under the prerogative right to waste was
relied upon to allocate legal rights of British subjects.
Great Britain did apply certain bodies of municipal law,
such as customs, admiralty and prise jurisdiction, over the
coastal sea. Analysis has shown that the application of
such municipal law was protective in nature• Analysis has
also revealed that the exercise of protective jurisdiction
was insufficient to create possession of the coastal sea for
ownership, but by the eighteenth century was sufficient to
create a belt of coastal sea subject to the exclusive
exercise of protective jurisdiction by the littoral sovereign.
The issues resiaining for this dissertation deal with
whether the American colonics exorcised protective
jurisdiction over their adjacent sea, or whether that right
was one strictly within the authority of a sovereign and
remained vwifch Great Britain, Finally, the issue roust be
resolved whether at the time of the War of the American
Revolution the United States or the several states possessed
the authority to apply municipal law over the adjacent sea




The second part of this dissertation undertakes to
determine whether as a matter of American constitutional
law the United States or the several states held an
exclusive right to exercise protective jurisdiction over
the adjacent sea during the eighteenth century# Because
of the federal system of national government adopted by
the United States there is doubt as to whether the United
States or the several states succeeded to the right of
Great Britain to exercise protective jurisdiction at the
time of the War of the American Revolution. This doubt
is complicated by whether prior to that war Great Britain
retained the right to exercise protective jurisdiction
solely within national sovereign authority, or whether the
exercise of such jurisdiction could be or was delegated to
colonial governments. The complication is that if such
authority was delegated by Great Britain in colonial
charters» that authority would remain with the new state
governments in their several capacity unless granted to
the federal government in the Constitution.
Analysis has shown the exercise of protective
(126)
jurisdiction over the coastal seas to be a right of
sovereignty* the state governments were not national
y, ...
governments and thus held no capacity to independently
exercise such a right* A further complication arises
from the exercise of protective jurisdiction over seas
adjacent to the colonies, because the argument can be
made that, while as a matter of international law it was
Great Britain as sovereign that held the right to
exercise protective jurisdiction, as a matter of municipal
law it was the colonial governments which exercised the
right.
Hie result of such reasoning is that, if it cannot
be demonstrated that the ri$it to exercise protective
jurisdiction was granted to the federal government at
the time of the War of the American Revolution, 1776-1783,
then today state governments would be able to enforce
state laws over foreign nationals on the adjacent seas
causing serious problems for the federal government in
the conduct of foreign affairs•
Analysis makes it clear, however, that in fact Great
Britain did not delegate a right to exercise protective
jurisdiction over the adjacent seas to her colonies•
Moreover, by signing die 1783 Treaty of Paris ending the
War of the American REvolution Great Britain acknowledged
die nationhood of the United States* It is from the status
(127)
and authority of a nation in the world community that
the United States continued the application of municipal
law over the adjacent sea as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction#
Finally, examination of the constitutional development
of the United States in the eighteenth century supports
the conclusion that the several states at no point
possessed an independent authority to exercise protective
jurisdiction# If the several states did exercise
protective jurisdiction over the coastal sea during the
War of the American Revolution they did so only at the
request or with the authorization of the national sovereign
and subject to review by the national sovereign#
(12S)
CHAPTER IV
Colonial Charters For The American Colonies
The objects and resources in seas adjacent to North
America were made a setter of grant in colonial charters#
Those charters conveyed franchise interests to prerogative
rights over the adjacent seas, such as franchises for
ownership of flotsam and jetsam, as well as governmental
authority over both regulation of commercial activity and
prosecution for criminal acts including piratical attacks#
Colonial governmental powers, general property rights and
legal rights were created as franchise Interests and thus
were subordinate to the sovereign# Also colonial franchise
interests were granted and held subject to municipal law
requiring that such interests accord with the precepts of
that law#
The analytical tools applied earlier, that is, the
possession standard to examine ownership rights and the
protective jurisdiction test to examine governmental powers,
will be employed now to evaluate colonial interests and
Crown rights in the seas adjacent to North America,
However, before either of those analytical tools can be
applied to colonial interests and Grown rights over the
adjacent seas, it is necessary to isolate the particular
(129)
intercets and rights Involved* As & result the language
and terms of colonial charters must be examined and
analysed according to the rules of construction of
municipal law* The product of that analysis will be
identification of colonial interests and Crown rights
dealing with objects and resources within the adjacent
seas. The general property rights, governmental and
legal rights and interests which are identified as being
conveyed by the language of colonial charters, as a
matter of municipal law, will indicate any right of
ownership over such objects or resources claimed by either
the colonies or the Crown* At that point the possession
standard and the protective jurisdiction test will be
applied to isolate and Identify colonial interests and
Crown rights which might have existed over the adjacent
seas as a matter of international law and municipal law*
A, Great Britain's Creation of Colonial legal and
Governmental Rights Through Colonial Charters
After discovery of the "new world" and limited
exploration by means of the early discovery voyages, the
Crown determined to settle the discovered areas as a
means of support for its territorial claims arising from
discovery* Colonies were generally created through the
efforts of private groups during the early part of the
(130)
colonial period. Great Britain issued charters to these
groups# which included iiidividuala and groups# as well a®
corporations. Colonial eharfcers granted the legal authority
to found and establish a colony. 'Hius these charters
became the vehicle adopted by the Crown in the seventeenth
century and early eighteenth century to achieve settianient
and encourage economic exploitation of the Atlantic Coast
area of Horfch Africa.
Use of charters to encourage and control activities of
subjects in Korth Aawtrlea. was not new to the Crown. Prior
to the interest in establishing colonies# charters which
war© issued for early discovery voyages effectively mde
the subjects holding such charters agents for the Crown#
and their claims to newly discovered lands and resources
became claims to those sasaa lands and resources for the
British nation. thus# the sixteenth century charters for
exploration and discovery issued to Sir lluraphrey Gilbert#
Sir Hiillp Sydney, Adrian Gilbert and sir Walter Raleigh
helped to .form a basis from which the Grown claimed
ownership over the vast and uateown liorth American
Continent.163
the later' seventeenth century colonial charters
expanded the purpose of exploration and discovery with a
new primary objective# that is# to establish economically
productive settlements in the for® of colonic®. Prom
(131)
necessity these settlement charters created local
colonial governments, three types of which may be
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distinguished among the North American colonies.
First, colonial governments were created pursuant to
charters known as "corporate charters", which were granted
to incorporated groups wishing to establish a colony.
Second, colonial governments were created pursuant to
charters, known as "proprietary charters", which were
issued to an individual or groups of individuals. As
with corporate charters these proprietary charters were
issued to those seeking economic profit. However,
proprietary charters also were granted to those seeking
to form colonies allowing a greater latitude of religious
belief and practice than was allowed in England. Both
these types of colony were known by the charter they held,
that is, as proprietary colonies or corporate colonies.
Third, some colonies were governed directly by the Grown,
either without charters or, subsequent to the failure of
colonial government, pursuant to charters. These Crown
controlled colonies were referred to as royal colonies.
The primary example occurred in Virginia. After Virginia*s
third charter of 1612 was revoked that colony ceased to be
a proprietary colony and became a royal colony governed
1 fi5!
directly by the Crown. Another example of a royal
colony with a unique background history was Georgia which
(132)
initially was established by a trusteeship charter that
expired in 1756 thereby passing colonial government to
the direct control of the Crown and so creating a royal
colony.166 Georgia *s charter was initially issued only
for a trusteeship period because by the eighteenth century
the Crown began to recognize that chartered colonies were
far too independent and difficult to control. The events
of 1776-1783, that is, the War of the American Revolution,
confirmed that perception.
Colonial governments were generally formed on the
pattern of a locally elected legislative assembly and
Crown approved governor. Local participation in
responsible government was so much a part of colonial
way of government that even the Crown colonies generally
retained their legislative assemblies after their charters
either had been revoked or terminated. Ihese legislative
assemblies became the actual governing bodies of both
royal and chartered colonies. Hie royal and chartered
colonies also received designated grants of territory to
govern, in which they held governmental authority as well
as various governmental interests and property rights.
Each charter granted franchise interests to governmental
rights and property rights, the conveyance of such interests
was achieved through the use of general terms in colonial
charters such as "franchises", "jurisdictions" and
(133)
"royalties"• These words were usually found In the
first portion of the grant# Elsewhere in the charters
the particular prerogative governmental powers and
prerogative property rights and legal rights intended
to pass were specifically set out# The purpose of using
the general words such as franchises and royalties was
in order to characterize the legal nature of the interest
being passed as an interest under prerogative right,
whereas the actual grant was set out in the later
particular words which specified the franchise Interest
intended to be passed. Such grants clearly point to the
subordinate, nature of colonial government in comparison
with the underlying constitutional authority of Great
Britain#
Charles Viner, in his eighteenth century abridgement
of English law postulated the general common law rule of
construction that particular words of grant narrowed and
1 67
limited general words. Other eighteenth century
writers including William Nelson, Sir John Comyns and
Matthew Bacon confirmed, the application of this common
16*3
law rule of construction. Thus royal grants, as
distinct from grants by private individuals in documents
such as wills and deeds, were subject to special rules of
construction. Other than under a quickly passing
Elizabethan rule favoring grantees, royal grants, according
(136)
to the common law rule, were to be construed strictly
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and against the grantee. Nothing would be allowed to
pass in a grant from the Crown by implication and Crown
grants were restricted to particular words only. Unclear
or ambiguous grants of franchise interests were
eliminated by the rule of construction which prohibited
their passing anything by general words.
The very issuance of a royal grant, such as the
colonial charters and the lesser grants included in
them, was required to be under the great seal and made
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a matter of record. This requirement assured that
Crown interests would not be inadvertently passed or be
claimed to have passed when there was no record of the
grant. As a consequence of formalities required for a
royal grant, any surrender of a royal grant was also
required to be a formal matter of record. Obviously-
royal ties arising under Crown prerogative right were
conservatively guarded. Such conservative treatment
requiring that royal grants be a matter of record is in
accord with the general rule of construction that general
words of grant without more were too indefinite and would
pass no tiling. Because the colonial governmental powers
and interests, as well as legal rights, arose from charter
grants to subordinate colonies, whether those colonies
held any interest or right in the adjacent seas dependa on
<135)
whether the Crown intended to pass those rights and
interests and used sufficiently specific charter language
to convey such rights and interests#
In 1629 a charter was Issued for the colony of
Carolina# That 1629 Charter for Carolina Is presented
here as an example of the creation of subordinate
governmental powers and limited rights and interests in
the adjacent seas by charter language# Charter language
governed the content and extent of governmental powers
passed to the colonies. Thus, as was stated in the
Charter for Carolina, the colony received the right to
establish a government:
#«.Together with all singular these and
these soe apply, Rights Jurisdictions,
privileges prerogatives Royalties libertyes
immunities with Royal rights and franchises
whatsoever as well by sea as by land, within
that Region Territory Isles and limits
a foresaid.
But the specific governmental powers included within such
general words as "jurisdictions", "prerogatives",
"franchises", and "royalties" did not pass by such general
words and were only passed when identified by particular
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words# Particular words enabled the franchise interest
In governmental powers to pass and thereby enabled creation
of colonial courts, ordination of colonial judges, and
establishment of jurisdictional capacity for those colonial
courts in order that they might have cognizance of cases
(136)
arising by land and sea#
There is some question whether early grants# such as
the 1629 Carolina Charter, which gave jurisdiction over
"matters arising by land and sea" was a grant of admiralty
jurisdiction# It is unlikely that admiralty jurisdiction
was passed by such broad or general words# This position
is supported by the fact that the standard form of granting
admiralty jurisdiction, as with all other prerogative
interests, came to be by specific words# Once the charter
granted the right to have a vice-admiralty court, a
commission was subsequently and independently issued by
the Lord High Admiral, or later by the Commissioners of
the Admiralty# That commission set out specifics of the
Admiralty jurisdiction to be exercised# The earlier grants
of jurisdiction over matters arising on the sea were
appendant to the grant of jurisdiction over matters
arising on land and thus can best be described as a grant
which allowed common law remedies for matters occurring
on the sea# Later grants of admiralty jurisdiction through
commissions set out a broad admiralty jurisdiction, and as
in England that admiralty jurisdiction excluded common law
1
jurisdiction from matters with a maritime essence. The
granting of vice-admiralty commissions with broad jurisdiction
external to the charter grant allowed the Crown to directly
control colonial vice-admiralty courts by summary
revocation or issuance of commissions# In fact by 1692 the
<137)
Crown had effectively excluded colonial jurisdiction over
maritime matters through the Crown-controlled system of
f *7/
vice-admiralty courts. Moreover the admiralty
jurisdiction applied by the colonial vice-admiralty
courts remained a subject-matter jurisdiction, protective
in nature, and never became based on any general
jurisdiction or claim of ownership over the seas adjacent
to the colonies*
Colonial charters empowered colonial governments to
make laws for citizens and those persons within their
jurisdictions. But that charter language as it appears
in the 1629 Charter for Carolina typically restricted the
nature and scope of law which colonial governments could
create and apply:
• #./Y/ct so© that the foresaid Iawes and
ordinances be consonant to Reason and not
repugnant or contrary but (as conveniently
as may be done) consonant to lawes,
statutes, customes and rights of our Realms
of England .175
Among the other governmental powers granted in the 1629
Charter for Carolina were a limited power to make war and
raise a militia for the purpose of pursuing enemies by
land and sea, even beyond the colonial boundaries* Also,
along the seacoast the colonial government could create ports
and was entrusted with safeguarding the public right to sea
1 7fi
fishing* These were both governmental powers which
allowed the exercise of protective jurisdiction over the
(138)
adjacent sea for the benefit of the colony, but neither
indicates a grant of ownership of the sea adjacent to the
colony or even a grant of power to exercise exclusive or
general protective jurisdiction over those adjacent seas.
In a similar fashion, rights to real property and
personal property, as well as other legal rights included
within the general charter grants of "franchises",
"prerogatives" and "royalties", were elsewhere identified
in the charter as franchise interests giving a right to
the benefits and profits of the prerogative right. For
example, waifs, estrays, wreck, royal fish, flotsam,
jetsam and ligan all were specified as franchise interests
held by the colony. As a further example, in a second
Carolina document, the 1669 Fundamental Constitution for
Carolina drafted by John Locke, property rights and legal
rights did not pass by the general grant of "franchises"
and therefore they were later specifically set out in the
charters
All wrecks, mines, minerals, quarries of
gems, and precious stones, with pearl-
fishing, whale-fishing, and one-half of
all ambergris, by whomsoever found, shall
wholly belong to the lords proprietors.177
Another example which demonstrates the specific grant
to the colonies of real property and personal property,
as well as the legal rights over such objects and resources
before their appropriation or extraction, appears in the
(139)
1612 Virginia Charter, the third charter for that colony:
,,.togetiier with all and singular Soils,
Lands, Grounds, Havens, Ports, Rivers,
Waters, Fishings, Mines and Minerals, as
well Royal Mines of Gold and Silver, as
other Mines and Minerals, Pearls, precious
stones, Quarries, and all and singular
other Commodities, Jurisdictions, Royalties,
Privileges, Franchises and Preheminences,
both within the said Tract of Land upon the
Maine, and also within the said Islands and
Seas adjoining whatsoever and thereunto or
thereabouts, both by Sea and Land being or
situate,,,1'8
As can be seen by this charter language, and that of the
1629 and 1669 Carolina charters, when charter language is
interpreted by the common law rule that nothing passed by
royal grant unless by specific words only specifically
granted governmental rights and interests as well as
property rights were conveyed* One exception is a general
grant, such as franchises in the sea in the 1612 Virginia
charter. If a charter had granted "franchises pertaining
to the sea" such franchises would have been identified,
for example, flotsam, jetsam, and ligan. Because they
could be identified although not individually mentioned
they would become particular grants and pass by that ability
to be identified. Thus these identifiable legal rights
were made particular by circumstances outside the grant
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and would pass.
Before examining what governmental powers, property
rights and legal rights passed to each colony through their
(140)
charters it is important to distinguish those rights
which could be held only by the colony and those which
could be held both by individuals and the colony. First,
governmental powers and interests were granted by way of
the charters in order to allow the corporation or
proprietors creating the colony to hold franchise rights
of government which would not have been available to them
in their individual capacity as private persons# For
example, the power to establish courts or designate harbors
is not one that could be granted to private persons in
their individual capacity. Similarly, in the 1612 Charter
for Virginia, a right to royal mines was passed to the
i qn
colony as well as the right to raise a militia. Neither
right could be held by private persons in their individual
capacity. To grant powers such as these to an individual
would have been a violation of the jus publicum because
it would lessen the governmental rights of the Crown. By
passing such rights to a subordinate government the Crown
did not lessen its sovereign governmental control and the
jus publicum was not damaged.
Second, some of the franchises and property rights
passed to the corporations or proprietors in the colonial
charters could be held by the colony under general
governmental rights and interests, or be delegated to
individuals* Franchises and property rights which passed
(141)
from the colonial governments to individuals, passed as
vested legal rights. Hie advantage to holding a vested
franchise interest in an individual capacity, as a private
person rather than in the capacity of a colonial government
or proprietor, was that the vested legal rights of
individuals were not terminated when the colonial charters
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were surrendered, revoked, or expired.
Once vested, an individuals property ri^its or legal
rights could not be altered by unilateral Crown action
terminating a colonial charter. Any revocation or
alteration in the property rights or legal rights of
individuals was required to be in accord with common law,
and unilateral Crown action could not terminate substantive
vested rights created at common law# Even those holding
the colonial charters held a vested legal right to those
charters and thus another reason appears for the requirement
of formal surrender of vested legal rights and property
182
rights created by the charters, or the charters themselves.
Revocation of charters, or specific legal rights held
by corporations and colonial proprietors as well as their
charters, was usually achieved through the use of legal
writs of quo warranto and scire facias. But in fact not
all colonial charters were terminated by such legal action
pursuant to formal writs. In fact several charters were
simply understood to be terminated when a second charter
(142)
was Issued. Grant of a second inconsistent charter
provided the Crown with a record of its intent to revoke
the prior grant. But issuance of a new charter or
revocation of an earlier charter did not affect private
property rights and legal rights held by persons in their
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individual capacity. These interests and rights remained
vested and protected by common law.
Hie governmental rights and interests created by the
charters, as limited by the common law, were subordinate
to Crown control and had no independent status. It is
clear that colonial Charters and the governments they
created existed by Crown authority, and that those
governments remained subordinate to Crown authority, and
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coxild be terminated by that authority. As a result
abuses of governmental powers by the colonies or attempts
to assert independence from the national sovereign were
met by revocations of charters or charter rights according
to municipal law. Moreover, when charters terminated it
was common law and the substantive rights created by that
municipal law of the sovereign which protected and preserved
the property rights and the legal rights of colonials as
subjects of Great Britain, not as colonists in any distinct
status,
(143)
B. The American Colonies and their Charter-Created Rights
The colonial charters of concern here were issued in
the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century.
Charters issued for the northeast area of the colonies
included the 1620 Charter for New England and two charters
subsequently issued under authority of the 1620 Charter
for New England; one for New Plymouth in 1629, and the
other for Massachusetts Bay in the same year. Also
issued was the second Charter for Massachusetts Bay in 1691,
and charters for the colonies of New Hampshire in 1620,
Rhode Island in 1643, and Connecticut in 1662, In the
central colonial area, including the present State of New
York south to the State of Maryland, charters were issued
in 1632 for Maryland, 1660 for New York, 1664 and 1674 for
New Jersey, 1681 for Pennsylvania, and 1701 for Delaware.
In the southern area charters were issued for Virginia in
1606, 1609 and 1612, for Carolina in 1663 and 1669, and
for Georgia in 1732.
These colonial charters will be examined to demonstrate
that the grants of franchise to prerogative property
rights and legal rights as well as governmental rights
and interests were essentially similar among the colonies.
Moreover it will be shown that while often broad
governmental powers and numerous franchises to prerogative
rights were granted, at all times the colonies remained
(144)
local governments subject to Great Britain as sovereign
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and thus subservient to the laws of England. As a
result colonies could hold no greater rights and interests
over their adjacent seas than were exercised by Great
Britain or were delegated by Great Britain to the colonies.
Along with governmental powers and franchises to
prerogative royalties, areas of territory were granted
within which these powers and franchises applied generally.
Islands in the seas adjacent to the colonies were also
conveyed by the charters and it is reasonable to assume
that these islands were part of the colonial territory.
However, there is no reason to assume that the grant of
islands conveyed ownership or created possession of the
intervening seas. The use of particular words to convey
islands, and the absence of particular or even general words
to convey the intervening seas in the colonial charters,
confirms that ownership of the adjacent seas was neither
included nor intended to be included within a grant of
islands.
Governmental powers and franchises granted in colonial
charters applied to these islands, and they were also
understood and even described in some charters as applying
1 Rfi
over the adjacent seas. The argument could be made that
by application of governmental powers and grant of
franchises to royalties within the adjacent sea it was
intended to grant ownership of or general jurisdiction over
(143)
the adjacent seas to the colonies * &t least to the
distance offshore within which islands were granted* But
examination shows that the colonial governmental powers
were protective in nature and included only authority
over appropriated objects and extracted resources as well
as defensive measures for colonial safety* No general
jurisdiction over or ownership of the adjacent sea was
granted in the colonial charters •
There is little doubt that colonial governments held
power to exorcise a limited jurisdiction over the coastal
seas* Hie nature of that jurisdiction was not general
but protective, and as audi involved only foreign nationals
who were enemies* pirates* or criminals by violation of
colonial law and thus under colonial jurisdiction in the
same manner that similar offenders were under Great
Britain's jurisdiction In the seas adjoining the coasts
of the British Isles* that is* by personal jurisdiction
J 87
over thorn* Similarly the allocation of property rights
over objects and resources appropriated and extracted from
the adjacent seas was a matter of municipal law dealing
with legal rights of citizens arid no indication is given
that such jurisdiction generally applied to foreign citizens*
Examining the colonial charters according to the three
geographic areas described earlier, that is, northeast,
central and south, it becomes apparent that no ownership
(146)
of or general jurisdiction over the adjacent coastal seas
was conveyed or intended to be conveyed:
1. The northeast geographic area of colonies. — In
the northeast, under the 1620 Charter for New England,
grants of governmental rights and powers, and legal rights
as well as property rights, were made similar to the grants
made in the 1629 Carolina Charter. A body known as the
Council for New England was created by that 1620 Charter,
This Council supervised colonial laws in the New England
region to ensure that those laws would be consonant with
the municipal law of England, The Council for New England
was also responsible for designating colonial courts and
appointing the colonial governors and their assistants.
Notably the general governmental authority of this Council,
or the colonial governments created under its charter, did
not automatically apply over the adjacent seas. For example,
even the right to pursue enemies over seas was a matter of
special authorization in the colonial charter and did not
exist as an inherent governmental right. Also, the grant
of territory in the 1620 New England Charter did not include
any grant of ownership over an appurtenant coastal sea. In
fact the colonial territorial boundaries described in that
charter specifically ran "from Sea to Sea", and no general
governmental power was created beyond the boundary of the
(147)
Aside from the application of colonial municipal law
to colonists and other British subjects, no general grant
of jurisdiction was made in the New England Charter, or
by other colonial charters. The jurisdictional authority
created in colonial charters allowed only limited exercise
of authority over the adjacent seas. As with the jurisdiction
exercised by Great Britain over the seas adjacent to the
British Isles the jurisdiction exercised under the authority
of the New England Charter involved application of
municipal law on the basis of citizenship jurisdiction,
The only basis for the exercise of colonial jurisdiction
over foreigners on the seas adjacent to the colonies in
this charter and others was protective in nature and involved
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crimes such as piracy or acts of war by enemies. Earlier
it was demonstrated that this application of municipal law
to foreigners was based upon the exercise of protective
jurisdiction. Thus it was that the subordinate colonial
governments, created and extant by the authority of the
municipal law of Great Britain, applied their local law
over the adjacent seas only under the authority of and
subject to that municipal law of Great Britain.
By authorizing the colonies to act defensively or for
protective purposes on the adjacent seas, Great Britain
effectively made the colonial governments agents of the
sovereign. Therefore acts enforcing protective jurisdiction
(148)
waulcl be considered the act of the nation from the
perspective of international law, and as such the colonies
cannot be described as having any Independent authority to
exercise protective jurisdiction# Moreover, the colonies
held no de facto status as a personality recognised in
international law which could translate their exercise of
protective jurisdiction into a claim of ownership over the
adjacent seas,
Two charters in the northeast area, both of which were
subgrants by the Council for New England under authority of
the 1620 New England Charter, fail to create ownership in
the sea although ownership of islands was granted and
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offshore fishing rights were conveyed in the adjacent seas.
First, the Council for New England granted a charter to
William Bradford in 1629, for the colony of New Plymouth,
That charter conveyed a right of fishing in the adjacent
sea and limited control of coastal seas, but ownership of
or general jurisdiction over the coastal seas was not
granted* Second, the Council for Hew England granted the
1629 Massachusetts Bay Charter which gave a right of fishing
offshore as well as control over harbors, creeks, ports and
islands, but did not give unlimited control over the
adjacent seas.
Indeed the right to fish in the adjacent seas granted
in colonial charters was not a grant of exclusive control
(149)
because such grant was to enjoy the rights of all
Englishmen to fish in the sea and in the anas of the sea,
without reference to any power of exclusion over other
colonists or foreigners• Further the boundaries for
Massachusetts Bay Colony were described by its charter
language as running "from the Atlantick and Westeme Sea
and Ocean on the East Parte, to the South Sea on the West
Parte." Clearly no ownership of or general jurisdictional
interest over the adjacent seas was granted by such
boundaries and any exercise of colonial jurisdiction beyond
those boundaries has been shown to be protective in nature;
largely involving British subjects.
Charters issued by the Council for Hew England are
peculiar in that the Council could grant no more in the
charters which it issued than it held under the 1620 Hew
England Charter# Ironically the 1620 Hew England Charter
was revoked in 1635 and all rights of the Council for New
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England were relinquished. Both the 1629 Massachusetts
Bay Charter and the 1629 Charter for Hew Plymouth were still
extant at this tin® and apparently neither was revoked by
the termination of the 1620 Charter for Hew England. Hie
explanation appears to be that legal ri$its created by the
Council for New England pursuant to the authorization of
the 1620 Hew England Charter were considered to be created
on behalf of the Crown. As such these two charters, which
(150)
could contain grants to no more legal rights than ware
held under the 1620 New England Charter, were held
independently as presently conveyed and vested legal rights
under municipal law and thus were not affected by the
termination of the creating authority.
The sea around England was not considered to be
possessed and owned under municipal law, except during the
Stuart period which coincides roughly with these early
charters# However, such claims of ownership applied only
to the English seas. Even Salden who was most vocal for
Stuart pretensions to ownership of the English Seas based
his claim on occupation of the sea by naval vessels and
fisheries activities which thus allowed English possession
of those seas. In the seas adjacent to the American
colonies there simply was no such fisheries activity or
naval occupation by either the colonies or the Crown, and
thus there was no basis for a claim to ownership of seas
adjacent to the American colonies even had that claim been
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made. This reality substantiates the position that the
Crown never intended to convey interests and rights over
the seas adjacent to the colonies to the extent which
Great Britain claimed and exercised those interests and
rights in the English seas. In fact it is quite clear
from Crown use of the colonial vice-admiralty courts that
Great Britain reserved an essential part of the rights and
<151)
Interests In the seas adjacent to the colonies to herself#
Xn 1683 the 1629 Massachusetts Bay Charter was revoked
by a writ of scire facias# A second charter for Massachusetts
Bay was issued in 1691. That 1691 Charter for Massachusetts
Bay included the standard grant of ports, havens, isles,
commodities and jurisdictions. In fact all islands within
ten leagues of the shore were granted, and & right to sea
fishing was confirmed In the colonists, but no ownership
over the adjacent seas was conveyed and no indication of a
general jurisdiction over the adjacent sea appears in this
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charter.
Other charters were issued by the Council for Hew
England among which was a 1629 Grant of Hew Hampshire to
John Mason. Mason as proprietor of the colony received
franchises to escheats, flotsam, jetsam, ligan and maritime
jurisdiction together with "all the rights of the Council
in the premises", the Council*s rights included Islands,
and the Council specifically granted Islands within five
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leagues of the coastline as well as the adjoining seas»
This grant of adjacent seas is unique. The sea could not
actually be conveyed by the Council because under the 1620
Hew England Charter the Council was given no right of
ownership or general jurisdiction over the adjacent seas.
Since the grant to Mason was limited to the "rights of the
Council in the premises" the explanation is that Mason was
<152)
granted franchises to the royalties arising under the
prerogative property right pertaining to the adjacent seas,
and these franchises were simply meant to apply seaward to
five leagues exclusive of the interests of any other
colonial grantee# Therefore the term "seas adjoining11 was
used by the Council without intention that the adjacent
seas should pass#
What actually passed to Mason were exclusive franchise
rights within a designated sea area, hut not ownership of
the area or even general jurisdiction within it# One
interesting aspect of the rule establishing the need for
specificity in Crown grants was that even with this
purported grant of adjacent seas it was necessary In the
Charter for Hew Hampshire to specifically mention islands
as being granted# Moreover because the adjacent seas had
never been granted to the Council by specific words or
otherwise, it could not legally grant to Mason that which
it did not hold#
Because Mason's ri^its were specifically based on the
rights of the Council, rather than being created without
reference to the rights of the Council as the Massachusetts
Bay Charter had been, it was necessary that a new charter
be issued for Mason after the 1620 New England Charter was
revoked in 1635# The new 1635 Charter for New Hampshire
granted Mason the same mainland territory, isles and seas
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as were held under the 1629 Grant of New Hampshire#
(133)
Tills grant of seas may also be explained as not passing
ownership of the adjacent seas, but merely creating an
area where maritime franchises held under the charter
would apply* as his former charter had done.
Hew Hampshire and its grant of adjacent seas,
referred to as "seas adjoining", which phrase Itself
indicates the seas were beyond the boundaries of the
colony, was unique among the American colonies. However,
any ownership interest which the Hew Hampshire colony may
arguably have held over that adjacent coastal sea
terminated when Mason relinquished all his rights and
surrendered the 1635 Charter to the Crown in 1679,
Thereafter Hew Hampshire remained a royal colony and all
Interests which Mason had held as proprietor were cither
merged in the Crown prerogative ri$xt or held independently
by the Crown,
Besides the colonies founded pursuant to charters
issued by the Council for Hew England, the northeast area
contained the colonies of Rhode Island and Connecticut
which were, created pursuant to Independent charters issued
by the Crown, Rhode Island began its existence as a colony
in 1643 when the Patent for the Providence Plantations was
issued. Later, in 1663, a colonial charter was granted
for Rb<lde Island and Providence Plantations, Both the
original 1643 patent and the later 1663 charter required
(154)
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that colonial law comply with the law of England# It
is quite clear that whatever status these colonies held
as a legal matter, they were always inferior governments
arid subordinate to the national sovereign which granted
their charters.
As with the other colonies the national sovereign
granted the Rhode Island colony franchise rights over
harbors, havens, ports and islands, as well as a right to
offshore fishing in the 1663 charter# But no grant of
ownership or general jurisdiction over the seas was made5
in fact the colonial territory was described as "bounded
on the south by the ocean" which clearly placed the sea
beyond the colonial boundaries wherein general jurisdiction
was exercised# Thus Rhode Island was not granted ownership
of or general governmental interest and jurisdiction over
the adjacent seas# As a matter of municipal law the
colony of Rhode Island did not have independent capacity
to own the sea, or assert do facto general jurisdiction
without authorisation or ratification of such act by the
Crown as national sovereign# Neither any such assertion
or ratification ever occurred,
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Connecticut was first issued a charter in 1662#
That charter contained governmental powers, property rights
and legal rights in the form of franchises which were very
similar to those granted in all the other colonial charters#
(155)
Ho exclusive fishing rights were given to Connecticut on
the adjacent seas# There was simply & reiteration of the
inter-colonial right of sea fishing, which precluded any
colonial assertions of exclusive fishing rights • By tills
general right to fish one colony could not exclude the
fishermen of other colonies from their coastal seas#
Moreover the general public rights to fishing and
navigation in the adjacent seas by British subjects and
friends was clearly set out in this charter by the
reservation of a general fishing right# That reservation
evidences that no attempt was made to set aside the seas
adjacent to the colonies as subject to exclusive colonial
rights and interests* However, the charter implies that
protective jurisdiction may be exercised to exclude
enemies, but this neither creates authority to establish
an exclusive fishery nor creates a general jurisdiction
over the adjacent seas#
This 1662 Connecticut Charter granted governmental
powers and property rights as franchise interests by the
following languages
###/T/ogether with all firm Lands, Soils,
Grounds, Havens, Forts, Rivers, Waters, Fishing,
Mines, Minerals, Precious Stones, Quarries, and
all and singular other Commodities, Jurisdictions,
Royalties, Privileges, Franchises, Prchcminonccs,
and Hereditaments whatsoever, within the said
Tract Bounds, Lands, and Islands aforesaid or to
them or any of them belonging#*-^
Clearly no ownership of the sea or seabed adjacent to the
(156)
colony was granted#
2. The central geographic area of colonies* — The
central area of colonial America comprised five colonies,
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland.
New York was originally a Dutch colony which Charles II
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gave to James, Duke of York, in 1660. At that time
"New Amsterdam" was under Dutch control, but the Duke of
York secured it from the Dutch in short order. When James
became king in 1685, New York became a royal colony and
remained so until the revolution. There was a grant of
islands in the charter for New York when it was issued to
James, together with a grant of mainland territory, but no
ownership rights or rights of general jurisdiction were
conveyed over the ocean.
Pennsylvania was a proprietary colony granted to
William Penn in 1681 by the Duke of York.^^ Its territory
was formed by a slice from the Duke of York's grant from
Charles II in 1660. As with the Duke of York's grant, this
colony was not concerned with ownership of the sea,
especially after Pennsylvania relinquished any claim to a
seacoast with a grant of some territory to other
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proprietors forming the colony of Delaware in 1701.
Hie Delaware grant from Penn required that the proprietors
acknowledge the sovereignty of the Crown as a condition
for the grant. Further Delaware's grant ultimately was
(157)
based on that of the Duke of York through the grant to
Perm, and as such it did not and could not contain any
ownership right or right of general jurisdiction over
the adjacent seas.
New Jersey came into being as a separate colony in
1664 when the Duke of York conveyed the area to Lord
Berkeley and Sir George Carteret. In 1674 Charles II
made another grant in the central area of the colonies to
form the colony of West Jersey, Ihis grant was made to
Carteret, and incorporated the terms of the 1664 Charter
for New Jersey given by the Duke of York in order to
identify the governmental rights and property rights that
were to pass to Carteret as proprietor. East Jersey
originally under Lord Berkeley incorporated itself pursuant
to adoption of a "fundamental constitution" in 1683 under
a grant to a number of proprietors. Both East Jersey and
West Jersey as separate colonies remained subject to the
national sovereign authority of the Crown. Both these
colonies eventually surrendered their governmental charter
rights to Queen Anne in 1702. However, the proprietors
specifically retained their property rights, vested in them
by the original charters, as part of their formal surrender,
although a royal colony was created by the surrender of
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their governmental rights under the charter.
In 1632 a charter for the colony of Maryland was
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issued. The proprietor holding the charter rights was
(158)
Lord Baltimore (Calvert). As part of Lord Baltimore's
grant of territory that charter conveyed ports, bays,
havens and straits as well as all islands within 10 leagues
of the shore, but the adjacent sea was not conveyed. Also
conveyed was general right to fishing in the adjacent seas
but no general jurisdiction over the adjacent sea was so
conveyed. The governmental power under the Charter for
Maryland was vested in Lord Baltimore, and as with the
other colonies such authority was restricted by the
provision that charter rights in the colonies were not to
be exercised contrary to the laws of England. Nothing
appears in this charter to indicate any intention to
claim ownership of, exclusive rights in, or general
jurisdiction over the adjacent seas and seabed.
3. The southern geographic area of colonies. —
Finally, in the southern colonial area charters were issued
for Virginia, Carolina and Georgia, Virginia received its
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first charter in 1606. That charter conveyed all
islands within 100 miles of the coast together with ports
and havens as well as a right to offshore fishing. The
intervening sea between the mainland and the islands,
within which the right to fishing applied, was not itself
conveyed by the charter. In fact the colonial boundary
was "along the said Coast" clearly indicating that no
ownership interest of or general jurisdiction over the sea
(159)
was granted. The second Virginia Charter was issued in
1609 and granted essentially the same rights and interests
by the first charter within a colonial territory bounded
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by tiie coastline from "Sea to Sea". Notably this
charter was issued during the period when an inland sea
was thought to exist which explains the use of from "Sea
to Sea" describing the territorial boundary. Thus the
grant from sea to sea did not actually convey the sea
because the great western sea (Atlantic Ocean), andan
unknown inland sea were intended as the territorial bounds
for colonial administration,
*70A
A third Virginia Charter was issued in 16X2^ That
charter conveyed all islands within 300 leagues of the
coast. The extension seaward of the islands to be
included within the colony was in order to bring Bermuda
within the governmental administration of the Virginia
colony, as well as to assert ownership over any
undiscovered islands in that area. As with the two prior
charters no ownership of or general right of jurisdiction
over the intervening sea was created by the third Charter
for Virginia. There is no doubt that as a colonial
government Virginia was considered to be very much
subordinate to the Crown as sovereign.
Under the third Virginia Charter the usual provision
was made that colonial laws of Virginia were to be in
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accord with the law of England, In fact Virginia
(160)
later came under direct government by the sovereign in
16Z3 when it became a royal colony after its third charter
was revoked by a quo warranto writ « A fourth Charter for
Virginia was drafted in 1676 but was never officially
issued and Virginia remained a royal colony until 1776,
and the War of the American Revolution.
A charter was issued in 1629 creating the colony of
o 08
Carolina, That charter was a proprietary charter
issued to Robert Heath, When the 1629 Carolina Charter
was examined in part earlier, it was used for the purpose
of showing the model charter language which was relied upon
to grant governmental powers, property rights arid franchise
rights. Among the many important governmental powers which
this charter granted were the power to establish courts
with jurisdiction of cases arising by land and sea, to
make war, to raise a militia, and to pursue enemies by land
and sea. The colonial boundary under this 1629 charter ran
"to tlie Ocean upon the east side", and neither included
ownership of the adjacent sea or seabed within the area of
grant, nor broadened any grant of jurisdiction in the
chapter into a grant of general jurisdiction over the
adjacent seas.
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In 1663 a second charter for "Carolina was issued.
The recipient of this charter was Clarendon and his grant
included ports, havens and harbors, but not adjacent seas.
(161)
A 1665 Charter for Carolina was also issued and it
contained a recital of conveyance of the right to grounds
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in the Virginia seas. This was simply a grant to
existing or future islands in the adjacent sea, Next in
the history of Carolina was a 1669 "Fundamental Constitution
of Carolina" which did not create any ownership interest in
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or general right of jurisdiction over the adjacent seas.
Carolina was a proprietary colony which eventually
developed two distinct areas of settlement} North Carolina
and South Carolina. In 1729 the proprietary rights in both
the Carolina settlements were surrendered. The
governmental rights and property rights of the proprietors
were passed to the Crown, and subsequently two royal
provinces, North Carolina and South Carolina were created.
The Georgia Charter issued in 1732 was the last colonial
212
charter granted to an American colony. That charter in
fact was distinct from earlier proprietary charters in
that it created a temporary trusteeship which terminated
in 1756. After the trusteeship terminated, Georgia became
a royal colony. In the charter which Georgia initially
received, the usual franchise interests, property rights,
legal rights, and governmental powers, were granted. As
with thecharters issued to other colonies Georgia received
no ownership interest or general right of jurisdiction over
the adjacent seas. Also, similar to other colonial
(162)
territorial boundaries, the colonial boundary of Georgia
did not include the adjacent sea and ran "along the sea
coast".
Not one of these charters for American colonies
contained any grant of ownership of or general jurisdiction
over the sea or seabed in the seas adjacent to the colonies.
Analysis has shown as a matter of construction, according
to the common law principles, that the colonial charters
were legally inadequate to pass any such ownership interest
or general jurisdiction had that been the intent. Moreover,
as a matter of municipal law and international law at this
time, examined earlier, the adjacent seas could not be
claimed unless they were occupied and possessed by the
littoral sovereign. While such claims of ownership
were made by the Stuarts with regard to the English seas
even those unsubstantiated claims were based on fisheries
activities and the presence of naval forces. No fisheries
or naval force was present in the seas adjacent to the
American colonies which would have been sufficient to
occupy those seas and thus allow possession adequate to
form a basis for any claim of ownership over those seas.
Moreover there appears to be no implicit or explicit
intention by Great Britain to occupy and possess the seas
adjacent to the American colonies let alone attempt to
convey such authority to occupy and possess to the colonies.
(163)
C. Summary, Chapter IV
Colonial charters were the legal method adopted by
the Crown to establish overseas subordinate governments
designed for the economic support of England's economy.
These colonies were established with local governments
comprised of a governor and legislative assembly with
authority over and within the territorial boundary of a
particular colonial area. The colonial governments were
authorized in the colonial charters to exercise limited
jurisdiction which has been shown to be protective in
nature. The limited jurisdiction was granted to colonial
governments along with certain franchise rights over
various prerogative royalties, especially to objects
appropriated and resources extracted from the adjacent
seas. Colonial authority extended to allocation of these
franchise rights among British subjects within the colony,
but no authorization was made in the charters which
indicated that the Crown attempted to pass to the colonial
governments any right of ownership of or general
jurisdiction over the seas adjacent to Worth America.
Further, the colonial governments were authorized to
apply an exercise of limited jurisdiction over the adjacent
seas to repel enemies and suppress piracy. Also included
within the exercise of limited jurisdiction was a right
to assert personal jurisdiction over those committing
(164)
criminal acts on the adjacent seas affecting colonists
and English subjects or their property in the colonies.
This limited jurisdiction was protective in nature. At
no point do any of the colonial charters issued to the
American colonies admit of an interpretation that ownership
of the sea or seabed in the adjacent seas was conveyed to
the colonies or that the colonial governments received a
grant of general jurisdiction over those adjacent seas




Great Britain As National Sovereign Controlled
Colonial Governments During The
Seventeenth Century And
Eighteenth Century
Throughout the colonial period of the seventeenth
century and eighteenth century Parliament enacted much
legislation which affected and directed colonial conroerce,
property and government. Upon examination such legislation
demonstrates that the colonial governments were not only
a creation of municipal law but also a form of government
subordinate to the national government• As subordinate
domestic governments the colonies held no de Jure orHaw. mil ii.mii I rm. »
de facto status under principles of international law
which would have enabled them to act independently in
order to occupy and possess the adjacent seas for ownership
or protective purposes# Thus Great Britain holding the
powers of national government effectively exercised
sovereign rights over her colonies. As sovereign any
right to possess the adjacent seas for protective purposes
resided with Great Britain and therefore Great Britain was
able to act external to the national territorial boundaries
and exercise limited jurisdiction over the coastal sea.
Any colonial measures attempting occupation or claiming
(166)
possession of those adjacent seas should not be considered
to be independently performed as a matter of international
law. Rather such acts should be viewed in international
law as actss of the sovereign, and such acts by the
colonies would be conducted as British subjects or agents
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of the sovereign.
Turning to the exercise of national governmental
authority over the colonies it appears that commencing in
1660 and continuing throughout the colonial period a series
of Parliamentary enactments were aimed at directing and
controlling colonial commerce# This series of legislation
contained measures known as the "navigation acts" which
exerted control over colonial affairs making it apparent
that the conduct of external conaaerce by the colonies was
manipulated and directed by the sovereign authority of
Great Britain# The navigation acts were especially
pervasive in their control over the goods exported or
imported by the colonies, Ihe effective direction of
colonial commerce was achieved by the initial move in 1660
which restricted the carriage of exports or imports in the
colonies to English or colonial vessels#214 Moreover, wool,
sugar, indigo, tobacco, ginger and fustic were specified
goods which could not be exported indiscriminately; in
fact, those goods could be shipped only to England or other
British colonies. Violation of this act carried substantial
(167)
penalties? a line In the amount of -XT,000 would be
levied for a vessel under 100 tons, and if2,000 for vessels
larger than 100 tons# A second act, passed in 1663,
required all colonial exports bound for Europe, which
were earlier required to be shipped in English or colonial
vessels, first to pass through certain English ports
thereby imposing new duties upon the goods entering and
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leaving England# Ten years later, in 1673, Parliament
enacted a statute which required a bond to be posted for
the value of colonial goods when they were being exported
in order to ensure that such goods would be landed in
21 fi
England before arriving on the continent# J Some.
colonials had apparently discovered "that Great Britain was
easily avoided on an Atlantic crossing#
It is not surprising that faced with such restrictive
measures on colonial commerce the independent-nainded
colonials took every opportunity to avoid the. consequences
of the navigation acts# Thus enforcement of the acts
created more than a minor problem for Great Britain especially
because of "###the artifice and cunning of ill-disposed
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persons###". These enforcement difficulties were such a
cause of concern to the sovereign that Parliament enacted
move legislation requiring that each vessel owner, its
master, and three-qu&rters of the crew fee either colonials
or Englishmen# " This statute was designed to ensure
(168)
compliance with the sovereign's law by placing the duty
of obedience squarely on his patriotic subjects. But
just to be certain that the navigation acts were complied
with, the Crown sought to exert a more immediate form of
control in the colonies through the colonial governors•
therefore colonial governors were required to take an oath
to enforce these navigation acts. Failure of the governor
to take the oath, or neglect, or complicity on the part of
the governor enabling evasion of the navigation acts'
requirements would result in dismissal of the governor
from office and a 1,000 fine. It is not surprising that
colonial governors were for all purposes the Crown's
agents within the colonial governments. This agency is
supported by the commissions which the Crown issued to
these governors. The commissions enumerated among the
governors* responsibilities power to direct administration
of government, authority over the colonial judiciary, and
power to disallow legislation enacted by the colonial
assembly.^*^
Usually the power to erect a vice-admiralty court was
also set out in a commission to the governor. Thus in
accord with grants in most colonial charters, subsequent
to the Crown's issuance of the governor's commission
authorising him to exercise the admiralty jurisdiction,
the Lord High Admiral or Conradssloners of the Admiralty
(169)
would send an admiralty commission setting out admiralty
jurisdiction for the colony as broad as it had ever been
in England, Such admiralty jurisdiction was identical
with the admiralty jurisdiction exercised in England, It
was also the same subject-matter jurisdiction, without any
element of general jurisdiction as exercised within the
colonies or Great Britain, Thus vice-admiralty commissions
issued to colonial governors included within their broad
admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction contracts signed
beyond the seas to be performed within the colony, matters
dealing with flotsam, jetsam, ligan, derelict vessels,
royal fish, anchorages, ballast, illegal fishing, wreck,
death on the sea below the high water mark, mayhem, and
all causes civil and maritime between merchants, owners
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and proprietors of vessels.
The broad jurisdiction of the colonial vice-admiralty
courts, and their ability to act without reliance upon
biased colonial juries made these courts an effective
tool for immediate Crown control in the enforcement of
British law directing the colonies for national economic
welfare. The statutory measures taken for the national
economic welfare, such as the navigation acts, usually ran
against colonial interests and thus failed to gain approval
from the colonists. But Crown management over affairs of
trade and customs was tightened through the vice-admiralty
(170)
courts• By 1763 nine vice-admiralty courts existed, one
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in each of the royal colonies# By 1767 four central
appellate vice-admiralty courts were established in Halifax,
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Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston# These appellate
vice-admiralty courts made Crown presence and authority
more immediate by placing appellate judges In the colonies
thereby obviating the old time-consuming appeal process
to the high Court of Admiralty in England# Placing agents
of immediate Crown authority within the midst of the
colonies enabled Great Britain to demonstrate that it held
sovereign power and legal authority over the subordinate
colonial governments•
During the eighteenth century enforcement of customs
laws was placed with vice-admiralty court jurisdiction.
Enforcement of those laws in the vice-admiralty courts
also avoided the colonial jury# Thus in 1676, the vice-
admiralty courts were given jurisdiction over the
collection of penalties and forfeitures arising from
violations of the trade laws, as well as jurisdiction
to collect revenues for violations of Pariiamentary
statutory regulations enacted for application within the
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respective colonies# Moreover, under the authority of
the Lord High Admiral vice-admiral ty courts had been
invested with power to issue privateer's commissions# Not
only did these courts issue privateer's commissions but
they held exclusive jurisdiction over prise cases. Clearly
(171)
the subject-matter jurisdiction vested in the vice-
admiralty courts by the Crown excluded the colonial
governments from exercising a protective jurisdiction and
applying an important body of law over the adjacent seas.
Thus customs regulation, admiralty and prize jurisdiction,
each intimately connected with exercises of protective
jurisdiction as shown earlier were reserved in the sovereign,
Great Britain and not delegated to the colonies *
Not satisfied with the requirements imposed by national
authority under the navigation acts and the oaths of
colonial governors, Parliament enacted a further requirement
that customs officers stationed in the colonies post
224
security with the governor for performance of their duties,
The customs inspection of vessels performed by these men
was directed to be with the same thoroughness and according
to the standards of such inspections performed in England,
Then Parliament specifically declared null and void any
colonial laws existing or to be enacted which conflicted
with laws established by Parliament on customs enforcement
or the navigation acts. It is clear that tills important
aspect of national authority, exercised as a protective
jurisdiction, was being retained under authority of the
sovereign, Great Britain,
Great Britain directed colonial trade to accord with
the economic theory of mercantilism followed at that time.
As such Great Britain sought to bolster domestic industry
(172)
for export purposes by manipulating the colonies as a
source of raw materials and goods, as well as using them
as a secured potential market for British manufacturers•
For example, in 1699 American and Irish producers were
flooding the potential British wool market in Europe#
Parliaments reaction was to enact legislation which
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prevented the exportation of wool from the colonies#
In 1732 colonial manufacture began to take over domestic
British markets for felt hats# Parliament responded by
prohibiting die export of hats from the colonies, and by
requiring a seven-year apprenticeship for colonial hat
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maters# Another example occurred in 1750 with
Parliament's measure directing the colonial governments
not to permit the construction of any mills for the
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manufacture of steel.
But Great Britain was not concerned with domestic
manufacturers and producers alone# Thus in 1733 when the
colonies were importing sugar and molasses from non-
British colonies, and thereby hurting these products in
the West Indian colonies, Parliament placed a high tariff
on sugar and molasses imported from colonies under foreign
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control# Clearly trade and industry in colonial America,
as a matter of municipal law, was within the control
of sovereign authority under the Crown and Parliament#
Hie colonies did not have sufficient status under
(173)
municipal law to control their exports and imports.
Such control might be an indication of some de facto
independent status of the colonics „ but in fact they were
clearly subordinate municipal governments.
Interference with colonial governmental rights and
interests began to take on a more direct approach in the
eighteenth century with a series of enactment® by
Parliament known as the f*white pine acts"# these acts were
the product of the Crown1 s governmental prerogative
responsibility for defense of the realm# coupled with the
rich supply of naval stores and tall straight white pine
trees in the American colonies# thus, the need to provide
masts and spars for naval vessels prompted Parliament to
claim these colonial white pine trees as Crown property#
According to the first of these acts in 1711, white pine
tree© not privately owned and larger than twenty-four
inches in diameter at one foot from the ground were to be
marked with the kingf3 broad arrow indicating that they
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were Crown property# In order to cut these trees a
license'was required* Should someone fell a white pine
marked with the king's arrow without a license a fine of
100 was to be swiftly imposed by a justice of the peace#
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In 1721 Parliament passed a second white pine act#
That 1721 act restricted the cutting of all white pines
not within townships• Violations of this act were to be
(174)
tried in the colonial vice-admiralty courts. By trial in
these vice-admiralty courts only two witnesses were needed
for conviction, and as mentioned earlier a colonial jury
was avoided. Such a jury in other courts was usually
reluctant to convict colonials violating measures such as
the white pine acts. By 1729 another white pine act
claimed for the Crown all white pines that were not on
231
private property, "This law applied even to those trees
which were located within townships, but not to those
subject to private property rights. The taking of white
pines by the Crown demonstrates the power of Great Britain
as sovereign to reclaim property rights granted to
colonial governments in colonial charters in order to
pursue national needs and objectives, as well as to enact
criminal laws enforcing that sovereign right. Such
taking also shows the advantage of holding vested property
rights not dependent on the continued existence of a
colonial charter.
Clearly great Britain as sovereign had retained and
exercised the right of a sovereign over subordinate
colonial governments in order to control the exporting
and importing of goods in each of the colonies. Such
authority in the sovereign, and the exercise of that
authority as & matter of municipal law, clearly indicate
that the colonial governments served no more than the
(175)
subordinate function of fulfilling inferior local
administration. Thus Great Britain could act to limit
the legal authority of inferior local colonial governments
by authority of its sovereign status and national
governmental authority.
Not only were laws enacted by colonial legislatures
subject to review and disallowance but also the governmental
rights held under colonial charters were restricted in
the eighteenth century so that charter holders could not
create an independent grant of territory and governmental
authority passing those charter rights to a new grantee
as was done in the seventeenth century by the Council for
New England. For example, when the proprietors of
Carolina decided to cede a portion of their territory to
Sir Robot Mountgomery, to be under his governorship, the
proprietors were told that such a grant could not be made
by them directly. As part of the Crown's tightened
controls on the colonies the Carolina proprietors were
told that they first would have to surrender their charter
and subsequent to such surrender two new charters would
be issued, one to the Carolina proprietors and one to
Mountgomery. But even this plan to create a new colonial
government did not achieve fruition because the Council
for Trade and Plantations recommended that no further
proprietary charters be issued due to the difficulties
(176)
proprietary colonies were causing Crown administration.
As a result of that recommendation Mountgomery*s bid for
a charter failed and no new colonial charters were issued
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for the American colonies thereafter.
Great Britain's control over colonial property was
not limited to disposition of charter rights or
reclamation of property in emblements such as the white
pines. Parliament, in fact, could even order restrictions
on the sale of real property in all the colonies;
proprietary, corporate and royal. Thus Parliament enacted
legislation which ordered that no land in the colonies was
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to be sold to other than British subjects. There is
little question that Great Britain was the ultimate
sovereign authority over the colonial governments. By
the time of the revolution in 1776, all unappropriated
public lands were again claimed by the Crown in all colonies
where governmental charter rights had been surrendered*
Other controls were exercised by Great Britain over
land within the colonies. For example, in 1761 royal
governors were ordered not to grant any real estate adjacent
to or within lands reserved to the American Indians. This
order was the result of the 1763 Peace of Paris. Under
the terms of that treaty Canada and lands east of the
Mississippi were brought into the British empire through a
cession from France based on conquest. Subsequent to the
(177)
cession of those lands the Proclamation of 1763 was
Issued, That Proclamation prohibited settlement in the
new 'Western lands", Moreover these "western lands",
which were not subject to charter grants to the American
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colonies, were to be reserved for the American Indians,
Through this Proclamation the Crown demonstrated that it
had the authority as sovereign to allocate new lands in
the colonies taken by conquest, as well as the right to
restrict the use of land already allocated to the colonies
by charter, in order to achieve superior national interests.
There can be no question that the national government
of Great Britain perceived itself to be a sovereign with
sovereign authority over her American colonies. Thus each
colonial government was limited to the authority which the
Crown was willing to allow and no colony existed as a
government separate from the sovereign. Perhaps the most
clear statement depicting the colonial governments in
their subordinate position appeared in a Parliamentary
233
enactment in 1766, In this legislation the Crown and
Parliament were described as having hill power and authority
to enact laws and statutes binding the "colonies and people
of America, subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, in all
cases whatsoever". Time and again Parliament's enactments
recited that colonial ordinances or statutes at variance
with the laws of Great Britain were completely null and
void and thereby indicated Parliament's perception of the
(178)
colonies as inferior and subordinate governmental
organizations•
William Blackstone discussed the relationship of the
lav? in the American colonies to the law in Great Britain.
He submitted that the colonies were subject to municipal
lav? insofar as it was applicable to the colonial situation.
Apparently as the date 1776 approached the Crown considered
that the colonial situation required colonial law to accord
more closely with that of Great Britain. However, due to
the complicated appeal process to the Privy Council for
colonial laws which were challenged or had been disallowed
by the colonial governors, the colonies were largely able
to direct the structure of their own laws, especially when
they did not conflict directly with Parliament's
legislation. Another consideration in review of colonial
laws was that such laws were not consistent from colony
to colony and therefore a certain latitude for innovation
was allowed by local circumstances.
The governmental jurisdiction exercised over the seas
adjacent to the colonies was so exercised at the discretion
of Great Britain. Upon analysis such exercise appears to
be of the same protective nature as that jurisdiction
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exercised over the seas adjacent to the British Isles,
tost of the municipal laws applied over the seas adjacent
to the colonies were applied under the authority of Great
(179)
Britain and involved admiralty and prize law as well as
customs laws which a protective jurisdiction analysis has
already demonstrated did not contain a claim of ownership
or general jurisdiction over the sea, Moreover it has
been shown that the colonies did not possess any attribute®
of de facto legal personalities in international law; they
did not control imports or exports nor was their
governmental authority over colonial affairs and territory
exclusive of the sovereign's needs and direction.
Summary, Chapter V
It is not surprising that customs laws formed the
bulk of legislation to be applied to the colonies. Over
the years, in both the seventeenth century and eighteenth
century, British attention had been consistently focused
on external colonial trade• The colonies were started
with the idea that they should aid the national economy
by providing raw materials and promoting the development
of British commerce. It was not until the early
eighteenth century, when the colonies became difficult to
govern, that any real attention was paid to their internal
activities of trade and government. By that time the
effort to control independent internal colonial affairs
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was understandably largely a failure.
Laws in favor of British industry had been enacted
(ISO)
pursuant to sovereign authority to control colonial
industries, and pursuant to that same authority vice-
admiralty courts eventually became the tool for Crown
enforcement of navigation acts, white pine acts, and
customs laws over British subjects within the colonies.
But the Crown adopted other methods to ensure the
enforcement of Pariiament's legislation. For example,
control of local officials, such as customs officers, was
not left in the hands of colonial governments, or even
Crown controlled governors, but was placed and retained
under immediate and direct Crown authority. Also reports
were filed by the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations
which described the performance of governors in enforcement
of the national tax laws. Also receivers-general were
directly appointed by the Crown in the colonies to handle
the Crown1s interest in quit-rents, fines, forfeitures,
amercements, as well as in all items which were seized and
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condemned in the vice-admiralty courts.
Colonial governments as a matter of municipal law were
not independent entities , Rather they were subordinate to
British national interests. Commerce, property and
government in the colonies were all manipulated for
expedient service to national interests. There is no
question that the sovereign authority was Great Britain's,
so much that the colonies held no de facto status as
(131)
governments which would have enabled their Independent
occupation and possession of the adjacent seas for claims
of ownership or assertions of general jurisdiction as a
matter of international law.
Independent of administering her colonies or in
conjunction therewith Great Britain had neither claimed
nor conveyed any ownership of or general jurisdiction
over the seas adjacent to the colonies. As a matter of
municipal law not only did the colonies lack authority to
make such an appropriation of the adjacent seas, but there
is no evidence that any of them acted sua sponte to do so.
Moreover, even if such a claim had been made it could only
have been made by British subjects on behalf of the
sovereign because of the incapacity of colonial governments
to appropriate the adjacent seas as a matter of either
municipal law or international law,
The authority exercised by Great Britain over colonial
governments and over exercises of protective jurisdiction
In tiie form of customs and criminal jurisdiction establish
that no rights or interests of the sovereign over the
seas adjacent to the colonies had been delegated to those
colonies# Colonial governments were set up under
municipal law only as administrative units for colonial
territory, not as sovereigns with independent de jure or
de facto legal personalities capable of independently
(182)
effecting and exercising full international law rights






United States To The
Sovereign In
America
Hie War of the American Revolution, 1776-1783,
brought the colonial status of the American colonies to
an end. Prior to adoption of the Articles of Confederation
after the war the only "national" governmental organization
was the Continental Congress, formed initially by delegates
from the colonies and subsequently from the states. The
organizational process designing the national government
both during and subsequent to the revolution has given
rise to an issue of American constitutional law which
bears upon this dissertation. That issue is, whether the
former colonies which engaged in the War of the American
Revolution attained independence separately, thereby
creating as a matter of international law thirteen states
or, whether one nation entered that struggle and
emerged as the United States. It is the resolution of
that issue which controls the rights of the states as
opposed to the United States over the adjacent seas, as
those rights passed from Great Britain, and were thereafter
allocated between the states and the United States under
the governmental organization of the new nation.
(184)
Analysis of Great Britain's legal position toward
her colonies in the previous chapter revealed that those
colonies held no international legal personality.
Further, that Great Britain was the sovereign over the
colonies, and external activities were regulated by the
sovereign. How analysis of the American Revolution will
demonstrate that in fact it was not an act of thirteen
individual domestic states which rejected Great Britain's
status as sovereign. Rather the people of those colonies
rejected British rule, Iheir act of rejection was as a
whole, as an act of a single nation not of thirteen nations.
At the time of the War of the American Revolution the
colonies formed the territorial and governmental basis
upon which the original states came to be constructed.
Although the War of the American Revolution may be said
to have formally begun with the American Declaration of
Independence on July 4, 1776, the colonies which partook
in that revolution did not organize a federal government
under the present Constitution until 1789. In fact it was
not until 1781 that these colonies were organized under
the temporary and ineffective Articles of Confederation,
Thus it was necessary that the structure of federal
government in the United States adopted during and after
the War of the American Revolution provide the component
states with certain governmental capacities participating
(185)
in the domestic rights of sovereignty. As a result, the
states are referred to as sovereign, but this is a matter of
municipal law and these states possess no sovereign
capacity as a matter of international law, nor are they
legal personalities as a matter of international law.
A. Revolution and Confederation, 1756-1787
During the eighteenth century the colonies made
several attempts at a supra-colonial level to coordinate
their defense against raids by the French from colonies
in Canada, as well as by American Indians. Attempts at such
coordinated action among several colonies had even been
made before the eighteenth century. In 1643 the colonies
of Massachusetts Bay, New Plymouth, Connecticut and New
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Haven had formed a league for protection. But that
league in no way limited or shaped the chartered
governmental powers of the colonies involved. Eventually
the league evaporated when the external threat from
Indian attacks subsided.
The first serious attempt at major unification among
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all the American colonies occurred in 1754.*"' A meeting
of delegates was held in Albany, New York, to discuss a
document for unification known as the "Albany Plan"
presented by Benjamin Franklin. Franklin urged the colonies
to awareness of their mutual problems and interests. Not
(186)
only was his Albany Plan designed to enable the colonies
to defend themselves more effectively but if adopted it
would have enabled the colonies to present a united front
for colonial petitions to the King and Parliament. At all
times this Albany Plan for union was understood to be
undertaken with the specification that the union would take
no action contrary to the laws of England, there was to
be no question that this proposed union, which would have
set up a central colonial government, fostered settlements
in western lands, and established a common defense
including commissioning of vessels for a coast guard was
to be subordinate to the sovereignty of Great Britain.
Ultimately the Albany Plan came to naught once the
delegates returned home because of a lack of mutual interest
among the colonies. But the very fact that the conference
at Albany could have been called indicates that the
colonies were troubled and that mutual interests were
emerging as a rfesult of their common restlessness and
dissatisfaction.
Ultimately the continuing troubles with Great Britain
led to a meting of delegates called for September 5, 1774
in Philadelphia, this meeting of delegates was known as
the First Continental Congress and it was the beginning
of a national government. Hie original objective of the
Congress was not to direct a movement for independence
(187)
but to reconcile the colonies with the sovereign. However,
that objective failed and the first battles of the War of
the American Revolution were fought on April 18-19, 1775,
at Lexington and Concord, west of Boston in the
Massachusetts colony.
The Second Continental Congress met in Philadelphia on
May 10, 1775, Even in this later meeting the objectivenof
Congress was again to explain by apology the taking up of
arms and thus to be reconciled with Great Britain, To
that end a petition was sent to George III on July 8, 1775
from the Continental Congress, but he refused to look at it.
Perhaps looking at such a petition would have been to no
avail for the desired reconciliation because by the time
the petition arrived in Great Britain, war was underway.
Thus when George III received the petition a battle had
been fought on Breed's Hill, outside Boston at Charlestown,
and General Benedict Arnold was then leading a military
expedition against Quebec,^ ^
The people of the American colonies were in revolt
and it was their revolt coupled with the colonial
tradition of local government that created the foundation
for the domestic governmental structure of the United
States, Thus the people were the sovereign not the
government, In their sovereign capacity the people were
citizens of their national government, which government
only exercised the sovereignty delegated from the people.
(188)
The individual colonies had provided local government in
the form of legislatures and courts, and after commencement
of the revolution continued to provide those governmental
services 'while receiving from the people the right to
exercise limited sovereignty for internal domestic
government• Residents of these former colonies, now
domestic states, were citizens of their states as well as
citizens of the nation# In consequence national
representation of local interests was achieved by delegates
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sent from the states to the national Continental Congress#
These delegates voiced concerns of the citizens of their
several states, but as members of a national body they also
represented citizens of tile nation and they directed the
government of a nation not a single domestic state# The
local government of the several states exercising a limited
internal sovereignty was left to state governors,
24s
legislatures and courts# "
After two Continental Congresses had met the colonists
entered upon the national act of formally beginning a
revolution by issuing the Declaration of Independence on
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July 4, 1776# Prior to this national declaration of
independence several of the states had articulated choir
own declarations of independence and formulated
constitutions for state governments# But these state
actions were the result of a national direction from the
(189)
Continental Congress and were not attempts to create a
number of independent nations. Therefore the Congress
became the vehicle of representation for the people of
the American colonies, and it was as a nation that the
people in the several states acted together "to alter
their former systems of government".
Congress assumed the role of sovereign as a matter
of international law, with its formal notice of
independnece directed to Great Britain and the world. All
national rights of sovereignty were claimed for the nation
in the name of "United Colonies", or "States of America",
Congress, representing the people of the nation, had set
fotth grievances of the people in the Declaration of
Independence and thereby claimed the rights of a nation
assuming the rights of sovereignty for the entire people
in the name of the "United Colonies". Thus it was stated
that the nation "as Free and Independent States, ,,, have
full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract
Alliances which Independent States may of right do." The
point is clear? national rights were not assumed for the
states separately, but only for the nation in its states
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and people as a whole.
Since the earliest days of the nation there have been
strong advocates for "states* rights" which are set up in
opposition to those rights of government held by the
(19Q)
sovereign. Among state delegates to the Continental
Congresses were those who argued that the states were
"sovereign" or that they were "free and independent".
These were largely arguments for states1 governmental
rights, which would have allowed a large degree of local
autonomy. Later in American history such claims were
tested by civil war. In a few cases, delegates held to
the view that the states were legal personalities, such
as sovereigns in international law, and that the states
were therefore separately sovereign, ftee and independent,
with only few rights held by the national government.
Thus the states' rights argument maintained that each
state held a distinct territory and government with
complete control of both the territory and government in
the local sovereign populace. However, under the national
system of government, and as stated in the Declaration of
Independence, sovereignty was vested in the people as a
whole. It was the sovereign people, not the several
states, that created the United States. That national
government then either succeeded to the rights of the
previous sovereign, Great Britain, or it developed its
own national interest distinct from those previously held
by Great Britain. As a matter1 of internal government the
people vested their several states with domestic sovereignty
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for the regulation of local concerns only. Such vesting
(191)
did not lessen the authority of the national government
as sovereign in international law# Hie Continental
Congresses had acted in the role of a national goverraaent
with the authority of a sovereign*. Fro® that point onward
the United State© acted as a sovereign, a legal national
personality in international law*
Several examples demonstrate the national goverraaent
acting as the sovereign and exercising sovereign rights*
In June, 1775, George Washington was issued a commission
as "Commander in chief, of the army of the 'United
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Colonies1" by the Continental Congress* The purpose of
that army, of the commission, and of the Continental
Congress was the defense of the national interest of the
American people—not the interests of thirteen temporarily
and loosely allied international sovereigns* £4oreover,
the Continental Congress acted from the beginning to secure
to itself the traditional functions of national authority*
Thus a standing committee of the Continental Congress was
appointed with power of final disposition to review
"sentences passed on libel© in the courts of Admiralty in
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the respective statesThat authority had been
reserved previously for the sovereign Great Britain in the
vice-admiralty courts. Further, the Continental Congress
alone had the supreme power over "war and peace",
"international affairs", and thus "captures" or prise cases
(192)
which traditionally were a matter of international law
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with foreign affairs consequences. Where a national
interest was identified uniformity and consistency were
required and provided for by a right of appeal from local
governmental and court rulings to Congress. As a
matter of municipal law ultimate authority over national
concerns was placed in the Continental Congress.
A formal document for the national government of
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the United States appeared in the Congress in 1779.
This document, known as the Articles of Confederation,
became operative in 1781 when the State of Maryland
provided the last necessary signature to the Articles,
These Articles were not a treaty between sovereign nations,
they were more than that because they were a plan for
national government• Thus a perpetual union under a
national government was formed under the provisions of
the Articles, not a loose confederation of nations. The
title adopted for the nation, its people and their
government in these Articles of Confederation became the
"United States of America".
The Articles of Confederation were poor as a document
for government and this was a consequence of the failure
to grant sufficient authority over state governments to
251the national government. It was therefore easy for
internal state politics to cripple conduct of national
(193)
government as well as the exercise of "external
sovereignty", that is, the conduct of foreign affairs#
Paranoia had been pervasive in America during the
revolution because in many quarters it was feared that the
war would be fought only to establish a national government
equally abusive of its citizens as the former colonies
considered Great Britain to have been# Therefore the
Articles set out very limited powers for the national
government, which were drafted and adopted while the
revolution was in progress# Failure to vest the national
government with sufficient power had subjected the national
government to local and regional influences with the
result that state governments largely received the burden
of providing governmental continuity both during the
violent change from colonies to a nation, and during the
formulation of a national document of government# It was
the governments in the several states which stabilized the
nation while the people formulated the structure to be
adopted for the national government.
However much state governments were relied upon during
the turmoil of revolutionary war, the state governments
never were or ever became severally sovereign# Examination
252
of Article 5 of the Articles of Confederation shows that
the delegates to the national Congress were to be appointed
by the state legislatures, subject to recall by those
(194)
legislatures. Such control of delegates to the national
Congress by state legislatures points to the establishment
of a system of domestic state authority over delegates
retaining authority over the national government in the
hands of the people Initially through the state
legislatures* But sovereign authori ty—»the right: to act
as a legal personality in international law—'was clearly
set out for the national government In Article 6 which
granted Congress, not state legislatures, power to send
and receive ambassadors, negotiate treaties, conduct war
and formulate peace, as well as the right to issue letters
of marque. The participation of state legislatures was a
matter of local concern for those legislatures which never
entered upon any national act, and they exercised only
functions of internal sovereignty in the domestic conduct
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of government.
The structure of government under the Articles of
Confederation contained several defects which eventually
led to thctr termination. For example, a unanimous vote
was required to enact amendments, while assent of nine
states out of thirteen was required for important matters.
Hie most notable of all the defects was that Congress was
given bo taxing power. Thus the national government was
dependent on contributions from parsimonious state
legislatures for funds, Moreover, because of the loose
(195)
structure of govemoent under the Articles, as well as
possible Indian or pirate attacks occurring in the
colonies while the Continental Army was engaged with the
British, it was necessary that the exercise of certain
powers usually considered "national" be delegated to the
states# As. a result the organisation of state navies
and militias was encouraged# However, Congress retained
the authority to regulate the states* armed bodies in time
of peace after disbanding of the national army# To
Congress was reserved also a power to review the exercise
of such delegated powers, which power confirms the authority
of the national government as sovereign#
During the war the states were authorised to issue
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letters of marque against the enemy# The authority to
issue such letters had previously been exercised by Great
Britain because it was retained as a right of the sovereign#
However, this grant of authority to the states was merely a
war measure and during times of peace the Articles of
Confederation strictly reserved the right to the Congress.
Also reserved to the Congress by the Articles as an exercise
of sovereign authority was the right to try pirates or
felons operating on the high seas, as well as jurisdiction
over prise cases# Under the authority over prim cases a
Court of Capture Appeals was created# That Court had the
(196)
right of final determination over all cases of capture
determined in state courts.
Actually the Articles delegated a good deal of control
over state activities to Congress, especially those acts
ordinarily understood to be external exercises of power
by a sovereign. While the states could raise a navy or
militia under the Articles the states had no individual
power to wage war unless based on the immediate need to
repel invasion and when they did so they were agents of
the national government acting pursuant to prior
authorization from that government. Hie states were also
restricted from negotiating any treaties among themselves
or with foreign nations, unless Congress ratified the
Adoption of the Articles of Confederation formalized
the national government under the authority of Congress.
In a similar fashion the various states adopted their own
documents for government• These state documents established
the form of government to be followed in each of the former
colonies, as well as the applicable body of law to be
applied within the state jurisdiction. Often these state
constitutions created state admiralty courts, the decisions
of which in matters of prize were subject to appeal to the
national Court of Capture Appeals established under the
Articles. The national government was allocated a necessary
(197)
element of the foreign affairs power by this control over
state courts applying International law to captures#
Most state constitutions adopted the familiar body of
the common law of England as the state1 c law* Also most
state constitutions clearly set government upon tit©
sovereignty of the people who were citizens of the
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particular state* thus Delaware in 1776# Maryland in
1776# and Georgia in 1777 recited the sovereignty of the
people as the basis of government* Consistent with the
declaration of a sovereign people in those constitutions
were declarations in the constitutions of other states#
It is obvious that at all levels of government American
jurisprudence understood constitutional government to be
dependent on the sovereignty of its constituent people*
Representatives of the sovereign people In their
national capacity negotiated the Treaty of Paris in 1783
which ended the War of the American Revolution* The power
to enter into treaties was not set out for Congress in the
Articles of Confederation, but Congress regarded the treaty
power as derived from the exclusive power of war and
?57
peace#'" Therefore Congress exercised its sovereign power
and appointed representatives to negotiate a treaty of
peace with Great Britain# Through commissions to those
delegates Congress directed them to act for the nation as
a whole, not for thirteen separate states# The commissions
(198)
were issued in the style of an authorisation to negotiate
for the 'United States" to establish the independence of
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the "United States". Because Great Britain had created
the colonies by several charters and held sovereignty over
them severally it was necessary for her to relinquish
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claims to all thirteen colonies. But the actual
negotiations were carried on with the representatives of
the new national sovereign sent by Congress not with
representatives of the several states.
In short, one nation emerged from the struggles of
the War of the American Revolution because the people of
the nation made the revolution not the colonial governments.
Hie sovereign people acting In their national capacity,
through local delegates sent to Congress, formed a national
government.
B. Adoption of the United States Constitution, 1787-1789
Hot many years passed under the Articles of Confederation
before.it became evident that a different system of
government was necessary. The critical need was to vest
more governmental power at the national level. Interests
of the states in the internal affairs of -their several
governments were the primary reason that under the Articles
of Confederation certain necessary powers, such as the
right of taxation or control of customs duties, had not
(199)
been granted to the national sovereign. The effect of
that failure to grant a taxing power to the national
sovereign was that when delegates to Congress could agree
that funds were necessary in certain amounts from the
several states they could not then obtain funds.
In 1787 a convention was called in Philadelphia
charged with the task of revising the Articles of
Confederation. Instead that Philadelphia Convention
drafted a new document for government, the Constitution.
No official records were kept of the proceedings of the
Philadelphia Convention; in fact secrecy was insisted
upon. However, two unofficial journals were kept, one
by George Washington and the other by James Madison. Both
of these journals were subsequently deposited with the
Department of State and are relied upon by historians
today as if they were official records.
For the cost part the journals of Washington and Madison
indicate that the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention realized that although they were appointed by
the several states, their duty was to the entire people
of America. As a result the Constitution which was drafted
by these delegates was for a national government, for the
United States, not for a federation of thirteen nations.
Actually some delegates regarded the existence of the states
as temporary, simply existing for the period in which a
(200)
federal government was evolving# Those delegates
considered that the status of a national government
would require elimination of pretentious state sovereignty#
Contrarywise, delegates opposing a strong national
government raised again the fear that such a national
government would obliterate the rights of its citizens
and override state governments which protected those rights#
However, the journals of the Convention demonstrate that
generally the delegates understood that state governments
were not sovereign in the international law sense#
Rather, the states were sovereign only in the internal
functions of government which they carried on as a matter
of domestic government# Indeed the journals clearly
demonstrate that a vast majority of delegates considered
the act of severance with Great Britain to be a national
act, but that in pursuing independence the colonies acted
as a nation in such a manner that state governments
achieved a secure position in the evolving municipal
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aspect of the national system of government#
In contrast to the vast majority of delegates, there
were those who considered that they had only been
empowered to review the Articles of Confederation at the
1787 Philadelphia Convention rather than to design a new
document of government. These delegates voiced serious
concern that the Convention lacked sufficient authority to
(201)
draft a new constitution, Although their concern was not
frivolous, it was belied by the fact that as delegates
of the people, rather than as delegates of state
governments they had authority to draft a new instrument
for national government♦
When the draft Constitution was produced it was
forwarded for ratification to the several states.
Ratification was achieved in each of the states through
specially called conventions, not through state legislatures,
emphasising again that it was the people creating this new
government for the nation. In these state conventions,
various points of concern were raised and debated. For
©-{ample, at the convention in Massachusetts concern was
voiced that state government would be eviscerated if too
much sovereign authority was given to the federal government •
The thought was that state governments would be unable to
check the exorcise of sovereign power over matters of state
government. In the end the Massachusetts convention
realised the critical need for strong national control and
that convention ratified the Constitution,
In Pemsylvania the state convention recognised that
too much control in the states over the exercise of
sovereign power by the federal government would only harm
the Union, That convention voiced the theory that the
people as sovereign had the authority to ratify this new
(202)
Constitution because they had the right to allocate
portions of delegated sovereignty between the national
sovereign and the states• At the convention held in
Horth Carolina one delegate accurately observed that the
form of government ratified by the sovereign people for
their prosperity mast include sufficient power and
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authority to provide for that prosperity.
Ratification of the Constitution was not simply a
formality* Indeed it involved a serious debate in the
stats conventions which lasted more than two years and
it was also the subject of considerable debate in the
various publications of the day* Urns opposition to
ratification of the new Constitution occurred as more than
a murmur during this period, the dissent which was voided
was based in large part on a theory of the individual
sovereignty of each state, that is, each state's supremacy
in domestic affairs and in all matters affecting those
affairs* Opposition to the new Constitution argued that
national sovereignty ought not to be allowed authority to
interfere with state sovereignty# The opposition effort
included the emotional argument that the War of the
American Revolution had been fought to redress transgressions
against freedoms, rights and liberties, and that government
under the Constitution was provided with the mechanisms
capable of destroying once more those freedoms, rights and
(203)
liberties. Opposition to the new Constitution was
legitimately focused on the possibility that the states had
struggled for independence only to succumb to a new and
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equally odious authority.
A series of essays known as the Federalist Papers, or
Hie Federalist, appeared in support of the adoption of the
Constitution. These essays are the most famous and
authoritative writings of the tin© on government according
to the new Constitution. Their authors were intimately
familiar with the proposed Constitution because they were
involved in its drafting. Their participation in the
drafting of the Constitution adds greatly to their authority.
Thus Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison wrote
their Federalist Papers to expound the need and advantages
of a strong central government with internal checks and
balances# Essentially they were arguing for a national
government which was capable of exercising protective
jurisdiction. Therefore they argued for a navy to protect
commerce from pirates and enemies, a unitary policy on
customs regulations to control exports and imports as well
as to create a system for effective taxation, a national
admiralty jurisdiction which would consistently apply a
uniform body of law, clear supremacy of the national
government in matters of defense, and a system of national
courts to avoid the bias of state courts in matters
requiring national uniformity, especially the application
 
(205)
automatically exclude state gcmmnentfil authority in all
areas# The powers of the federal government were set out
in the Constitution, although certain powers of government
j
were too numerous to be specifically described in the
Constitution and thus several constitutional theories
evolved to describe, the exercise of these powers by the
federal government# First were inherent powers which
belonged to the federal government simply by reason of the
national sovereignty delegated to it fro® the people# the
foreign affairs power is an example of such an inherent
power because only the federal government may act
externally in the community of nations on behalf of the
United States by reason of its delegated national
sovereignty#
Other powers were either "resulting powers" or "implied
oAA
powers"# Resulting powers were those powers of
government derived from the conjunction of two or more
federal powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution#
An example of a resulting power arose in litigation over
the federal power to maintain national moaumeafs at the
Civil War battlefield in Gettysburg, Fennsylvania»
lhat power was confirmed and described by the United States
Supreme Court as resulting from the power to declare war,
the power to tax, and the power to equip the armed force®#
the final group of powers arising in the Constitution are
implied powers which exist as a matter of necessity for
(206)
the use of enumerated powers. Hie theory is that without
certain implied powers some of the enumerated powers would
be useless, and it cannot be presumed that the Constitution
would make useless grants of power. Also, under the
"necessary and proper" clause Congress can make those laws
necessary and proper to the carrying out of the powers
enumerated. An example is the enumerated power to
establish post offices with implied power to obtain land
for those post offices and the further implied power to
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take that land by eminent domain* Each of these implied
powers is both necessary and proper in order to exercise
the enumerated power to establish post offices.
Hie powers of federal government, although those of a
sovereign, were not always automatically exclusive. While
the foreign affairs power and other powers for the external
exercise of sovereignty were by their nature exclusive,
other powers were exclusive only when state law conflicted
with the national exercise of Constitutional powers through
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federal legislation. One example appears in state
quarantine regulations which were held to be valid law
unless they became an impediment to an act of Congress in
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the area of health laws. In some areas of law the
states were allowed to enact legislation until preempted
by enactments of Congress. Such matters usually arose in
the area of trade when conflict arose with the federal
<207)
exercise of power under the Constitution's "commerce
clause" s which allowed the federal govarraaent to regulate
commerce between the several states as well as with
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foreign governments • Urns the states were not allowed
to enact their own customs regulations tar interstate or
international imports or exports# Hie reason was that
the area for eueh legislation had been preempted by the
federal government and such enactments would destroy the
national objective of uniform customs regulations tar
purposes of coiaaerce and foreign affairs#
Among the powers delegated to the United States in
the Constitution allowing non-conflicting state
legislation was the grant of jurisdiction in the admiralty
and maritime clause of Article 111# That grant of
jurisdiction coupled with the "necessary and proper" clause
created a resulting power which gave ultimate, maritime judicial
and legislative authority to the United States# State
legislatures could not enact laws within this exclusively
federal body of admiralty and maritime 1m but they could
regulate matters within tilt© purview of federal authority
by providing supplemental or alternative remedies for
suits that might also be brought in admiralty and thus in
federal courts# This power of state law was confirmed by
the 1789 Judiciary Act's "saving to suitors" clause which
gave a right to seek a common law remedy where one was
(208)
available, enabling avoidance of an admiralty proceeding
if that was desirable* Such state law remained valid as
long as it provided alternative or supplemental relief and
did not conflict with federal law in the conduct of
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federal affairs#
Great Britain had maintained admiralty jurisdiction
within the national governmental prerogatives of the Crown#
Vice-admiralty courts established in the colonies under
Crown authority had even become a tool for the enforcement
of unpopular enactments by Parliament# As a result, after
the commencement of the revolution the colonists decided to
remove the hated admiralty jurisdiction from any national
control* But the need to place total control over foreign
affairs in the national government placed prise
jurisdiction within the power delegated by the people to
the national government under the Articles of Confederation.
Later it became apparent that the protective jurisdiction
function performed by the specialised subject matter
admiralty jurisdiction required a system of national
courts to apply that law effectively and consistently#
Therefore, when the Constitution was drafted a national
court system was delineated with full admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction* Details for this court system appeared in the
1789 Judiciary Act, which followed the constitutional
directive that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction be
(209)
strictly federal. Although the state courts could offer
remedies for matters arising on navigable, water where
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ran they could not
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offer admiralty law as a means of providing that remedy#
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction included all
maritime matters, on the high seas and on navigable waters
of fee United States including ports, harbors and rivers#
Prise jurisdiction as well as a very broad admiralty
jurisdiction came within fee Constitution* & grant of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the reason prize
jurisdiction remained a matter of federal concern was fee
same reason feat such jurisdiction had been vested in fee
national government under the Articles of Confederation.
that reason was feat prfee cases required fee application
of international law. Furthermore, became prise matters
would have serious consequences for fee conduct of foreign
affairs, it was necessary feat such jurisdiction be given
to fee national government under fee Constitution* It can
easily be seen feat, from fee perspective of national needs
in the community of nations, it was most important that
prise cases come within national admiralty and maritime
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jurisdiction*
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction remained a subject-
matter jurisdiction as it had been in fee colonial vice-
admiralty courts and in fee admiralty courts of England.
(210)
However, although American admiralty and. maritime
jurisdiction did not have a territorial basis or any
relation to a possessed marginal belt of sea, the application
of prise jurisdiction did come to bear on the development of
a three-mile belt of neutral waters adjacent to the
coastline- of the United States, and it was the three-mile
belt of coastal waters which was later considered to form
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the territorial sea.
Notably the Constitution specifically granted
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as a federal subject-
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matter jurisdiction. No other body of law was so
specifically designated. This grant carried a body of
admiralty law to be applied in admiralty and maritime
cases exclusive of common law. The body of admiralty law
and jurisdiction was broadly interpreted and not limited
by the strictures which common law and statutes had
imposed on it in England. But that body of general
maritime law was applied as subject-matter jurisdiction,
as it had been in England, and did not evidence any
ownership, or general jurisdiction over the waters
adjacent to the coastline of the United States. General
jurisdiction over the seas adjacent to the United States
was later established through possession and ownership of
those seas by the United States as sovereign. The general
jurisdiction applied under the later extension of sovereignty
(211)
was restricted by the international law right of innocent
passage.
Hie power of the federal government over the
governments of the states is set out clearly in the
"supremacy clause" of the Constitution which creates the
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sovereign federal government. From the first meeting
of the Continental Congress in 1774 at Philadelphia, the
people of the United States took upon itself the
sovereignty formerly exercised over the colonies by the
Crown and Parliament of Great Britain. * This authority in
the people was delegated to Congress and ultimately
delegated to the federal government, through the Constitution
and clauses in that document of government such as the
supremacy clause. Thus it was the American people and
their national government, not thirteen states, which
succeeded to the rights of sovereignty exercised by Great
Britain over the seas adjacent to the colonies.
C. Summary, Chapter VI
At the time of the American devolution the municipal
law of Great Britain and international law both recognized
tiie right of littoral national sovereigns to possess their
adjacent seas for purposes of exclusively exercising
governmental authority which analysis has shown to be
protective jurisdiction. Because the right to exorcise
(212)
that jurisdiction was a function of sovereignty it did not
pass to the states as a governmental right either trough
their former status as colonies or their post-revolution
status as domestic states* Hie states were not sovereigns,
and neither held aoaf attained the capacity in international
1m to essercise independent protective jurisdiction over
the adjacent ma, Whatever jurisdiction they had exercised
by letters of mar«pe, customs duties or the prosecution. of
pirates they exercised as a matter of authorisation from
the sovereign, essentially as agents of the national
government* Although the United States immediately
replaced Great Britain as sovereign, several years would
pass before the form of national government would be
developed* Similarly, several more years were to pass before
the United States would exorcise protective jurisdiction
over the seas adjacent to the coastline* Initially the tmr
nation exerted its protective jurisdiction over the coastal
sea because maritime comaorce was the strong point of the
national economy and because there was a pressing need for
defensive measures and the enforcement of custom
2gg
resulationc to be exorcised over the adjacent seas** Such




Hie United States' Exercise Of Protective
Jurisdiction Over Hie Adjacent Sea
Between the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, and
the beginning of the nineteenth century the United States
asserted limited governmental jurisdiction over its
adjacent sea* Hie right to exercise this jurisdiction was
claimed by the sovereign as a national right and upon
analysis such jurisdiction is shown to be protective in
nature*
In accord with tile period's standards of international
law examined earlier, the United States occupied its
coastal sea by controlling it through commerce and naval
operations* Such occupation and control sufficiently
possessed that sea to exercise protective jurisdiction
over it* However, there is nothing to indicate that, as
a matter of either political or legal doctrine, the federal
government considered the adjacent sea to be owned by the
United States, or by any of the several states, or that
any right of general jurisdiction existed over the area*'
Rather, national concern was focused on westward expansion
and national interest in the adjacent sea was limited to a
protective concern focused on commerce as well as on its
obligations under international law as a neutral nation*
(214)
The national interest in interstate and foreign
commerce by sea was served under the exercise of protective
jurisdiction which applied customs law as well as admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, and defense measures# Criminal
law was applied generally upon the high seas over
American vessels, American citizens, and those perpetrating
acts of piracy. In conjunction with all of these exercises
of protective jurisdiction, as discussed in this chapter, a
belt of the coastal sea three nautical miles in width was
adopted by the executive branch of government in 1794, as
the area of adjacent sea where the presence of American
national interests required enforcement of the international
obligation of neutrality. However, the adoption of that
neutral area of adjacent sea was not adoption of a
territorial sea nor an assertion of ownership or right of
general jurisdiction over the adjacent sea. In fact the
exercises of protective jurisdiction, which prompted
adoption of a belt of neutral water, were not confined
to being exercised only in that belt.
A. National Authority of the United States Applied Over
the Adjacent Sea through Municipal Law
Hie Statutes at Large examined for the period 1789 to
1801 reveal that a strong central government was erected
by the Constitution* That government exercised national
(215)
authority over the "western lands" which were large areas
west of the original states and east of the Mississippi
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River held in trust for the nation. Those western lands
were later developed into the territories for new states.
Because the western lands were external to the territory
of any component state, but not external to the nation,
they evidence the sovereign power of the federal government
to hold and exercise jurisdiction and control over
territory within the nation, but outside territorial
boundaries of states. The western lands are presented for
comparison with the power and authority of the federal
government to act also as a sovereign and exercise
jurisdiction over the adjacent sea external to the states
and external to the nation. Such jurisdiction over the
adjacent sea was protective in nature, as is demonstrated
by one early statute providing for defense of coasts and
harbors of the United States and a later statute for the
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protection of commerce. But like Great Britain and
other nations the United States' exercise of protective
jurisdiction also included the establishment of aids to
navigation, redress of crimes against citizens and their
property, enforcement of customs laws, application of
admiralty jurisdiction, and prize jurisdiction as well as
the provision of a neutral waters area in the adjacent seas.
Among the navigational aids which were established under
(216)
national authority for the benefit of commerce were
lighthouses. Lighthouses also provide an example of the
joint state-federal governmental authority over domestic
territory. Initially lighthouses were built or subsidized
by the federal government. Authority for the establishment
by subsidization or acquisition of such navigational aids
within state territory is found in the Constitution. Thus
the navigation servitude included within the grant of
commerce power to the federal government, coupled with the
necessary and proper clause, permits federal action to
take real property within state territory, under national
authority and responsibility to erect aids necessary for
navigation such as lighthouses. Establishment of
navigational aids therefore was a national, not a state
responsibility and related to the general public right of
navigation which had been protected throughout Great
Britain and the colonies prior to the American revolution.
Jurisdiction over criminal acts by American citizens
or on American vessels, as well as acts of piracy, was
made a national responsibility under the Constitution's
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the
national government. Federal jurisdiction was described
in the Statutes at Large as pertaining to enumerated
crimes such as murder, robbery, piracy, barratry and other
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felonies. These criminal acts were within federal
(217)
jurisdiction exclusive of any state jurisdiction# Hie
test for federal jurisdiction was that the crime occurred
on the high seas or in rivers, basins, bays or havens
outside the territory of any state, that is, beyond inland
waters# Thus the federal criminal jurisdiction on the
adjacent seas was exercised as a matter of protective
jurisdiction by the national government exclusive of any
state jurisdiction except, state personal jurisdiction
over state citizens.
National courts of the United States issued decisions
before and after adoption of the Constitution which
indicate the protective nature of the national jurisdiction
being exercised over adjacent seas. Jurisdiction of the
national courts extended to matters subject to national
legislation, and therefore the subject-matter jurisdiction
of these courts included violations of national laws
dealing with customs and revenue as well as admiralty and
prize law.^"*
Authority to collect taxes and regulate commerce was
granted in the Constitution to the federal government and
is the basis for the creation of customs and revenue laws
236
and jurisdiction.*" These customs and revenue laws
enacted by Congress were designed to be applied over the
adjacent sea within one marine league of the United States
coastline. Beyond a marine league into the adjacent sea
customs jurisdiction was asserted over vessels discovered
(218)
hovering or otherwise demonstrating an intent to
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violate customs laws of the United States. Such
exercise of customs jurisdiction was a national act for
the protection of the integrity of United States
municipal customs laws, and did not consist of a series
of thirteen acts by the several states. Thus the
protective nature of customs jurisdiction applied to the
coastal sea by the United States was similar to the
customs jurisdiction applied by Great Britain over the
seas adjacent to the British Isles.
General admiralty jurisdiction, which was also granted
by the Constitution to the federal government, was
exercised not only on navigable bodies of water within
the territory of states but also on the high seas beyond
inland waters and therefore outside the boundaries of
states. The grant of admiralty jurisdiction in the
Constitution extended national jurisdiction over inland
waters and the high seas because in admiralty matters on
both bodies of water the needs of United States citizens
required that a uniform and traditional body of law be
applied to their conduct and disputes involving their
maritime interests. Analysis of traditional admiralty law
has already shown that law to have been applied by Great
Britain as a subject-matter jurisdiction without any
territorial basis. That traditional body of admiralty
law was adopted as the law of the United States and
(219)
subsequently applied as a subject-matter jurisdiction
through the exercise of protective jurisdiction without
2gg
any territorial basis.
Prize jurisdiction exercised by national courts was
vested in the national government from the beginning of
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the United States. Before the adoption of the
Constitution, a committee of Congress and later the Court
of Capture Appeals held jurisdiction over the ultimate
disposition of prize cases arising in th© state courts.
After the adoption of the Constitution exclusive
jurisdiction over prize cases was vested in the federal
district courts as part of their admiralty jurisdiction.
Hie district courts were created by the 1789 Judiciary
Act which was enacted to establish the judicial system
according to the terms of the Constitution. Both the
district courts and the earlier Court of Capture Appeals,
under the Articles of Confederation, applied traditional
international prize law. That traditional body of priae
law was adopted by the Constitution in its broad grant of
admiralty and raaritime jruisdictlon to the federal
government# Thus the prize law of the United States before
1800 was essentially the same quasi-international body of
law which had been enforced by the Admiralty Prize Court
in the colonies and Great Britain before the revolution in
1776, and in Great Britain from then until 1800,
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Prisse law was of ©special importance to the United
States during its early years because of the international
position of neutrality adopted by the young nation# The
main cause for American concern with her neutral status
was that three nations were at war. To each of these
nations. Great Britain, Spain and France, the United
States owed treaty obligations of neutrality and provision
of neutral coastal waters. Vessels of these nations were
visiting American ports and frequenting the sea adjacent
to the United States. Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of
State, thought that by employing all: possible means to
provide neutral waters In the adjacent sea under
International law those nations would have no claim to
compensation for violations of the American coastal waters
neutral status based on any allegation of failure of the
United States to provide neutral waters in the adjacent
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seas .
Hie theory which Jefferson advocated was that neutrality
aught to be enforced from the United States coastline out
into the Atlantic Ocean as far as the Gulf Stream. This
indicates that Jefferson did not consider the United
States to have any specific area of adjacent sea which
inherently or historically appertained to the nation or to
its component states. Indeed Alexander Hamilton*s view
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confirms that indication. Hamilton simply argued that
(221)
the United States ought to extend national jurisdiction
and authority over the adjacent seas and did not specify
a distance. Clearly neither Jefferson nor Hamilton seem
to have thought that Great Britain claimed jurisdiction
over a specific area of the adjacent sea to which the
United States had succeeded. What is indicated is that
they understood such extensions of jurisdictions by
international legal personalities to be in accord with
then accepted principles of international law.
As men actively involved in state and federal
government, it is unlikely that Jefferson and Hamilton
were unaware that jurisdiction of a protective nature was
exercised by Great Britain over the seas adjacent to the
colonies. Their readiness to assert American jurisdiction
over those same seas shows not only familiarity with
accepted international law but with the prior exercise of
such jurisdiction by Great Britain, That readiness to
extend United States jurisdiction also demonstrates that
their experience was not that the colonies had exercised
such jurisdiction or that the states ought to do so. The
difference between exercises of protective jurisdiction
into the adjacent seas for varying distances, from cannon
shot to four leagues, for various purposes, from customs
to health, and the protective jurisdiction which Jefferson
and Hamilton sought to establish was that a specific area
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of adjacent sea was being claimed as peculiarly subject
to exclusive American national interests for purposes of
neutrality* Therefore a specific area of adjacent sea was
delineated wherein treaty obligations would be considered
to require the provision of neutral waters as a matter of
international law and bilateral treaties. Ultimately
President George Washington instructed Thomas Jefferson,
Secretary of State, to consider one marine league into
the adjacent sea as the official position for the United
States under international law wherein the United States
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would consider itself obliged to provide neutral waters.
Under the international law precepts which bound the
United States to maintain the neutral status of inland
waters and coastal waters out to three nautical miles,
captures could not be legally effected by any belligerent
nation against any vessel in those waters. If a belligerent
vessel committed acts of war within neutral waters that
vessel was no longer owed obligations of neutrality by the
littoral nation or any other nation and it could be
captured in neutral waters as valid prize under
international law. Not only belligerent vessels, but also
vessels of other neutrals could lose the littoral nation's
obligation to afford protection in neutral waters. They
lost that obligation of neutrality if vessels of such
neutral nations violated the international laws of neutrality.
(223)
An example of such violation would be the carriage of
contraband by one neutral in the neutral waters of
another.
Violations of neutral water status were considered to
be an assault on the littoral neutral nation. As a
result„ if a foreign vessel violated the standards of
international prize law as adopted by the municipal law
of the littoral neutral nation, the municipal courts could
seize and restore any vessel captured by the violator, or
order that compensation be paid to its owners by the
violator. It is clear that prevention of such assaults
on the integrity of a national sovereign by flaunting the
rules of neutrality was a matter of exercising protective
jurisdiction over the adjacent seas. It was also a matter
of serious concern for the conduct of foreign relations.
When foreign citizens violated municipal law, or the
neutral water status of the adjacent seas within three
nautical miles of the United States' coastline, they
were brought within the jurisdiction of municipal law
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applied by the federal district courts. "mat
application of municipal law was pursuant to an exercise
of protective jurisdiction.
The protective jurisdiction exercised through federal
courts was not a general jurisdiction. Thus, when legal
proceedings involved matters not affecting American
citizens, the legal interests of American citizens, or the
(224)
peace and safety of the United States the exercise of
jurisdiction was discretionary because the national
interest in the protection of the nation, its citizens
and their property was not involved. The usual rule
followed by federal courts was to invoke a nascent forum
non conveniens analysis, although not employing that label,
and thereby deny the exercise of jurisdiction over matters
concerning foreign parties and interests arising on the
high seas.^
On the civil side of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
an example of not denying jurisdiction over foreign parties
and causes of action arises with suits by foreign seamen
for wages or other contract rights when they were employed
on foreign owned and registered vessels# Denial of
jurisdiction in many such cases would have caused undue
hardship# To avoid unnecessary hardship judicial discretion
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was exercised and the jurisdiction was granted# The
point raised is that the federal courts jurisdiction
included a subject-matter jurisdiction which would be
applied to citizens and others within the authority of the
national law# But no general jurisdiction over the adjacent
sea is indicated by foreign parties which acquiesced in
such exercise of the national jurisdiction, or in
application of municipal law over foreign parties and
causes of action 'ultimately only when a decision of the
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courts could be efficacious. Similarly the admiralty law
applied by Great Britain over its adjacent seas had shown
no indication of general jurisdiction being applied over
all parties within a specific distance from shore. Thus
American admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was like
the admiralty jurisdiction of Great Britain, a subject-
matter jurisdiction applied to particular matters
occurring on the high seas on the basis of citizenship or
protective jurisdiction and without any ownership right
or general jurisdiction over the adjacent seas before 1800,
Analysis of the Constitution reveals that national
authority was exclusive of independent state authority
beyond the state territorial boundaries, except over
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state citizens. But states held general jurisdiction
over inland coastal waters, such as bays and harbors,
within their territorial boundaries. Thus in such waters
the states were able to assert general jurisdiction
concurrent with federal subject-matter jurisdiction. For
example, by an act of Congress a large portion of Lake
Michigan was placed within the boundary of the State of
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Illinois. The federal authority within such bodies of
water could be applied only according to the terms of
Constitutional grants of authority, such as the commerce
clause as well as the grant of admiralty and maritime
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jurisdiction. When state laws were applied to these
waters the basis was general jurisdiction within state
(226)
boundaries as an incident of state sovereignty» But the
state law applied to these rivers, beys and harbors through
state courts could not include admiralty and maritime law
which was an exclusive subject-matter reserved to the
jurisdiction granted the federal government. State courts
could offer only state statutory and state common law
remedies#
Similar to international states the domestic states
in some instances could extend their jurisdiction over
the adjacent seas beyond state boundaries# But such
state jurisdiction could not overlap and conflict with
the law of other domestic states nor could it be applied
on the high seas beyond an area adjacent to the coast
reserved for national exercise of protective jurisdiction#
State extensions of jurisdiction into the adjacent sea
were associated with traditional authority to manage
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specific resources, for example, coastal fisheries#
However, any application of state law in tills adjacent sea
was subject to exclusion or preemption by federal authority
under the several clauses of the Constitution which have
been discussed, that is, the grant of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, the grant of power to control
interstate and international commerce, and the exclusive
national right to conduct foreign affairs. Each of these
Constitutional grants of authority was bolstered by the
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grant of authority in the "necessary and proper" clause
as well as the "supremacy" clause which gave the national
government authority to act pursuant to these other grants
of rights and powers.
Thus the United States held the right to act on the
high seas external to the nation, and any state exercise
of jurisdiction in that area was based on the federal
jurisdiction. As a result the states when exercising
jurisdiction seaward of low-water mark may be characterized
as agents of the national government, acting with the
acquiescence of the national government. The federal
jurisdiction exercised over the adjacent sea, under which
any state authority was exercised, was protective in
nature and that nature could not be changed by any
independent action of the states. There is therefore no
basis for alleging state ownership over the adjacent sea
or general jurisdiction therein as a consequence of the
federal government's exercise of protective jurisdiction
over those seas.
B. Exercise of Protective Jurisdiction Over the Adjacent
Seas Shown in the United States' Conduct of Foreign Affairs
Concern with the adjacent seas at the national level
occasioned the delimiting of neutral waters adjacent to
the coastline of the United States. This concern was
(228)
demonstrated in a Special Session Message of 1797
delivered by President John Adams, third President of
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the United States,to Congress,' President Adams
requested adequate naval power to protect the young
nation's more than 2,000 miles of coastline. As part of
the justification for such protection, he enumerated not
only the economic interest in the fishing industry but
also the economic interest in interstate and foreign
commerce. In the next year, 1798, President Adams again
addressed Congress, and on a similar note urged them to
create naval power sufficient to act against depredations
by French privateers in neutral waters adjacent to the
coastline of the United States; violating American
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obligations under the internationl law of neutrality.
To show how helpless the United States was to fulfill its
obligation to provide neutral waters President Adams
pointed out that attacks by French privateers were even
occurring within the very harbors of the nation. In 1800
President Adams had occasion to address Congress, and he
again urged that the navy be strengthened and coastal
303fortification be increased. In support of his argument,
President Adams highlighted the national economic interest
in secure foreign and interstate commerce. Clearly the
exercise of protective jurisdiction in the adjacent seas
was a matter of national economic and political interest,
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and intimately connected with, the exercise 'of the national
foreign affairs power♦
Defending commerce and meeting obligations under
international law were matters affecting national interests
on the high seas beyond the national boundary, or neutral
waters adjacent to the United States# But the national
conduct of foreign affairs was not limited to providing
protection for international commerce and in fact the
foreign affairs power was exercised to create treaty
obligations with other nations affecting the obligations
of the United States toward those nations within ocean
areas adjacent to the United States coastline# These
treaties were negotiated by the United States for the
nation and only the United States had the status and
capacity, as legal personality in international law, to enter
into such treaties, or to create obligations affecting the
national interest within the seas adjacent to the United
States#304
Between 177S and 1800 the United States became party
to fourteen bilateral treaties of significance in this
context# The subject-matter of these treaties, among
other items, generally included the granting of raost-
favored-nation status with regard to duties and tariffs,
thus demonstrating federal authority over commerce #
Maritime matters appeared within these treaties, and those
matters included protection of foreign vessels in American
(230)
waters, agreements by foreign nations to abstain from
fishing in the sea areas adjacent to the coastline of
the United States, agreement to respect American fishing
rights on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland, reciprocal
agreements to respect the passports of vessels from
neutral states, agreements to lend assistance to mariners
suffering shipwreck, and agreements to protect foreign
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vessels from piratical attacks within the adjacent seas.
None of the items of agreement in these treaties
indicate any claim to ownership of the adjacent seas.
Even the 1783 Treaty of Paris ending the War of the
American Revolution did not grant ownership of the adjacent
sea among the governmental interests which it ceded or
OA£
quit-claimed to the United States. The national
governmental interest over the adjacent seas which the
United States had received from Great Britain in the
Treaty of Paris, 1783, was not ownership of those seas
but ownership of islands in those seas within twenty
leagues of the coast. A line was drawn twenty leagues
from the coastline of the United States on the now famous
Mitchell map known as the "King George Map". This map
was appended to the peace treaty for the purpose of
showing the area of the adjacent sea within which the
United States received islands. The line was drawn not
so much to show islands belonging to the United States,
as to show that Bermuda and the Bahamas still belonged to
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Great Britain, No ownership or general jurisdiction over
the sea was described by or can be implied from the line
drawn on this map, and certainly such interests would not
have passed to the states as domestic administrative
units of government when the previous sovereign reserved
to itself the exercise of protective jurisdiction over
the adjacent sea. As such, the right to exercise that
jurisdiction would have passed to the sovereign United
States, the opposite signatory to the peace treaty, not
to domestic states*
Both before and after the 1783 Treaty of Paris other
treaties, treaties of amity and commerce, were negotiated
and concluded by the national government on behalf of the
United States with various sovereigns. Among these were
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treaties with Sweden (1783) and with Prussia (1785),
In these two treaties the United States agreed to protect
the vessels of the other party while in the seas adjacent
to the United States, Hie treaty with Prussia specifically
gave permission to Prussian citizens to frequent the
coastal waters of the United States,
Hie infamous Barbary Pirates were a plague to American
vessels in the Mediterranean as much as to European vessels.
After a de facto state of war had existed with several
Barbary States for a number of years the United States
concluded peace treaties with those states. These
(232)
treaties provide examples of the American perception of
the breath of coastal waters subject to neutral rights,
much the same as British treaties with these same states
revealed Great Britain's perception as to the breath of
such waters. In a 1786 Treaty of Peace with Morocco the
United States received a pledge from Morocco to extend
neutral waters privileges to American vessels within
OAQ
cannon-shot of her ports. Similar treaties were signed
with Tripoli and Algiers in 1797, which included the
agreement that neutral waters privileges would be accorded
American vessels in waters within range of coastal
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fortifications, In a 1797 treaty with Tunis there was
an agreement to reciprocally accord neutral waters
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rights. Respect for the safety of American vessels in
foreign ports was also the subject of a 1794 treaty with
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Great Britain, That treaty contained a mutual pledge
by the United States and Great Britain requiring the
vessels of each nation to accord full respect to the
municipal laws of the other when in that party's ports and
waters. Such an exchange was similar to the treaty between
Great Britain and Russia acknowledging the British right to
exercise jurisdiction over coastal waters.
In 1795 neutral waters privileges were negotiated with
Spain and in 1799 a supplemental treaty with Prussia made
neutral waters privileges reciprocal between that nation
(233)
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and the United States, Finally, by 1800 even France,
which had been engaged in a quasi-war with the United
States, agreed to accord neutral privileges to American
313
vessels when on the high seas. The United States and
France each further agreed to stay clear of the other*s
coastal fisheries.
What becomes apparent from the terms reached in these
many treaties is that a sufficient national economic
interest in commerce encouraged the United States to agree
to provide neutral waters privileges to many nations within
the seas adjacent to the coastline of the United States,
Moreover these treaties also demonstrate that the United
States did not claim ownership or a general jurisdiction
over the seas adjacent to its coastline* At most, these
treaties indicate an exercise of protective jurisdiction
and the extension of that protection over foreign vessels
and citizens as a matter of treaty obligation. This same
technique was used in the twentieth century to claim
jurisdiction over British vessels engaged in smuggling
liquor into the United States during prohibition. If
ownership of the adjacent seas was claimed, by the United
States where protective jurisdiction was exercised, or
had been passed to the United States by Great Britain in
1783, the United States would have been obliged to maintain
neutral status over the seas which it owned regardless of
(234)
the absence of treaty terms concerning neutral rights.
These treaties show that the United States and other
nations did not consider any obligation to provide
neutral waters to be due beyond inland waters of the
United States, including historic waters such as Delaware
Bay, unless under a treaty term, or that the description
of the adjacent seas as neutral water was in any way
connected with a claim of ownership or general jurisdiction
over those seas. In fact the United States did not
exercise its sovereign power to claim ownership of the
314
adjacent seas before 1800,
The exercise of the exclusive foreign affairs power
of the United States in negotiating these treaties
demonstrates the exercise of protective jurisdiction for
the benefit of other nations when an obligation of
protection had been created as a matter of international law
by the terras of a treaty. These international obligations
in the adjacent sea were created by the United States in its
capacity as sovereign—not by the several states in their
capacity as domestic sovereigns under the municipal law of
the United States.
C, Summary, Chapter VII
The jurisdiction exercised over the seas adjacent to
the coastline of the United States was a national act of a
(235)
protective nature, much the same as that exercise of
protective jurisdiction by Great Britain had been before
the War of the American Revolution# Underlining the
national authority and control over the adjacent seas
tile nation entered into several treaties granting various
rights to foreign vessels within the seas adjacent to the
United States, and creating corresponding duties for the
foreign nations in their adjacent seas# International
practice considered governmental interests in the seas
adjacent to a littoral state to be created and directed
as a right of sovereignty under international law. This
international law right of sovereignty is confirmed by
the rights to neutral waters established off the coastline
of the United States, and in foreign adjacent seas, which
the United States negotiated for her citizens•
Governmental rights and interests over adjacent seas were
always the product of the exercise of sovereign authority
and neither the American colonies nor their successor
states held that authority, or had the capacity to hold
such authority even if it had been passed to them as
colonies through their charters, or as states through A®
act of revolution or the treaty of peace in 1783#
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Conclusion, PART B
The United States replaced Great Britain in the role
of sovereign over the territory of America, That
replacement gave the United States as sovereign all the
authority, rights, and obligations of a nation in the
world community.
The authority which the United States received
included an inherent right under eighteenth century
international law to apply municipal law over the adjacent
seas as an exercise of protective jurisdiction. Prior to
the United States' exercise of that right, Great Britain
had exercised protective jurisdiction over the seas
adjacent to the American colonies. The rights of each
nation are distinct and therefore the United States cannot
be said to have succeeded to the right of Great Britain,
But the United States replaced Great Britain as sovereign
over the territory of America and supplanted the exercise
by Great Britain of protective jurisdiction over the seas
adjacent to America, Hie several states never
independently held the capacity to so act over the
adjacent sea.
The American colonies never achieved as much as de
facto status as legal personalities under international
law. Thus any rights they exercised over the adjacent sea
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were based on the underlying inherent right of Great
Britain to exercise protective jurisdiction within that
sea. Further* the colonies were always subordinate
domestic governments • Hie charters which created them
delegated no right to independently exercise protective
jurisdiction over the adjacent sea, and the subordinate
role, which they subsequently played in the affairs of
the sovereign establish that such right was never
delegated to or developed by them at some later time.
At the time of the revolution it was the people of
America and not thirteen local governments which revolted.
Prosecution of the War of the American Revolution was a
national act, and the constitutional development of the
national government during and subsequent to that war
vested the right to act for the sovereign people within
the community of nations, exclusively in the federal
government,
Aftier the 1783 Treaty of Paris the United States
formulated the application of municipal law under the
exercise of protective jurisdiction so that national
interests were understood to coalesce within a belt three
nautical miles in width measured from the coastline* Hie
United States considered that its international obligations
required neutral waters to be provided within the area of
the three-mile belt. Ownership over the area was not
(238)
claimed but the United States was the first nation to
adopt the three nautical mile measure as the seaward
extent for the exclusive exercise of protective
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jurisdiction for neutrality purposes#
(239)
Conclusion
The international law concept of sovereignty over
the coastal sea, which we know today, underwent an
evolutionary process through several centuries. This
dissertation has examined and analysed an early period
in that evolution when the governmental interest of littoral
nations did not encompass a right of ownership, general
jurisdiction, or exclusive right of exploitation understood
to be contained in sovereignty today. Rather, this analysis
has shown that during the seventeenth century and the
eighteenth century the governmental interest of a littoral
nation, reflected in state practice, under international
law was to apply limited bodies of municipal law to the
coastal sea area through the exercise of "protective
jurisdiction",
It was not until the nineteenth century that occupation
of coastal waters had been sufficiently established for a
littoral nation to assert rights of ownership which, when
coupled with extended national jurisdiction, resulted in
a national extension of sovereignty over coastal waters.
As this dissertation has shown, governmental rights exercised
by littoral nations in the coastal sea did not arise
spontaneously but instead evolved slowly based upon
(240)
other older inherent or prescriptive governmental rights
which were protective in nature, such as criminal
jurisdiction, admiralty jurisdiction, revenue laws,
defense measures, and property rights over appropriated
objects and resources extracted from the coastal sea.
Delay in the development of international law's
recognition of a right of ownership over the coastal sea,
in the case of Great Britain, resulted from preoccupation
with large areas of high seas rather than limited bands
of coastal waters. The preoccupation with the high seas
occurred during the seventeenth century as a result of
national economic interest in the North Sea herring fishery.
While no doubt jurisdiction was exercised over these high
seas areas, that exercise occurred at different locations
and at different times with the result that the degree of
control or occupation effected by fishing vessels and
naval vessels was transitory and thus would not support
a claim of ownership*
In the seas adjacent to her American colonies Great
Britain exercised jurisdiction, of a protective nature
during both the seventeenth century and the eighteenth
century not as a consequence of the total occupation of
the sea area concerned, but as an aspect of national
governmental power much as in the coastal seas off the
British Isles, When limited and local government powers
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were granted to the colonies through colonial charters
no power was granted to exercise general jurisdiction
over the coastal sea. The American colonies did not hold
any jurisdictional rights independent of Great Britain's
assertions of jurisdiction within the area of their
coastal seas.
As time passed, from the founding of the American
colonies until 1776, Acts of Parliament and even
colonial laws point to the continuing superior status of
Great Britain as sovereign. Retention of one aspect of
that sovereign status, the power to exercise jurisdiction
over the seas adjacent to the colonies through the vice-
admiralty courts, became a means by which Great Britain
sought to reinstate herself in actual control of her
colonial governments. In 1776, the attempt to regain
control of the colonies failed and the status of Great
Britain as sovereign ended. This dissertation established
that the jurisdiction exercised over the seas adjacent to
the colonies until 1776, was protective in nature and
applied under, authority of a sovereign.
The constituent states of the United States were never
independent sovereign states either as colonies or from the
time of revolution, and thus those states never individually
and independently held the power to exercise jurisdiction
for protection and regulation within the area of the
adjacent seas. The American struggle for independence
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from its inception was a national struggle, and it was
the new nation, the United States, which asserted rights
over the coastal sea as sovereign under international,
law. As a matter of history, as well as municipal law,
the individual states possess no exclusive ri$it to
exploit resources and property, or assert any general
Jurisdiction over the adjacent seas. Any rights granted
to the states within the coastal seas of file United States
are a matter of the allocation of sovereign power and
rights internally; a domestic matter. Thus the states
have no claim to exclusive rights of exploitation or
general jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond
what Congress might grant them. At present the states
have no interest beyond three nautical miles seaward of
the coastline in the Atlantic Ocean, Therefore the states
cannot assert governmental rights or property rights having
a historical basis or otherwise in international law which
might interfere with or direct formulation of the United
States policy for the Third United Nations Conference on
law of the sea.
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submerged by the sea.
22* As examples see Kirby v. Gibbs, 84 Eng. Rep.
183 (1668)j Attorney General v. Sir Edward Farmer, 83 Eng.
Rep. 125 (1667)j John Constable*s Case. 123 Eng. Rep. 367
(circa 1664).
the pre-seventeenth century municipal law view on
ownership of the sea was expressed by Plowden in a denial
of a property right of the Crown in the seabed. But that
view was reversed by Callis writing during the reign of
James I. See Fill ton, supra note 8. the initial impetus
toward development of a legal argument for Crown property
right over the sea and seabed through prerogative right
appeared in a book by Digges in 1569 entitled Arguments
grooving the Queens Matles propertye in the Sea Lands,
and salt shores thereof, and that no subject carm lawfully
hould eny part thereof but by the Klnges especiall graunte.
However both the views of Call is and Digges were also make¬
weight as discussed infra.
23. The jurisdiction exercised by a nation has been
discussed by the late Professor Friedman of Columbia
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University as being founded on four bases as follows:
(a) territory, •*.
(b) nationality, • ••
(c) protection of certain state interests
not covered under (a) & (b),
(d) protection of certain universal interests.
W. Friedman, International Law, 440 (1965).
The coastal sea was not territory, and was not
understood to be appurtenant to national territory until
late in the eighteenth century or early nineteenth century.
The other three bases for jurisdiction form the bases for
a protective jurisdiction analysis. Thus nationality or
citizenship always allows the sovereign to exercise
jurisdiction. Foreigners come within the exercise of such
protective jurisdiction in the last two categories. As an
example under (c) customs laws were applied over activities
on the high seas during the seventeenth century and
eighteenth century. Similarly, under (d) acts of piracy
were subject to the exercise of national jurisdiction for
protective purposes•
24. See generally Broadfoot's Case. 168 Eng. Rep, 76,
83 (1743); Rex v. Hampden (Ship Honey Case). Hargrave, 3
State Trials 826-1254 (1637), The Ship Money Case discusses
at length the responsibility of the Crown to place naval
vessels on the coastal seas for defense purposes as an
obligation of prerogative governmental authority.
25. Attorney General v, Richards, supra note 21, at
982.
26. The basis of the prerogative right was in the
common law. Halisbury, vol, 7, at 221, 226, Power vested
in the Crown by prerogative right could not be used to
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alter the law# Viner, vol. 16, at 561. Prerogative right
was not created by common law but was contained by and
dependent upon Che common law. Proclamations (noon.)» 77
Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353-1354 (1611).
27. dee note 22 supra. for examples.
28. See Lowe v. Govefct. supra note 11 for a case
dealing with foreshore property rights. For a case
dealing with derelict lands see Cifford v. Yarborough,
4 Eng. Rep. 1087 (1828). For an example of a grant of
a newly emerged island see XIX Calendar of Treasury Books.
96 [1704] (1961).
29. The Crown could grant the foreshore, the area
between high-water mark and low-water mark* Capel v.
Buszard. 130 Eng. Rep. 1237, 1242 (1829). For a grant
of periodically inundated marshes to make salt, near
Great Yarmouth see State Papers. Domestic. Car. X, 371
[1636-1637].
30. See XIX Calendar of Treasury Books. 62 [1704] (1961)
for a grant of commissions to find derelict lands. See
note 28 suprat for a grant of a newly emerged island.
A petition for lease of land left by the sea in
Aulkborough, Lincoln Co. appears In XIX Calendar of
Treasury Books3191 [1704] (1961).
31. Land gained from the sea is of three kinds:
1st. Per alluvionem, alluvion, or land
washed up by the sea.
2nd. Per relictionera, derelict land, or
land left dry by the shrinking or retirement
of the sea.
3rd. Per insulae productionera, ite,
islands or islets gradually or suddenly
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formed out of the sea, or at the mouths
of rivers, & c.
R. Hall, On the Sea Shore, 103-104 (2d edition 1875).
Also, see generally Whitaker v. Wife and the Lady
Newburgh, 84 Eng. Rep. 479 (1672); and see 39 Halisbury13
Laws of England, 560 (3rd edition 1952) (hereafter cited
as Halisbury, vol. , at •).
32. Huntley's Case, supra note 21.
33. Hie Crown held waste under prerogative right.
Humbleton v. Bucke, supra note 11• When the sea entered
and submerged land so that it could no longer be identified
or reclaimed it too became the waste and subject to the
Crown prerogative right. Wast. Inundation, 123 Eng. Rep.
276 (1564). But because such land could not be possessed
it could not be granted under the prerogative right alleged
to hold it. Attorney General v. Richards, supra note 21.
Hie exception was where the submerged soil v?as close to
shore on an open coast, or within arms of the sea or
otherwise contained in the body of a county and thus within
the nation. Grants of fishing weirs, or the right to erect
such weirs on the open coasts demonscrated this actual but
limited possession, by a subject, of the seabed. See
Hargrave, A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of
England, in which is reprinted Matthew Hale's De Jure Maris,
18-22 (1787).
34. See Halisbury. vol. 7, at 463.
35. See note 12, supra.
36. The seabed belonged to the Crown as waste under
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the prerogative right. See Wast. Inundation, supra
note 33,
37. Crown grants of franchise which vested a present
legal right in the grantee and thus were not naked
possibilities were valid even though no property right
applied over objects until appropriated and resources
until extracted. See generally the example of a grant to
mine coal in Campbell v. Leach, 27 Eng. Rep. 478 (1775).
The King held the capacity to grant valid legal rights
even when property rights arising under those legal rights
were mere possibilities. See Sir Edward Turner*s Case.
86 Eng. Rep. 968 (1678).
38. For examples see supra notes 11 and 20.
Hie leasing of an oyster bed is found in State Papers.
Domestic. Car. II, 541 [1673-1675]• The leasing of derelict
land and marsh areas is found in XXIV Calendar of Treasury
Books. 321 [1710] (1961); and XXVIII Calendar of Treasury
Books. 447 [1707] (1961). Even newly emerged islands were
leased. See XIX Calendar of Treasury Books. 96 [1704] (1961).
The Crown held prerogative right to sundry types of
ownerless property located within the coastal seas and
retrieved by subjects. Silver bars lost off Cornwall
belonged to the Cream, State Papers. Domestic, Jac. I, 97
[1619-1623]. Also ships sunk below low-water mark belonged
to the Crown. See Kirby v. Gibbs, supra note 22, The
privilege to recover items sunk in the sea was also granted
by the Crown. State Papers. Domestic. Car. I, 536 [1627-
1638]j State Papers, Domestic. Car. I, 313 [1625-1626],
39. For a discussion of rights to flotsam, jetsam,
ligan and wreck see Sir Henry Constable's Case, supra note
20, at 221,
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40. See Campbell v. Leach» supra note 37.
41. See Cadell MSS, Acc. No. 5381, box 8, folder 2,
Joint Print of Documents C'adell v. Allan. 13-14 (dated
October 17, 1903) located in special collections of the
Scottish National Library, Edinburgh.
42. Id., box 11, folder 1, (letter dated May 12, 1860)
The Opinion of George Dundao, (lawyer) at 1-3.
43. Id., folder 3, (map) entitled "Coallierys of
Barronstounness and Grange" (depicts boundary between
mines stretching Into the Firth of Forth) (1784).
Arms of the sea were within the boundaries of a county
and rights recognized at common law were sustained therein.
See Cremer v. Tookley's Case. 78 Eng. Rep. 227 (1628);
Towson v. Towson. 81 Eng. Rep. 342 (1615). It was bays,
arms of the seas, and navigable rivers which the Crown
actually possessed as waste through their location within
the nation.
44. Coal was mined at Culross prior to 1625. A.
Cochrane, Description of the Estate and Abbey of Culross,
127-128, 130-132 (1793).
In his book on Culross David Beveridge recites the
description by John Taylor who visited Sir George Bruce's
mine at Culross in 1618. According to that description
the mine could be entered from land or through an artificial
island. Drainage was achieved by a horse-mill pump,
allowing removal of coal for twenty-nine years before the
mine was destroyed by a storm in March, 1625. D. Beveridge,
Culross and Tulliallan. 158-162 (1885).
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45. For descriptions of the mine at Whitehaven see
R. Galloway, A History of Coal Mining in Great Britain,
953 93 (2d edition 1969); D. Hay, Whitehaven A Short
History, 47, 49-50, 52 (1966).
46. Hie beds of navigable rivers and arms of the sea
were property of the Crown under prerogative right. See
Hie King v. Smith, 99 Eng. Rep. 283, 285 (1780); Blustrode
v. Hall, 83 Eng. Rep. 1081 (1664); and Le Roy v. Trinity
House, 82 Eng. Rep. 986 (1663).
47. See Blundell v. Carterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190,
1202-1204, 1207 (1821), for a discussion of the public
rights to fishing and navigation under the jus publicum.
48. Tidal waters were presumed to be navigable
waters. Miles v. Rose, 128 Eng. Rep, 868 (1814), A
towpath could be established by custom along the shores
of navigable waters for the public purpose of navigation,
although there was no common law right to such use. Ball
v# Herbert, 100 Eng. Rep. 560 (1789).
Hie navigation servitude was potentially applicable
to all riparian property. See Farmeter v. Attorney General,
supra note 15.
49. Digging of ballast could be established by custom
over the foreshore based on the public purpose in navigation.
Mayor of Lynn Regis v. Taylor, 83 Eng. Rep. 629 (1684).
The public purpose in exercise of the public right of
navigation was superior to use of land by private property
owner. See Blundell v. Carterall, supra note 47, at 1203.
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50. Warfage duty could be levied on vessels and
their cargo distrained for payment of the service. See
for example Syedo v. Hay, 100 Eng. Rep. 1008 (1791), It
was also possible to distrain anchor and sails of a vessel
until harbor duties were paid. Sec Vinkostone v. Kbden,
91 Eng. Rep. 219 (1698). The restriction on such charges
was that some benefit to navigation be created. Warn v.
Prideaux, 84 Eng. Rep. 718 (1672).
51. Both public and private rights to fish were
subject to the public right of navigation. Gray v. Bond,
129 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1821).
Any encroachment on the navigation right could be
abated, A sunken vessel creating an obstacle to
navigation could be removed at the owner*s expense.
R, Bum, 2 Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer, 384
(1764). The Admiralty Court had the authority to remove
any nuisance obstructing the public right to navigation.
Ho, 112, Admiral, 83 Eng. Rep, 1264 (1665),
52. A subject could exercise the public right to
fishing in all navigable rivers, arms of the sea, and in
the sea because as a matter of municipal law the fishery
is prima facie in the Crown and thus common. Warren v.
Matthews, 91 Eng. Rep. 312 (1703).
There are three types of fisheryj that appendant to
the soil, which occurs in non-navigable waters; that which
is several, existing by grant ox* prescription in navigable
waters; and that which Is coramon, existing in navigable
waters and the sea. See generally Smith v. Kemp, 91 Eng.
Rep. 537 (1693).
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53. A separate fishery in non-navigable waters carried
a presumption of ownership of the soil. Separate Fishery,
98 Eng. Rep. 695 (1772). In navigable rivers an exclusive
fishery could be prescribed by riparian property owners,
Ward v. Cresswell» 125 Eng. Rep. 1165, 1166-1167 (1741),
but the riverbed was presumed to be in the Crown. Carter
v. Marcot, 98 Eng. Rep. 127, 128 (1768). Littoral
landowners could not prescribe a fishery and their property
remained subject to the public right, even to the extent of
crossing the real estate. Blundell v. Carterall, supra
note 47, at 1204.
54. After Magna Carta exclusive fisheries could be
created only by act of Parliament (curia regis) if the
fishery was in tidal water. See Halisbury» vol. 17, at
303.
55. Prescription presumes a grant prior to 1189,
continuously and exclusively held, or may be established
by a continuous use outside the memory of man. See
generally Halisbury. vol. 12, at 546.
56. Claude Morisot, responding to Selden in 1643,
rejected pretensions to British dominion of the high seas
because he regarded the high seas as incapable of being
occupied, that is, controlled, even by navigation which
was at best transient. C. Morisot, Qrbis Maritimi. 446-
447, 463 (1643).
57. See infra note 114.
58. In the seventeenth century there was no seaward
limit for the exercise of jurisdiction over snuggling
(256)
operations# Vessels were simply ordered to cruise the
coasts to prevent smuggling# See W# Masterson, Jurisdiction
in Marginal Seas# 3 (1929)#
Laws were enacted to control the evasion of duties by
smuggling thus attempting to gain funds to support Che
Crown's foreign policy# Such laws were not totally
effectual:
The battle with the smuggler went on continuously;
operations were often on a major scale# Since
1723, 229 boats engaged in snuggling had been
confiscated and some 2,000 persons prosecuted;
in the process 250 Customs officers had been
beaten up or otherwise abused, and six had been
murdered# The extent of liquor smuggling was
shown by the seizure of 192,515 gallons of brandy.
As it must be presumed that far more cargoes
escaped than were ever taken it is clear that
there must have been a very large leak of potential
revenue # As for tobacco it was calculated that
the government was defrauded of one-third of the
duties it should have had# Here the loss was due
less to outright smuggling than to the ingenious
ways in which the merchants manipulated the
methods by which die duties were collected#
15. Marshall s Eighteenth Century England# 148 (1970)#
59# See An Act for preventing Frauds and Abuses in
die publick Revenues or Excise, Customs, Stamp-duties,
Post-office and House-money, 6 Geo# 1, c# 21 §§ 29, 31
(1719)#
For odicr examples see An Act for die more effectual
Prevention of Snuggling in this Kingdom, 24 Geo. 3, c. 47
§ 26 (1784); Axi Act for more, effectually preventing die
Mischiefs arising to the Revenue and Commerce of Great
Britain and Ireland# from the Illicit and Clandestine trade
to and from the Isle of Man, 5 Geo# 3, c# 39 § 7 (1165);
An Act for the further Improvement of his Majesty's Revenue
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and Customs, 3 Geo, 3, c» 22 § 5 (1762),
See also the version of these statutes enacted for
application in the American colonies, An Act for granting
certain Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in
America, 4 Geo# 3, c# 15 § 33 (1763)*
60# An Act for indemnifying Persons who have been
guilty of Offenses against the Law made for securing the
Revenues of Customs and Excise, and for enforcing those
Laws for the future, 9 Geo# 2, c# 35 § 23 (1736)#
61# Id., §§ 6, 10, 13, 18, 25, 27$ An Act for the
better securing, and further Improvement, of the Revenue
of Customs, Excise, and Inland and Salt Duties, 5 Geo# 3,
c# 43 §§ 7, 27 (1765).
62# An Act for the more effectual Prevention of
Smuggling in this Kingdom, 24 Geo# 3, c# 47 § 26 (1784);
An Act for preventing frauds and abuses in the publick
Revenue of Excise, customs, stamp-duties, post-office,
and house-money, 6 Geo# 1, c# 21 § 32 (1719).
63# Flotsam as such was exclusively in the admiralty
subject-matter jurisdiction# The Lady vvyndhaxa's Case, 86
Eng. Rep. 1081 (1678)# But customs violations were
cognisable in the Exchequer Court, a court of record,
which asserted a prior exclusive jurisdiction over goods
involved in attempts to evade customs laws# Score v# The
Lord Admiral# 114 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 (1709); Pidgeon v#
Trent, 84 Eng. Rep. 426 (1675); Sounder's Case# 72 Eng#
Rep, 545 (1586).
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64. Discharging goods out of a ship within a
prohibited distance from shore was considered to be
tantamount to placing the goods on land and thus raised
the legal fiction of being infra corpus commitatus allowing
municipal courts to assert jurisdiction. See generally
A Case of Custom. 77 Eng. Rep. 1299, 1300 (1582).
65. The Happy Isabel, Ex, Ct. Memoranda Roll, 29-30
Geo. 2, Trinity Term, No. 24 (1757) (located in the Public
Record Office, London).
66. The Endeavor. Ex. Ct. Memoranda Roll, 11 Geo. 3
Easter Term, No, 108 (1771) (located in the Public Record
Office, London).
67. The Uffro Anna. Ex. Ct. Memoranda Roll, 4 Geo,
3 Michaelmas Term, No. 222 (1764) (located in tile Public
Record Office, London).
68* The Hilling Mind, Ex. Ct. Memoranda Roll, 13 Geo.
3 Easter Term, No. 222 (1773) (located in the Public
Record Office, London); The N.S. Concerto8 Ex. Ct.
Memoranda Roll, 5 Geo. 3, Michaelmas Term, No. 222 (1810)
(located in the Public Record Office, London).
69. See generally W. Blacks tone, 3 Commentaries on
the Laws of England, 70 (R. Burn editor 1783); J. Godolphin,
A View of the Admiral Jurisdiction, 28, 61, 153 (1661).
See also a copy of a letter patent given to Sir Thomas
Salisbury installing him as an admiralty judge in 1752,
printed in Reports of Cases Determined by the High Court
of Admiralty, 346-347 (R. Marsden editor 1885).
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70. Common law courts attempted to oust admiralty
jurisdiction from the maritime areas of counties by
asserting common law jurisdiction over "arras of the sea"
where it was possible to see the opposite shore# Such
bodies of water were thus said to be infra corpus coamifcatus«
Sea generally The Case ox the Admiralty, 77 Eng. Sep# 1451
(1610); Hal istarry, vol. 8, at 463#
Hie first of several statutes, enacted at the prompting
of common law judges, limited the admiral's jurisdiction
to things done upon the sea. What things the admiral and
his deputies shall meddle, 13 Rich. 2, c# 5 (1389)# See
also, In what Places the Admiral's Jurisdiction doth lie,
15 Rich# 2, c. 3 (1391); A remedy for him who is wrongfully
pursued in the Court of Admiralty, Hen, 4, c# 11 (1400),
The Admiral had no non-ci"iminal jurisdiction within the
body of counties# John Constable's Case, supra note 22,
at 369#
By the eighteenth century common law courts interfered
with application of admiralty law only when substantive
common law appeared to be infringed within common law
jurisdiction# Anonymous, 91 Eng. Rep. 829 (1698)* In
contrast, from the reign of Elizabeth I to Charles II the
jurisdiction apparently over every matter of which they
could take cognizance# Halisbury, vol# 1, at 47.
71# The admiralty jurisdiction was in tidal waters
and of tilings maritime. It was an exclusive jurisdiction
over things maritime. See R. Zouche, The Jurisdiction of
the Admiralty of England Asserted, 17 (1663).
72. As an example, a prohibition would issue against
the Admiralty Court taking a case involving a suit for a
seaman's wages when services were solely within the boundary
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of a comity. Didolph v. Bruce. 88 Eng. Rep. 1282 (1699).
73* The Admiralty Court could not take cognizance
of a plea in contract unless the cause of action arose
upon the sea. Don Diego Servients D'Acune v. Jolliff> 80
Eng. Rep. 228 (circa 1724); see also Benaen v. Jeffries.
91 Eng. Rep. 994 (1697). But if a contract was for
furtherance of an ocean voyage, such as that entered into
by seamen, then a libel could be made against the vessel
in the Admiralty Court for wages even when the ship never
left the county• Osman v. Hells. 88 Eng. Rep. 864 (1705).
Another example is a bottomry bond in which a "sea risk"
was essential. The Royal Arch. 166 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1857).
74. See Justin v. Bellam. 92 Eng. Rep. 38 (1702).
See also, as examples, Msntone v. Gibbons. 100 Eng. Rep.
974 (1685); and Cossart v. Lawdley. 87 Eng. Rep. 159 (1607).
75. Bottomry bond or hypothecation could only be done
outside the boundaries of counties. Johnson v. Ship-pin.
91 Eng. Rep. 37 (1703). Contracts for ship supplies made
in the body of a county, or made outside the body of a
county but not necessary for continuance of a voyage were
on the basis of personal obligation of the owner under
common law jurisdiction. See Coomes v* Jenkinson, 84 Eng.
Rep. 78S (1673); Anonymous. 83 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1664); and
The Spanish Ambussadour v. Buntish» 80 Eng. Rep. 1157 (1615).
Even the Isle of Jersey was classified as a foreign
place to order to uphold the maritimeness of a foreign
bond. Hie Barbara. 165 Eng. Rep. 514 (1801).
76. Matters which were not of a "maritime nature", but
were done on foreign soil, by the eighteenth century were
excluded from admiralty jurisdiction. See Don Diego
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Servient© D'Acune v. Jolliff, supra note 67, Prior to
common law's assertion of jurisdiction over such matters
by a fictional pleading of locus within a county (see
Morten v. Spencer» 83 Eng. Rep. 905 (1662)) the Admiralty
Court and the High Court of Chivalry took cases which
involved foreign parties or which arose from circumstances
beyond seas. See Houghton's Case. 123 Eng. Rep. 789 (1610).
See also A. Harding, A Social History of English Law. 162
(1966). The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man were
outside the common law and the Court of Admiralty and High
Court of Chivalry had jurisdiction of complaints arising
there. A, Harding, supraa at 301. Eventually the Court of
Chivalry, which was not a court of record and thus could
not fine or imprison although it could hear complaints
civil and criminal, fell into disuse because it was a weak
court.
The Isle of Man was not within the Kingdom of England,
and thus the inhabitants were governed by their own law.
Isle of Mann Case. 123 Eng. Rep. 575 (1598). The Isle of
Gurnsey had a law separate from that of the common law.
Clugas v. Penaluna. 100 Eng. Rep. 1122 (1791).
77. For examples of insurance contracts dealing with
maritime matters see M. Dalton, The Country Justice. 232
( ), discussing cotmon law jurisdiction over insurance
fraud by causing a ship to founder. Similarly a contract
for the purchase of a ship although arguably a maritime
matter, especially when done at sea was nonetheless within
common law jurisdiction. Edwards v. Harben, 100 Eng. Rep.
315 (1788); Hook v. Morston, 91 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1698).
Also charter party contracts chartering the ship were
within common law jurisdiction. Hie Royal Arch, supra
note 73.
Posting of a bond protected reluctant minority owners.
(262)
Lambert v. Aeretree, 91 Eng. Rep. 911 (1695). But common
law courts had jurisdiction for enforcement if the vessel
were lost. More v. Rowbothorn, 87 Eng. Sep. 919 (1705).
Prohibitions prevented the Admiralty Court from enforcing
its bonds. Knight v. Perry, 90 Eng. Rep, 373 (1690).
78. Seamen could libel in rem against the vessel for
their wages. The Peerless, 15 Eng. Rep. 182, 185 (I860);
Sandys v. East-India Company, 90 Eng. Rep. 43 (1684),
The coirsnon law courts had jurisdiction over wage contracts
through in personam actions. Brown v. Benn, 92 Eng. Rep.
322 (1706).
For example of class suits by seamen for wages see
Mariners v. Jones, 124 Eng. Rep. 7 (1619); The Mariner's
Case, 88 Eng. Rep. 269 (1725). Class suits enabled a
group to bring a single suit as a class to recover their
individual losses, rather than bringing separate actions
for each claim.
79. See Day v. Searle, 93 Eng. Rep. 973 (1734), If
under seal, a seaman's wage contract was removed from
admiralty jurisdiction. Mentone v. Gibbons, supra note 74.
If the wage contract was for labor solely within a county
then the common law courts would issue a prohibition to
the Admiralty Court if a libel was filed there for wages.
Ross v. Walker, 95 Eng. Rep. 801, 802 (1765).
See also Howe v. Napier, 98 Eng. Rep. 13 (1766); Buck
v. Atwood, 93 Eng. Rep, 832 (1727); and Opy v. Child, 91
Eng. Rep. 33 (1693) for examples where the contract for
seaman's labor varied from recognized essential maritime
standards and came within common law jurisdiction.
80. See Johnson v. Shippln, supra note 75.
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81. When work was done on a vessel by a craftsman
within the body of a county the common law courts had
jurisdiction and suit was brought against the owner
personally. On the other hand, if the work was done upon
the sea in the course of a voyage the Admiralty Court held
jurisdiction and the vessel could be libeled
Watklnson v. Bernadiston. 24 Eng. Rep. 769 (1726).
82. See note 76 supra.
83. Collision within the body of a county was within
common law jurisdiction. Drewry v. Twiss. 100 Eng. Rep.
1174 (1792)5 Goodwin v. Tomkins« 74 Eng. Rep. 110 (circa
1669).
84. See Caulc v. Cooke. 84 Eng. Rep. 313 (1610), for
a discussion of proceedings against a vessel, in the
Court of Admiralty, for personal injury received in the
course of a voyage through attempts at furtherance of the
voyage. See Sparrow v. Caruthers, 93 Eng. Rep. 1153
(1746) for a case at common law dealing with damages to
cargo while in a lighter at tlx© port of London. See also
Violet v. Blague. 79 Eng. Rep. 439 (1619). Were a
plaintiff to libel a vessel in the Admiralty Court for
such damages received while within cannon law jurisdiction,
the defendant party would have an action at caramon law for
any damages caused as a result of filing the libel in rem.
Child v. Sands. 91 Eng. Rep. 33 (1693).
Examples of non-«jaritime torts arising on the high
seas and suable at common law included a suit in trover
for wrongful conversion of goods on the high seas see
Le Pool v. Tryan. 82 Eng. Rep. 871 (1655); and see a case
at common law dealing with assault and battery on the high
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seas, Griffiths v. Dunnett, 135 Eng. Rep, 407 (1844).
The common law jurisdiction over non-roaritime torts
on the high seas was asserted through the pleading of a
ficticious locus for the event within a county. See note
76 supra. The Admiralty Court was unable to assert
jurisdiction by this technique of ficticious pleading.
Johnson v. Drake, 83 Eng. Rep. 884 (1662); Anonymous, 77
Eng. Rep. 1355 (1611).
85, For an example of damages caused by a derelict
vessel on the high seas later libeled in rem within the
body of a county see Turner v. Smith. 82 Eng. Rep. 1161
(1668).
See also other examples Turner v* Neele, 83 Eng. Rep.
388 (1669); Duke of York v. Linstred, 83 Eng. Rep. 1169
(1664); Beak v. Thyrwhet, 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (1607).
For an example of a vessel becoming derelict in port
and being within common law jurisdiction for damages see
Le Seigneur Admiral v. Linsted, 82 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1664).
For cases dealing with comaon law jurisdiction over
anchored vessels and other vessels within the boundaries
of counties see Wood v. Hannah, (1669), printed in A.
Browne, 1 A Dompendius View of the Civil Law, 83 (appendix)
(1797); Dorrington's Case, 72 Eng. Rep, 995 (1619). Such
vessels could be seized and attacked at common law. Score
v# file Lord Admiral, supra note 60, at 778 (1709);
Polyxphcn v. Branford, 83 Eng. Rep. 920 (1662).
86. Taking goods on Che high seas vi et armis was an
act of piracy triable by the Admiralty Court under the
Great Seal, Don Diego Servients D'Acune v. Jolllff, supra
note 67, Admiralty criminal jurisdiction extended within
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the bodies of counties for acts of murder and mayhem. See
Hie Eliza Jane (1836), 3 Hag. Adm. 355; Hie Elleanor (1805),
5 Ch. Rob. 39; and The King v. Harsh, 81 Eng. Rep. 23 (1615).
See also Sandys v. East-India Company, supra note 78.
87. See Trial of Thomas Vaughan, 90 Eng. Rep. 1280
(1696).
88. Lacy's Case. 74 Eng. Rep. 246 (1583). Admiralty
criminal jurisdiction was first limited to "great ships".
The Eliza Jane, supra note 86,
89. See King v. Solgard, 93 Eng. Rep, 1055 (1738),
90. See for example The King v. Savage, 82 Eng. Rep.
542, 543 (1648); and Hie Case of the Admiralty, supra
note 70.
91. Goods taken by a piratical act were within
admiralty jurisdiction. No. 1044, Piracy, 72 Eng. Rep.
886 (1605). Admiralty had exclusive original jurisdiction
over goods taken by piratical act on the high seas.
Anonymous, 86 Eng. Rep. 199 (1678), Sale of such goods
in a market overt created property rights at common law
and brought the goods within that jurisdiction. Queen
v. Steer, 91 Eng. Rep. 832 (1696).
Goods taken by pirates within the bodies of counties
were within common law jurisdiction. See Sheers v. Martyn,
83 Eng. Rep, 1244 (1665); Hildegrand. Brimston and Baker's
Case, 81 Eng. Rep, 488 (1616); Primston v. Court of
Admiralty, 81 Eng. Rep. 126 (1616); and Opinion of the
Justices, 73 Eng. Rep. 886 (1605). In these cases
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prohibitions would issue to the Admiralty Court if it
attempted to assert jurisdiction.
92. Sec Opinion of the Justices, supra note 84; and .
Hie Spanish Ambassador v. Pa-antes, 81 Eng. Rep. 381 (1612).
93. For discussion of the theory of "local obedience"
and obligations of foreigner© within the national territory
see M. Foster, Crown Cases. 185 (1762); and No. 188. 82
Eng. Rep. 434 (1641). Where the cause of action, the
parties and the locus were all foreign jurisdiction would
not be exercised. The Ida. 167 Eng. Rep. 3 (I860).
Protective jurisdiction analysis reveals that when
municipal law was applied to foreigners it was a result of
tine sovereign's interest in requiring the foreigner's
activity to conform with local activity. Maritime
contests provide examples of such interests, such as,
rules of navigation, anchorage areas, pilot regulations,
and liability for tortious injury. King v, Lambe. 101
Eng. Rep. 44 (1792); and King v, Heele, 101 Eng. Rep.
1367 (1799).
No general criminal jurisdiction was applied over
coastal waters during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. See Lord Cockbum's Opinion in The Franconia
(Queen v. Keyn), [1876] L. R. Exeh* Div. 63,
See Sherley's Case, 77 Eng. Rep, 384 (1557),
94. John Selden in his Mare Clausum described the flag
salute as follows:
It was accounted Treason, if any Ship whatsoever
had not acknowledged the Dominion of the King of
England in his own Sea, by Striking Sail. And
they we're not to be protected upon Account of
Amitie, who should in any wise presume to do the
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contrarie. Penalties also were appointed by
the King of England in the same manner as if
mention were made concerning a crime committed
ir. some Territorie of his Island
Supra note 7, at 118.
Sir Leoline Jenkins in a charge to a grand jury at
Southwark Admiralty Sessions, February 18, 1680, dealing
with criminal matters, with regard to the flag salute
and demonstrating its protective nature, stated as follows:
How the second part of your enquiry is of
transgressions against the ancient laws and
customs of the admiralty, such as are those
relating to the flag; and in this enquiry you
are to be very careful!, for thereon depends
the honour of the nation, and if tills be lost,
all sovereignty and dominion will be lost add
consequently trade; and thereupon you are to
enquire whether commanders do their duty in
requiring respect due the King's flag.
Reports of Cases Determined by the High Court of Admiralty,
supra note 63, at 255,
95. A vessel was considered to be an extension of
the territory of its flag. See generally Hie Peerless,
supra note 72; and Halisbury, vol. 10, at 319.
96. Hie three cases of murder are Acow's Case, 127
Eng. Rep# 741 (1806); Sauvajot's Case, 127 Eng. Rep. 741
(1799); and Prevot's Case. 127 Eng. Rep, 777, 778 (1709).
97. For example foreign pirates seising goods of a
citizen while on the high seas were thought to be subject
to the sovereign's authority because the goods were still
the property of a subject. Ho. 188, supra note 93.
98. Piracy was an international offense* E. Coke,
1 Institutes of the Laws of England, Hie Fourth, 134-137
(1797). Acts of piracy were sufficient to support a charge
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of treason# See An Act to amend en Act in the eleventh
Year of the Reign of King William the Third, intituled,
an Act for the more effectual suppression of Piracy, 18
Geo. 2, c. 30 §§ 2-3 (1745).
99. An Act to amend an Act in the eleventh Year of
the Reign of King William the Third, intituled, an Act
for the more effectual suppression of Piracy, 18 Geo. 2,
c. 30 § 1 (1745).
100. Id. §g 2—3.
101. The maritime essence was required for admiralty
subject-matter jurisdiction over crimes. See Trial of
Thomas Vaughan, supra note 87.
For cases dealing with ransom and the maritime essence
of crimes connected with ransom of a vessel or crewman
see Trantor v. Wilson, 87 Eng. Rep. 776 (1704); Mo. 29
Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 849 (1703); and Wilson v. Bird,
91 Eng. Rep. 911 (1695).
102. Certain common law rules of procedure were imposed
on criminal trials in the Admiralty Court. See the
statute, For Pirates, 28 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1536).
103. Trial of pirates could be held out of the realm,
but such trials were not restricted by common law rules.
See An Act for the Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 A
12 W. AM., c. 7 (1700); made perpetual in An Act making
perpetual...An Act of the eleventh and twelfth years of
the Reign of King William the Third, for the more
effectual Suppression of Piracy, 6 Geo. 1, c. 19 (1719).
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104. For example see All Persons may buy Woolls.
The Sea shall be open., IE Edw. 3, Stat. 1, c. 5 (1389);
and A Remedy for him who having a Safe Conduct is robbed
upon the Sea, 31 Hen. 6, e. 4 (1452).
The exercise of protective iurisdiction under these* V
two statutes accords with Byhkershoek's view of
jurisdiction over sea areas much later:
In this way it happened that, at the beginning
of the seventeenth century, probably no part
of the European Seas was looked upon as free
from proprietary claims of some power. At any
rate, most of them were actually subject in a
greater or lesser degree to sovereign
domination.
C. Van Bynkershoek, 1 Pe Dominio Maris Dissertatlo. 15-16
(2d edition J. Scott editor 1744) [Carnegie Classics of
International Law 1923].
105. For example, see Proclamation of James I. For
the Restraint of Foreigners Fishing on the British Coasts,
dated May 7, 1609, printed in T. W. Fulton, supra note 8.
Also see note 8 supra«
106. Admiralty Prize Court jurisdiction was exclusive.
Smart v, Wolff, 100 Eng. Rep, 600, 610 (1789). Although
the prize jurisdiction began to develop only after 1520,
by 1616 that jurisdiction was exclusive. E. Roscoe, A
History of the English Prize Court, 18 (1924),
A naval force must take the prise fov the capture to
be valid under prise law. Broom's Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 34
(1697); Morris v. Bercley.84 Eng. Rep. 277 (1669).
Letters of marque were issued to private persons
making them privateers in times of war, or in times of
peace enabling them to recover from foreign nationals the
value of goods taken by one of their countrymen without
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the holder of the letter of marque being classified as a
pirate. Once a vessel and goods were seized as prize
they were then condemned in the Admiralty Prize Court which
vested ownership in the Captor, E, Statham, Privateers
and Privateering, 7, 9 (1910),
107, The enemy lost its property right to a res at
the time of capture. The Reynard, 165 Eng. Rep. 51, 52
(1778); Verdale v. Marten, 84 Eng. Rep. 787 (1673). After
condemnation property rights to a res vested in the
captor unless there was a dispute as to moiety interests
which would be litigated at common law because they
involved substantive common law's allocation of property
rights. Beake v. Tirrell, 90 Eng. Rep. 379 (1690). The
exception was when the dispute over property rights fell
within ancillary jurisdiction of the Admiralty Prize Court,
Broom's Case, supra note 99; Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1135
(1692); Somer's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 461 (1590).
108. The common law courts would prevent the Admiralty
Prize Court from acting contrary to property rights of
citizens as vested by the substantive common law. Home v.
Earl Camden, 126 Eng. Rep. 295 (1790). Common law allowed
only its legal theories to establish property rights. For
example see Thompson v. Smith, 84 Eng. Rep. 99 (1667).
The Admiralty Prize Court had exclusive jurisdiction over
matters of prize, and only ancillary jurisdiction over
matters of property right. Smart v. Wolff, supra note 106.
Once a prize was condemned by the Admiralty Prize Court,
the common law vested property right over the res in the
captor. Prior owners could not challenge the right of the
new owner in the Admiralty Court or at common law.
Weston's Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 785 (1611).
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109* Items coming within prize jurisdiction remained
there even if landed and sold. Thus rights of a purchaser
of the res could not prevent the Admiralty Prize Court
from deciding whether the prize was valid, and if invalid
from returning the res to the original owner# Racily v#
whitwcll, 84 Eng. Rep# 524 (1672)# Rut if the res was
sold in a market overt the prize jurisdiction ceased#
Smart v# Uolffc, supra note 106; Sir John Watt's Case# 123
Eng. Rep. 797 (1611). See also PIayes Case, 83 Eng. Rep.
1025 (1663).
110.. Hie body of law applied by the Admiralty Prize
Court was distinct from other bodies of admiralty law.
See for example Le Caux v. Eden. 99 Eng. Rep. 375, 386
(1781). Ordinarily the Admiralty Prize Court decided
according to international law, but it could not apply
international law to avoid the strictures of municipal
law. iiunes v. Cornelius. 90 Eng. Rep. 38 (1684), See
F. Wiswall, Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and
Practice Since 1800. 22-23 (1970).
See also The -WalsIngham Packet, 165 Eng. Rep. 244,
246-247 (1799),
111. Heither neutral nor enemy goods or vessels
captured in neutral waters in violation of the recognized
bo^y of international prize law could be condemned as
valid prise# See E. Roscoe, supra note 106, at 12-13.
See also Twee Gebroeders (Ho» 1)» 165 Eng. Rep. 422, 423
(1800); Twee Gebrocders (Ho. 2). 165 Eng. Rep. 485 (1801).
James I caused a map to be published, delimiting by a
straight baseline method drawn from headland to headland
around England, coastal packets of water which were declared
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neutral and thus were to be free of all hostile actions
by vessels of nations hostile to other nations whose
vessels were in these coastal waters* Such coastal
pockets of water were known as the King's Chambers *
See T. W* Fulton, supra note 8, at 119*
112* See Reports of Cases Determined by the High
Court of Admiralty, supra note 69, at 231-233*
113# See A Remedy for him who is wrongfully pursued
in the Court of Admiralty, Hen* 4, c* 11 (1400); In what
Places the Admiral's Jurisdiction doth lie, 15 PdLch# 2,
c* 3 (1391); and What things the Admiral and his Deputies
shall meddle, 13 Rich* 2, Stat* 1, c* 5 (1389)*
114* J* Solden, Hare Clausum (M* Hedhura translator
1652) [Carnegie Classics of International Law]; H# Grotius,
Marc Liberum* (1635) [Carnegie Classics of International
Law] *
See a discussion of sixteenth century international
law writers in, Senior, "Early Writers on Maritime Law",
37 L# Q, Rev. 323 (1921)*
115* See Thomas Digges, Arguments prooving the Queens
Ha ties propertyc in the Sea Landcs, and salt shores
thereof* and that no subject cann lawfully hould any parte
thereof but by the Ktniscs especiall graunfcc (1659)*
116* R* Callis, Upon the Statute of Sewers, 39, 45,
57, 64, 76 (4til edition 1824).
117. Id. at 45-47, 64.
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Call Is was not wrong in arguing that the Crown
exercised authority over the seas. But the authority was
never shown to Ik; generally applied over foreigners# Thus
apparently only subjects were ordered not to harm friendly
foreigners in a fourteenth century statute# Ho friendly
stranger'was to be harmed in the British Seas, 13 Rich#
2, c# 5 (1390)#
11S# See note 8 supra#
119# See 11# Grotius, supra note 114, at 7, 10-12,
30, 47.
120. Id. at 22, 36.
121# W# Welwood, An Abridgement of All Sea-Lawes >
188, 193, 219-223, 236#
In an analysis of Weiwood's works one author points
out that Welwood's concept of possession of sea was based
on the inherent contiguity of marginal sea areas to land#
J# Oudendijk, Status and Extent of Adjacent Waters# 58
(1970).
122# J# Boroughs, Sovereignty of the British Seas# 12,
20, 30-32, 81-85, 92#
123# See J# Seldcn, supra note 114, at 118# Sec also
R# Zouehe, An Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure or of
Law between Nations, and Questions concerning the Same# 74
(J# Bricrly translator 16 ) [Carnegie Classics of
International Lav/ 1911]#
124. J, Selden, supra note 114, at 119-126, 135-138,
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355. See generally T. W. Fulton, supra note 8, at 118.
125. Id. at 355, 365, 429. The seas which Selden
thought met the test of occupation through control are
described by him as follows:
Hie Sea encompassing great Britain, which in
general wee term the British sea, is divided
Into four parts, according to the four Quarters
of the World. On the West lie's the Vergivian
Sea, which also takes the name of the
Deucaledonian, where it washeth the Coast of
Scotland. And this Vergivian, wherein Ireland
is scituate, the Irish Sea is recond to be a
part, called in ancient time the Scythian Vale,
but now the Channel of St. George. So that as
well that which washeth the Western Coast of
Ireland, as that which f1owe*s between great
Britain and Ireland, is to be called the
British sea,
* * * * *
Towards the North this Sea is named the Northern
Caledonian, and Deucaledonian Sea, wherein lie
scatter*d the Orcades islands, Thule, and others,
which being called the British or Albionian Isles;
yea, and Brittannides, give name to the neighboring
Sea.
*****
Upon the Eastern Coast of Britain flows the
German Sea (so called by Ptolomie, because it
lie's before the German Shore. On the South,
flows that which is particularly noted by
Ptclomie to be the British Sea. But all that was
called also the British Sea, which extends itself
like a half raoon along the French Shore, through
the Bay or Creek of Acquitain, unto the Northern
Coast of Spain.
Id. 182-184.
126. Selden was arguing for ownership according to
occupation and possession standards of contemporary
international law. His argument for occupation was based
on the presence of commercial vessels and naval vessels
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as follows!
It is true indeed which an eminent man saithj
That the Sea hath bean en la led by Occupation,
not" for' reason onejy, becans men had "so
enjoled the hand, nor is die Act or intent of
the" "minde ''suff'i'c'ient' thereto; "but" tHat there"
is a accessible of son external Act, from whence
this'" Occupation may bee undor'stood. Therefore
Arguments' a«a not' to' 'bee 'derived altogether from
a bare Occupation or Dominion of Countries,
whose Shores are washed by the Seas But from
such a private or peculiar use or enjoyment of
the Sea, as consist's in a setting forth ships
to Sea, either to defend or make good the
Dominion; in prescribing Rules of navigation to
such as pass through it, in receiving such
Profits and Commodities as are peculiar to every
kinde of Sea-Dominion whatsoever; and which is
the principal, either in admitting or excluding
others at pleasure.
Id. at 138.
127. IU Hale, De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdam,
iii-iv, vi-ix-xi, xlv, xxxvi, xl-xli (circa 1663) [printed
in R. Hall, On the Sea Shore (1830)]»
128. Hale describes occupation of the coastal sea as
follows ;
The king of England hath the propriety as well
as the jurisdiction of the narrow seas; for he
is in a capacity of acquiring the narrow and
adjacent sea to his dominion by a kind of
possession which is not compatible to a subject;
and accordingly regularly the king hath that
propriety in the seas but a subject hatin not
nor indeed cannot have that propriety in the sea,
through a whole tract of it, that the king hath;
because without a regular power he cannot possibly
possess it....
* i; k k k
The civilians tell us truly, nihil or&seseribitur
nisi quod possidetur. the king may prescribe
tiie propriety o£ the narrow seas, because he
may possess them by his navies and power. A
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subject cannot. But a subject may possess a
navigable river, or creek or arm of the sea;
because these may lie within the extent of
his possession and acquest.
Id. at xxxi-xxxiii•
129. For a discussion of the Anglo-Dutch fishery
dispute and the three seventeenth century wars resulting
from it see T. VJ. Fulton, supra note 8, at 378-516.
130. S. Pufendorf, Dc Jure Naturae Ft Gentium Lifcri
Octo, 552, 556, 561-565 (C. Oldfather translator, 1688
edition) [Carnegie Classics of International Law 1931].
131. P • Meadows, Observations Concerning the Dominion
and Sovereignty of the Sea. 28-29, 44 (1689).
132. 1 Traduction de Hu^o Grotius. Le Droit de la
Guerre et de la Paly., xxix-xxxi (J. Barbeyrac translator,
1724).
133. C. Van Bynkershoek, 1 Dc Dorainio Maris Dissertatio,
17, 32, 43-49.
See S. Pufendorf, supra note 130.
134. S. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles
of Natural Law. 21, 84, 87, 110 (C. Fenwick translator,
1758) [Carnegie Classics of International Law 1916].
135. Id. at 106-110. In fact Vattel wrote of the
coastal sea. occupation as follows:
The various uses to which the sea near the
shore can be put render it a natural object
of ownership. Fish, shells, pearls, amber,
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etc., may be obtained from it, Now with
respect to all these tilings the resources of
the coast seas are not inexhaustible, so that
the nation to which the shore belongs may
claim for itself an advantage thus within its
reach and may make use of it, just as it has
taken possession of the lands which its people
inhabit.
Id. at 107.
136. C, Wolff, Jus Gentium Methods of Scientific
Partractaturn» 72-73 (J. Drake translator, 1764) [Carnegie
Classics of International Lax*? 1934],
137. Id. at 69-74, 184. Wolff stated his belief, that
the high seas could not be owned, as follows:
Therefore it is inconsistent that any nation
should have ownership in the sea, consequently
the open sea is not in the number of those
tilings, the ownership of which can be acquired
by occupation, therefore of itself it is not
capable of occupation.
Id. at 71.
138. R. Valin,2.Hoveau Commentsire Sur L'Ordonuance
De La Marine, Pu Mois D'Aout 1681, 684, 698 (1766).
139. A. Browme, 1 A Compendius View of the Civil Law,
64 (1797).
140. Sir Henry Maine wrote that it was in the nineteenth
century x^hen nations came to exercise the same jurisdiction
over their coastal seas as they had on their land territory.
H. Maine, International Law, 39 (1888). Certainly this
was true of general jurisdiction over the coastal seas
(278)
around Great Britain. See Hie Franconia (Queen v. Keyn)»
supra note 93, especially Lord Cockburn's opinion in that
decision.
141. See the discussion of Galiani's proposal for a
three-mile belt of coastal sea in T. W. Fulton, supra
note 8, at 563.
See also M. Asuni, 1 Droit Maritime De L"Europe, 240,
252-253, 273-276, 305-306, 507, 509 (1305).
142. R. Hall, On the Sea Shore, 2, 16 (2d edition
1875).
143. Id. at 2, 16, 42-44, 103-104.
144. Considerations of international law were not the
sole reasons for much of the argument offered by either
position regarding the dominion of the sea. Evidently
patriotism inspired many of these writers, and clouded
their analysis with one or another bias. T. W. Fulton,
supra note 8, at 340.
145. See J. Selden supra note 107, at 119 where he
describes the collecting of tolls by Norway and Denmark
in their adjacent seas. The tolls were paid for protection
from pirates much the same as fishermen along the east
coast of England purchased licenses for protection from
the Dunkirk pirates. See generally T. W. Fulton, supra
note 8.
146. See note 129 supra.
147. Treaty, England and Sweden, Upsala, April 11, 1654,
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arts# 6, 9, 14, Printed in 3 Consolidated Treaty Series,
268-269 (C. Parry editor 1969)#
148. Treaty, between Sweden and England, , July 17,
1656, art. 10. Printed in 4 Consolidated Treaty Series, 149
(C. Parry editor 1969).
149. Treaty, between Great Britain and Denmark, ,
February 13, 1661, art. 20. Printed in 6 Consolidated
Treaty Series. 332 (C. Parry editor 1969).
150. Treaty of Peace, between England and the
Netherlands, Westminster, April 5, 1654, art. 13.
Printed in 3 Consolidated Treaty Series. 249 (C. Parry
editor 1969).
For a discussion of the flag salute see note 94 supra.
151. Treaty, between Great Britain and Portugal,
Whitehall, June 23, 1661, art. 11. Printed in 6
Consolidated Treaty Series. 332 (C. Parry editor 1969).
152. Treaty, between England and the Netherlands,
Breda, July 21, 1667, art. 2. Printed in 10 Consolidated
Treaty Series. 251 (C. Parry editor 1969).
153. See the Treaty, between England the Netherlands,
Hague, February 17, 1668, art. 11. Printed in 10
Consolidated Treaty Series. 271-272 (C. Parry editor
1969); Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, between England
and the Netherlands, London, December 1, 1674, art. 5.
Printed in 13 Consolidated Treaty Series, 271-272 (C.
Parry editor 1969).
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154. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, between Great
Britain and Spain, Utrecht, July 13, 1713, arts. 10, 11,
15. Printed in 28 Consolidated Treaty Series, 330-331
(C* Parry editor 1969).
155. Hie three Barbery State treaties are as follows:
Treaty of Peace, between Great Britain and Tripoli,
Tripoli, July 19, 1716, art. 24. Printed in 29
Cons-ol Idated Treaty Series. 499 (C. Parry editor 1969);
Treaty of Peace and Commerce, between Great Britain and
Tunis, Tunis, August 30, 1716 arts# 10, 11. Printed in
30 Consolidated Treaty Series. 4, 5 <0. Parry editor 1969);
and Treaty of Peace and Commerce, between Great Britain
and Algiers, Algiers, October 29, 1716, art. 2. Printed
in 30 Consolidated Treaty Series. 30 (C. Parry editor 1969).
156. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, between Great
Britain and Spain, supra note 154, arts. 11, 15, at 331,
334-335.
157. Treaty of Peace and Couanerce, between Great
Britain and Tripoli, Tripoli, September 19, 1751, art.
21. Printed in 39 Consolidated Treaty Series. 209 (C.
Parry editor 1969); Treaty of Peace and Commerce, between
Great Britain and Tunis, Bardo, October 19, 1751, art. 11.
Printed in 39 Consolidated Treaty Series. 350 (C. Parry
editor 1969).
158. Treaty of Peace, between Great Britain and
Algiers, May 14, 1762, arts. 2, 3. Printed in 42
Consolidated Treaty Series. 162 (C. Parry editor 1969);
Treaty of Peace and Commerce, between Great Britain and
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Tunis, Bardo, June 22, 1262, art# 4# Printed in 42
Consolidated Treaty Series, 172 (C# Parry editor 1969)#
139. Treaty of Amity and Gorisaerce, between Great
Britain and Russia, St# Petersburg, July 1, 1766, arts#
2-3# Printed in 43 Consolidated Treaty Series, 369-370
(C# Parry editor 1969); Treaty, between Great Britain and
Sweden, Whitehall, October 21, 1661, art# 5# Printed in
6 Consolidated Treaty Series# 486-487 (C# Parry editor
1969); Treaty of Alliance, between Great Britain and
Sweden, Stockholm, February 1, 1720, arts# 4, 15#
Printed in 31 Consolidated Treaty Series, 114-115, 120
(C# Parry editor 1969)#
160# Preliminary Articles of Peace, among France,
Great Britain and Spain, Fontainebleau, November 3, 1762,
arts# 2, 3, 17# Printed in 42 Consolidated Treaty Series#
229-230, 233 (G# Parry editor 1969)#
161# Definite Treaty of Peace, among France, Great
Britain and Spain, Paris, signed February 10, 1763, arts#
4, 5, 18# Printed in 42 Consolidated Treaty Series,
(C# Parry editor 1969)#
162# Id.# arts# 4, 18 at »
163. See Sir Humphrey Gilbert's letter patent printed
in R# Kakulyfc, 8 The Principal Navigations Voyages
Trafflques A Discoveries of the English Nation, 18 (1904)#
Sir Philip Sydney's charter is printed in State Papers,
Colonial (Am# & W» Ind,), [1574-1674], nos# 28-29, at
24-25 (1583)# Adrian Gilbert's charter, as well as that
of Sir Walter Raliegh are printed in R# Hakulyt, supra
at 289-294, 375-376.
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As examples of the transition from charters designed
for discovery and claims of ownership to charters for
settlement see the charters issued to Richard Hakulyt and
Sir Thomas Gates# Printed in State Papers Colonial (Am#
£ W# Ind#)# (1574-1675], nos# 48-49, at 32, 34 (1606-
1609)#
For an excellent reference work on the early voyages
of discovery across the North Atlantic see S# W# Morrison,
The Northern Voyages, A, P, 500-1600 (1971)#
164# For a discussion of the types of colonial
charters see W# Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws
of England. 93 (D# Lewis editor 1898)#
Examples of corporate charters are the 1620 Charter
for New England, printed in F# Thorpe, infra note 165,
vol# 3, at 1827; and the First Virginia Charter, 1606,
printed in id#, vol# 7, at 3783# Examples of proprietary
charters are those granted Lord Baltimore (Calvert) and
William Perm: Lord Baltimore received the charter for
Maryland, 1632, printed in id#, vol# 3, at 1679; William
Penn received the Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania,
1681, printed in id#, vol# 5, at 3035#
165# Hie Third Charter for Virginia, 1612, is printed
in F# Thorpe, 7 The Federal and State Constitutions
Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States,
Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the
Unftted States of America, 3802-3804 (1909). (Hereinafter
cited as F# Thorpe, vol, , at ,)
The Third Virginia Charter of 1612 was revoked in 1623
by a writ quo warranto, 1 Acts of the Privy Council (Col #),
69, 72, 79 (1624).
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166* Hie Georgia Charter is printed in F. Thorpe,
vol. 2, at 675.
167. C. Viner, 14 A General Abridgment of Law and
Equity. 57*63 (2d edition 1793). (Hereinafter cited as
C. Viner, vol. . at .)
168. See W. Hoison, Lex Testamentarla. 304*306 (1728);
J. Comyns, 2 A Digest of the. Laws of EnpJLand. 679 (1st
American Edition 1825). (Hereinafter cited as J. Corayns,
v°l* . at .): id. vol. 4, at 156; id. vol. 7, at
328; M« Bacon, A Hew Abridgment of tile Law. 161 (1st
American edition, from the 6th London edition 1813).
169. Hie prohibition against use of the liberal
Elizabethan rule appears in, A Proclamation prohibiting
use of any charter issued by Queen Elisabeth to achieve
any monopolies. Printed in 8 Calendar of State Papers
(Pom.) (1603*1610). 7 (1603).
170. Charters were required to be under the Great
Seal. C* Viner, vol. 16, at 561, 563; C« Viner, vol. 17,
at 69, 130, 134, 171. See also Halisbury, vol. 17, at
311; and Prerogative (Anon.). 73 Eng. Rep. 913 (circa 1547).
171. See Sir Robert Ilea tlx* s Patent for Carolina, 1629,
printed in F. Thorpe, vol# 1, at 69.
172. General words would pass nothing in a Crown grant.
For a discussion of the effect of general words such as
"franchises" used In Crown grants see Attorney-General v.
Trustees of the British Museum. (1903) 2 Ch. 598.
Ho royal grant will imply or presume to pass anything
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beyond what is undoubtedly intended and expressed. See
J. Gould, A Treatise on the Law of Waters. 48-49 (1883).
173. See for example the grant of authority to
establish a vice-admiralty court in the commission of Sir
Edmund Andros as Governor for the Dominion of New England,
1688, in F. Thorpe, vol. 3, at 1863, 1867. But the
specifics of that vice-admiralty court's jurisdiction was
to follow later in the form of a special commission from
the Lord High Admiral.
See also Sir William Phip's Commission as Governor
of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Dec. 12, 1691
printed in 2 Publications of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts, (1913); and Sir William Phip's
Commission as Vice-Admiral of the Province of the
Massachusetts Bay, Dec. 29, 1691, printed in id. at 372-
378.
174. By 1692 Crown-controlled vice-admiralty courts
were being established so as to effectively exempt
colonial courts from control of the coastal sea. See the
discussion of the vice-admiralty courts infra note 222.
Hie Massachusetts Bay Charter, 1691, contains a grant of
authority to have a vice-admiralty court, but a commission
was still required before that jurisdiction could be
exercised. See infra note 185, at 1885.
175. Sir Robert Heath's Patent for Carolina, 1629,
supra note 171, at 71.
176. Id. at 73-75.
177. Fundamental Constitutionsof Carolina, 1669, in
F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2772, 2785.
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For a discussion of the various prerogative rights
granted by franchise see note 11 supra.
178. Third Charter of Virginia, 1612, supra note 165,
at 3804.
179. A grant of "franchises" was a grant by general
words, but that grant could be valid if circumstances
external to the granting document made the particular
grant identifiable in fact. See Whistler's Case. 77 Eng.
Rep. 1021, 1024 (1613).
180. Only the King could own royal mines. See Queen
v. Earl of Northumberland, 75 Eng. Rep. 472 (1567). See
generally, Instructions for John Jackson. Receiver"General
of Rights of the Admiralty, 165 Eng. Rep. 17 (circa 1776);
and Warram's Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 553-554 (1587).
Hie Crown could not exercise the prerogative right so
as to lessen or restrict the rights of the nation under
jus publicum. Parmeter v. Attorney-General, supra note
15. Moreover the Crown could not restrict any right
pertaining to government in an essential way. See note
14 supra.
181. Thus private property rights were not affected
by revocation of the Third Virginia Charter,-1612.
Similarly, the proprietors of New Jersey reserved their
property rights under the charter when they surrendered
their right to government. See Surrender of the proprietors
of East and West New Jersey, of Their Pretended Right of
Government to Her Majesty, 1702, in F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at
2585.
See King v. Amery, 100 Eng. Rep. 273, 305-306 (1788);
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and Delassus v. United States, 34 U. S. (9 Pet.) 117,
133 (1835). See also 1 Acts of the Privy Council (Col. ),
70 (1623).
182. The Crown could not unilaterally revoke rights
vested in charter holders by virtue those documents.
Revocation or surrender was required to be in a proceeding
or by a method equally formal as the granting. See C.
Viner, vol. 16, at 566-567; and C. Viner, vol. 17, at 125,
165, 177 and 180.
183. A breach of condition in a grant by fact or by
law allowed the Crown to bring a writ scire facias
against the grantee to revoke the grant. C. Viner, vol.
17, at 165. Hie writ quo warranto was used to force the
grantee to demonstrate the authority by which the grantee
claimed certain rights of franchise or the whole grant.
Id. at 180.
Grant of a second inconsistent charter was a
sufficient formal act showing intent to revoke the
prior charter and thus the original charter holder could
not use the scire facias writ to successfully challenge
the new grantee's right on the basis that the initial
revocation or surrender was not formal. See generally
Basket v. University of Cambridge, supra note 13, at 63.
184. As an example of Crown authority over these
American colonies, consider that the Crown altered
boundaries of prior charters almost at will by placing
descriptions of boundaries for adjacent new colonies in
subsequent charters. See a discussion of this power to
change boundaries in Henderson v. Poindexter's Lessee.
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26 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 530, 533 (1837),
Detormination of the location of colonial boundaries
was, however, not considered a proper subject of inquiry
for municipal courts. See I'enn- v. Lord Baltimore. 27
Eng. Rep. 1132, 1134-1135 (1750).
185. For example the grantees of the Delaware Charter
given by William Penn were required to acknowledge the
Crown as sovereign. See Charter for Delaware, 1701, in
F. Thorpe, vol. 1, at 557-558. The Heath Charter for
Carolina, 1629, contains the typical requirement that
colonial laws be "consonant to the laves, statutes,
customes and rights of our Realmc of England." Sec note
171, at 71.
186. See the Third Charter for Virginia which conveyed
islands within 300 leagues of the Virginia coast. Mote
165 supra.
187. See for example the language of the Heath Charter
for Carolina, 1629, supra note 171,
188. See the Charter for Hew England, 1620, in
F. Thorpe, vol. 3, at 1827, 1829, 1833.
189. Id. at 1833.
190. See-the Charter of the Colony of Hew Plymouth,
1629, printed in F, Thorpe, vol, 3, at 1841, 1844; and
the Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 1629, in F. Thorpe,
vol. 3, at 1846-1847, 1850, 1859.
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191. See The Act of Surrender of the Great Charter
of New England to His Majesty, 1635, printed in F. Thorpe,
vol. 3, at 1860. See also Order to the Attorney General
to call in the patent for New England. I, Acts of the
Privy Council (Col.). 217 (1637).
192. The primary fishing areas at this time were on
the Grand Banks west of Newfoundland. Colonial fishing
was limited to inland waters south of Nova Scotia and
was not an important part of the economy of any colony
south of Massachusetts. In fact an early colonial
fishery dispute arose when colonists from Virginia began
to intrude on the fishing areas off southern Nova Scotia
and east of Missachusetts. See 1 Acts of the Privy
Council (Col.). 40-41, no. 65 (1621).
193. See The Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 1691,
printed in F. Thorpe, vol. 3, at 1870-1873, 1875-1876,
1885.
In this 1691 charter the Province of Maine which had
been the object of several earlier grants became part of
the Massachusetts colony. It in fact remained part of
Massachusetts until the early nineteenth century. The
earlier grants of Maine are identified as follows: Grant
of the Province of Maine to Sir Ferdinando Gorges and
John Mason, Esquire, 1622, printed in id. at 1661; Grant
of the Province of Maine, 1639, printed in id., at 1625;
and Grant of the Province of Maine, 1664, printed in id.,
at 1637. None of these grants purport to convey
ownership of the sea although islands are granted within
certain distances of shore. Similar to other charters
there was a requirement that laws be in accord with the
laws of England.
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194. Grant of New Hampshire to Captain John Mason,
1629, printed in F, Thorpe, vol, 4, at 2433-2434, See
also a grant of New Hampshire to John Wallaston, 1635,
printed in F, Thorpe, vol, 4, at 2437,
195, Grant of the Province of New Hampshire to
J, Mason, 1635, printed in F, Thorpe, vol, 4, at 2443-
2444 •
Two settlements in New Hampshire under Mason
acknowledged Charles I as sovereign and agreed to be
governed by the laws of England, See Agreement of the
Settlers at Exeter in New Hampshire, 1639, printed in
id, at 2445; and the Combination of the Inhabitants Upon
the Piscataqua River for Government, 1641, printed in id,
at ,
196, Patent for Providence Plantations, 1643, printed
in F, Thorpe, vol, 6, at 3209-3210; Charter for Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations, 1663, printed in F,
Thorpe, vol, 6, at 3211-3215, 3219, 3221.
Rhode Island theoretically did not have jurisdiction
over its coastal waters even for purposes of protection
because that right had been granted to New England and
Virginia, See 3 Acts of the Privy Council (Col,), 38
(1722),
197, See Charter for Connecticut, 1662, printed in
F. Thorpe, vol, 1, at 529-530, 533-434, 535,
198. Id. at 535-536.
199. See Grant of the Province of Maine, (includes
the Duke of York's entire, grant), printed in F. Thorpe,
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vol. 3, at 1637. See also S. E. Morrison, History of the
American People, 77-78 (1965).
For Justice Cardozo's analysis of the Duke of York's
charter see New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 365-368,
370-373, 378 (1934).
200. See the Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania,
1681, printed in F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at 3035-3038.
201. Hie Charter for Delaware, 1701, in F. Thorpe,
vol. 1, at 557-558.
202. See the Duke of York's Release to John Lord
Berkeley, and Sir George Carteret, 1664, printed in F.
Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2533; His Royal Highness' Grant to
the Lords Proprietors, Sir George Carteret, 1674, printed
in F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2546; the Fundamental Constitution
for the Province of East New Jersey in America, 1683,
printed in F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2574; and Surrender of
the proprietors of East and West New Jersey, of Their
Pretended Right of Government to Her Majesty, 1702,
printed in F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2585.
203. See the Charter of Maryland, 1632, printed in F.
Thorpe, vol. 3, at 1679 (§ 4), 1683 (g 16), 1686 (g 22).
204. See the First Charter of Virginia, 1606, printed
in F. Thorpe, vol. 7, at 3783-3784.
205. See the Second Charter for Virginia, 1609,
printed in F. Thorpe, vol. 7, at 3790.
206. See the Third Charter of Virginia, 1612, printed
in id. at 3802-3804, 3806-3807.
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207. Id. at 3806.
See Henderson v. Polndexter1s Lessee, supra note 166,
at 533, concerning revocation of the Third Charter of
Virginia.
208. See the Heath Patent for Carolina, supra note
154, at 69, 70, 71, 73-75.
209. See the Charter of Carolina, 1663, printed in
F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2743-2744.
210. The Charter of Carolina, 1665, printed in F.
Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2771-2772.
211. See the Fundamental Constitution of Carolina,
1669, printed in F. Thorpe, vol. 5, at 2772.
212. See the Charter of Georgia, 1732, printed in
F. Thorpe, vol. 2, at 675.
213. A modern example is the enforcement of state
fishing laws on the territorial sea of the United States,
and in the case of the State of Florida and the State of
Texas beyond the territorial sea. As a matter of
international law such enforcement is considered to be by
the United States, but domestically the enforcement is
by state govemma-ats. The right of the states to
unilaterally apply such enforcement is currently the
subject of litigation. United States v. Florida and Texas,
Supreme Court, No. 54, Original.
214# See An Act for the encouraging and increasing of
shipping and navigation, 12 Chas. 2, c. 18 §§ 3, 18, 19 (1660).
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215# See An Act for the encouragement of trade, 15
Chas# 2, c# 7 § 7 (1663)#
216# See An Act for the encouragement of the Greenland
and Eastland trades, and for the better securing the
plantation trade, 25 Chas# 2, c# 7 § 11 (1673)#
217# For the statute dealing with "ill-disposed persons"
see An Act for preventing frauds, and regulating abuses in
the plantation trade, 7 & 8 Wm# 3, c# 22 § 1 (1696). See
a discussion of smuggling in the colonies in the Comment
of J# Glen, Governor of South Carolina printed in D# Hawke,
U# S# Colonial History Readings and Documents, 265 (1966).
218# An Act for preventing frauds, and regulating
abuses in the plantation trade, 7 & 8 Wm# 3, c, 22 §§
2, 4, 6, 9 (1696).
219. For an example of the commissions issued to
colonial governors see Thomas Hutchinson's Commission as
Governor of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, April 7,
1774, in 2 Publications of the Colonial Society of
Massachusetts, 774 (1913).
220. For examples of commissions to colonial governors
and subsequent admiralty commissions see William Shirley's
Commission as Governor of the Province of the
Massachusetts Bay, Feb. 25, 1757, printed in 2 Publications
of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 128-129 (1913);
and William Shirley's Commission as Vice-Admiral of the
Province of the Massachusetts Bay, Aug. 21, 1741, in id,
at 237#
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For the subject-matter content of admiralty subject-
matter jurisdiction applied in the colonies see Raynes v.
Osborne, 2 Scl. PI# Adm. (1579), printed in 11 Selden
Society Publications, 156 ( ); and Lord Willoughby's
Commission as Vice-Admiral of Barbados and the rest of
the Caribbee Islands, Jan. 26, 1666, printed in 2
Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts,
357-361, 363-365 (1913).
The legitimate source of maritime law in the colonies
was the admiralty commissions. See the discussion in E.
Benedict, 4 The Law of American Admiralty. 434 (1940).
221. See L. Friedman, A History of American Law.
45 (1973).
222. By 1767 four appellate vice-admiralty courts
were established in, An Act for the more easy and effectual
recovery of the Penalties inflicted by the Acts of
Parliament relating to the Trade ot Revenues of the
British Colonies and Plantations in America, 8 Geo. 3,
c. 22 (1767).
The appellate vice-admiralty courts were designed to
make Crown power and authority felt in the colonies. See
a discussion of the use of these courts to exercise Crown
power and authority in C. Andrews, 4 The Colonial Period
of American History. 270 (1964).
Admiralty jurisdiction was as broad in the colonies
as it had ever been in England. See The Volunteer. 28 F.
Cas. 1260, 1263-1264 (No. 16,991) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
223. Customs laws were to be enforced by the vice-
admiralty courts. See An Act for the more easy and
effectual recovery of the penalties and forfeitures
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inflicted by the acts of Parliament relating to the trade
or revenues of the British colonies and plantations in
America, 8 Geo. 3, c. 22, § 1 (1767).
Admiralty courts held exclusive prize jurisdiction
and were empowered to issue commissions for privateers.
See An Act for the encouragement of the trade to America,
6 A., c. 37 § 3 (1707).
224. An Act for preventing frauds, and regulating
abuses in the plantation trade, 7 & 8 Wm. 3, c. 22, § 6
(1696). Contrary colonial laws were declared void by this
statute, id. § 9.
225. See An Act to prevent the exportation of wooll
out of the kingdom of Ireland and England into foreign
ports; and for the encouragement of woollen manufacture
in the kingdom of England, 10 & 11 Wm. 3, c. 10 § 19
(1699).
226. An Act to prevent the exportation of hats out
of his Majesty's colonies or plantations in America and
to restrain the number of apprentices taken by the
hatmakers in the said colonies or plantations, and for the
better encouraging the making of hats in Great Britain. 5
Geo. 2, c. 22 § 7 (1732).
227* An act to encourage the importation of pig and
bar iron from his Majesty's colonies in America; and to
prevent the erection of any mill or other engine for
silting or rolling iron; or any plating forge to work with
a tilt hammer; or any furnace for making steel in any of
the said colonies, 23 Geo. 2, c. 29 § 9 (1750).
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228, An act for the better securing and encouraging
the trade of his Majesty's sugar colonies in America, 6
Geo, 2, c, 13 (1733),
229, See An act for the preservation of white and
other pine trees growing in her Majesty's colonies of
New Hampshire, the Massachusetts Bay, and Province of
Maine, Rhode Island, and Providence Plantation, and
Connecticut, in New England, and New York, and New Jersey,
in America, for the masting of her Majesty's navy, 9 A,,
c. 17 §§ 1, 2 (1711),
230, See An act giving further encouragement for the
importation of naval stores, and for other purposes
therein mentioned, 8 Geo, 1, c, 12 § 5 (1721),
231• An act for the better preservation of his
Majesty's woods in America« and for the encouragement
of the importation of naval stores from thence: and to
encourage the importation of mats, yards and bowsprits,
from that part of Great Britain called Scotland, 2 Geo,
2, c. 35 §§1, 11 (1729),
232, For a discussion of this attempt by Carolina to
set up a new colony see C, Andrews,2 The Colonial Period
of American History, 226-227 (1964),
233, See An act for the more easy and effectual
recovery of the penalties and forfeitures inflicted by
the act of Parilament relating to the trade or revenues
of the British colonies and plantations in America, 8 Geo,
3, c» 22 § 16 (1767) which restricted land sales to
British subjects. See also die discussion of all
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unappropriated public lands again claimed by the Crown
in C# Andrews, supra rote 202, at 191-192#
234# For a discussion of the restrictions on sale of
"western lands" see the Proclamation of 1763, printed in
2 Foundations of Colonial America, 2341-234-3 (W# Kavenagh
editor 1973)«
235# See An act for the better securing the dependency
of his Majesty's dominions in America upon the Crown and
Parliament of Great Britain,,6 Geo# 3, c# 12 §§ 1, 2 (1766)#
When issuing commissions to colonial governors among
the responsibilities enumerated was a power of review and
disallowance of colonial assembly enactments. For
example see Trade Instructions to Banning Wentworth,
July 21, 1741, printed in 2 Hie Laws of Hew Hampshire
(1679-1801). 636, 643 (1917).
236# Colonial laws affecting coastal waters dealt
either with regulation of activities over inland waters
or with regulations affecting British subjects and those
harming British subjects or their goods# For example
see An Act to prevent the destruction of rockfish and
oysters, March 9, 1771, printed in 1 Laws of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania# 313 (1810); (Instructions
to Governor-Wentworth), July 21, 1741, printed in 2 The
Laws of Hew Hampshire (1679-1801). 636, 643 (1917); An
Act providing In Case of Sickness, May 15, 1714, in 2
Hie Laws of New Hampshire (1679-1801), 129 (1917); An Act
for Restraining and Punishing Privateers and Pirates,
August 17, 1699, printed in 1 Hie Laws of Hew Hampshire
(1679-1801)# 653 (1917); (Order Regulating the Taking of
of Mackerel), May 9, 1687, printed in 1 The Laws of New
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Hampshire (1679-1801). 251 (1917).
237. Internal colonial affairs were not of much
concern if they did not directly affect Great Britain.
For example it was 1740 before the sovereign took action
about as critical a problem as colonial currency, See
Instructions to Governors on Colonial Currency, August 5,
1740, printed in 1 Foundations of Colonial America, 548
(W# Kavcnagh editor 1973).
But British attention to colonial trade had been
constant# For example even during the period of the
Inter-Regnum in liie seventeenth century enactments were
directed at colonial fcrade. See An act for Increase of
Shipping and Encouragement of the Navigation of this
Nation, printed in id. at 254.
238. The customs officials were appointed by the
Commissioners of Customs, which body was located in
Boston as a step to make Crown authority felt. See C.
Andrews, supra note 222, at 270, 414, 421. The
Consolssioners for Trade and Plantations filed reports.
See Order in Council for Che Improved Government of the
Colonies, March 11, 1752, printed in 2 Foundations of
Colonial America. 1365-1366 (VJ• Kavenagh editor 1973).
Receivers-General were appointed. See Orders, Rules and
Instructions to be Observed by the Receivers-General of
the several Colonies and Provinces in North America,
July 24, 1761, printed in id. at 1378.
239. The Articles of Confederation of the United
Colonies of New England, 1643-1684, printed in F. Thorpe,
vol. 1, at 77-78.
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240# The Albany Plan-1754, printed in id, at 83-86,
This document was to have been transmitted to the King
for his approval,
241, For a discussion of the beginning of the war of
the American Revolution see S, Morrison, History of the
American People, 205-223 (1964),
242. For a discussion of the American constitutional
law theory of dual citizenship see the Slaughter House
Cases, 83 U,S, (16 Wall.) 36, 73-76 (1873).
243, Sovereignty was vested in the federal government
but state governments retained certain aspects of domestic
sovereignty delegated by the people. For a discussion
see these cases: Parker v. Brown. 317 U.S. 341, 359-369
(1943)5 Mcllvaine v. Coxe*s Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 208,
211 (1808); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (16 Wall.) 385-386
(1798); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Ball.) 158, 176-184,
187-188, 210 (1796).
244. See the Declaration of Independence; "The
unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen States of America",
July 4, 1776, printed in J, Richardson, 1 A Compilation
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897,
3 (1896).
The colonies were directed to issue their own
declaration of independence. See 4 Journals of the
Continental Congress 1774-1789, 342 (C. Ford editor 1906).
(Hereafter cited as J♦£.£., vol. , at •)
Colonists formed a unified body. B. Schwartz, 1 A
Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, 6
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(1963); and J* Story, 1 Cossaontaries on the Constitution
of the United States, 4, 6, 10, 13 (3rd edition 1858)#
See generally, United States v# California, 332 U,S#
19, 33-34, 36, 3S (1947); Cohens v, Virginia, 19 U,S.
(6 Wheat,) 264, 330-381, 338, 413-414 (1821); and Penhallow
v. Doano. 3 U#S# (3 Ball.) 54, 64, 73, 75-77, 90 (1795),
245# See J# Story, supra note 213, at 147-149, 151,
153#
Hie true answer oust be, that as soon as
Congress assumed powers and passed measures
which were in their nature national, to that
extent the people, from whose acquiescence
and consent they took effect, must be
considered as agreeing to form a nation#
Id# at 149# See also B# Schwartz, supra note 244, at
30-31; and C# Warren, the Supreme Court and Sovereign
States, 4-5 (reprint of the 1924 edition 1972)#
Some question may arise as to the existence of one
nation from the various titles used for the Union which
mention the multiple states# However, those titles are
all referring to a single entity, the new nation, as is
evidenced by the constant use of "United**# Thus in
September 1776, the Congress changed the style "United
Colonies" to "United States", witnessing the change in
government from colonial status to that of an independent
nation# See J#C#C#, vol* 5, at 747#
Contra see C# Antieau, 2 Modern Constitutional Law,
4 (1969)*
246* For a discussion of these states* rights positions
see Letters of Fabius, (published anonymously by John
Dickenson) (see letter no# 3, 1788), printed in P# Ford,
Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States,
Published During its Discussion by the People 1787-1788,
179 (1968); and Tench Coxe, An Examination of the
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Constitution, printed in id, at 136*
The sovereign nature of the national government is
clearly pointed out: by George. Washington in a letter to
the Rev, W. Gordon., dated July 8, 1783, in which he not
only offers that tie sovereign power was in the national
government and so regarded by other nations but goes on
to describe the international status of the states as
follows:
Massachusetts or Virginia is no better
defined, nor any more thought of by
Foreign Powers than the County of Worcester
in Massachusetts is by Virginia or the
County of Olouscester in Virginia is by
Massachusetts• •••
27 The Writings of George Washington, 49-50 (J• Fitzpatrick
editor 1938),
247, George Washington's commission from the
Continental Congress placing him under command of the
Congress is in J*C,C,, vol. 2, at 96,
248, See the appointment of the admiralty committee
in J.C.C,» vol* 7, at 75,
249. See the description of the powers of the
Continental Congress in J*C.C,, vol. 13, at 283-284,
250. Congress had accepted the Articles of Confederation
in 1777, but it was 1781 before the people accepted the
Articles through their state governments, Maryland was the
last necessary state to ratify. See J,C•£., vol, 19, at
223.
A discussion of the perpetual union formed under the
Articles appears in B. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 33.
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231 • Insufficient: power was granted to the national
government. See B. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 6-7.
Fear of a strong central government was pervasive, Id.
at 5,
Under the Articl as only a loose form of government
was created, with much power retained by the state
governments• See a discussion of that government in L.
Friedman, A History of American Law, 101 (1973),
252, See Articles of Confederation, printed in
J, Richardson, supra, note 244, at 9, 10, 11,
253, Besides lacking a power to tax under the Articles
there was no power to establish uniform customs laws, which
allowed each state to levy its own duties. See for
example, qui bam v, The Ship Anna, 1 I>all. 197 (Ct, of
Pleas., of Phila• City) (1787),
For the other powers delegated to the national
government in the Articles see Articles of Confederation
printed in J, Richardson, supra note 244, at 10-11.
See a discussion of the states* powers over pirates
under the Articles in Keane v* The Brig Gloucester. 2
Ball. 36 (Fed. Ct. of Capture Appeals) (1782)} and The
Speedwell. 2 Dall. 40 (Fed. Ct. of Capture Appeals) (1784),
254, States could issue letters of marque• See Kcane
v. The Brig Gloucester, supra note 253. The right to try
pirates and authority over captures were vested in the
national government. See Articles of Confederation in J.
Richardson, supra note 244, article no. 9, at 14. See
also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 115, 140
(1809).
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255* In matters of national interest the states
were controlled by the Articles# Dee the Articles of
Confederation, article no. 9, printed in J. Richardson,
supra note 244, at 14* The treaty making power and power
to wage war were exclusively vested in the national
government* See article 6 efc seq* printed in id* at 10-
11.
256* See Constitution of Delaware-1776, articles 12,
17, 25, printed in F* Thorpe, vol* 1, at 562-567;
Constitution of Delaware-1792, printed in id* at 568;
Constitution of Georgia-1777, printed in id* at 785;
Constitution of Maryland-1776, printed in F* Thorpe,
vol* 2, at 1687; Constitution of Formal Government for
the Commorarealth of Massachusetts-1780, printed in F*
Thorpe, vol* 3, at 1888-1890; Constitution of New
Hsmpshlre-1776, printed in F* Thorpe, vol* 4, at 2451;
Constitution of New Harapshire-1784, in id* at 2453;
Constitution of New Jersey-1776, in id* at 2594;
Constitution of New York-1777, printed in F# Thorpe,
vol* 5, at 2624-2625 (New York adopted the common law
of England and laws of the colony on April 19, 1765, id*
at 2635); Constitution of North Carol ina-1776, printed in
id* at 2§S7; Constitution of Pennsylvania-1776, printed
id, at 3081; Constitution of Pennsylvania-1790, printed in
id* at 3092; Constitution of South Carolina-1776, printed
in F* Thorpe, vol* 6 at 3241, 3243; The Constitution of
Virginia-1776, printed in id* at 3812-3813*
Virginia*s Constitution contained a declaration of
independence, promulgated prior to that issued by the
United States, but that promulgation was at the direction
of the Continental Congress so that Virginia acted at the
direction of Congress and not as an independent nation*
Id. at 3814-3815*
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257• Hie treaty power of Congress under the articles
is in article no. 6 of Hie Articles of Confederation,
printed in J. Richardson, supra note 244, at 10. That
treaty power is in the exclusive power of war and peace.
See J.C.C., vol. 13, at 283-284.
258. Style of the negotiators commissions is printed
in J.C.C., vol. 14, at 956.
259. Although the colonies were each mentioned as
being independent they were so recognized as a group in
one document and it is apparent that only one nation was
understood to have come into existence. See J.C.C.,
vol. 14, at 957.
260. See the Journal of the Federal Convention, printed
in J. Elliot, 1 Debates in the Several State Conventions on
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 139, 318-319
(2d edition 1941), (hereinafter cited as J. Elliot, vol.
at .), which shows that the delegates understood that
they were drafting a national document of government.
Some delegates thought of states as only temporary.
Id. at 387. National status was thought to remove the
need for pretentious state sovereignty. See Madison*s
Federal Constitutional Debates, printed in J. Elliot, vol.
5, at 176; Others feared a strong central government. Id.
at 193, 212. Delegates understood that states were not
sovereign in the international law sense. Id. at 212-213.
Moreover those delegates understood that the states were
not nations but comprised one nation. Id. at 213.
261. See Madison's Federal Constitutional Debates.
supra note 260, at 217-218.
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262# See the Massachusetts debases, in Debates of the
States, printed in J# Elliot, vol# 2, at 54, 60#
263# See the Pennsylvania debates, Debates of the
States, printed in id# at 429, 443-445; see also the
North Carolina debates, Debates of the States, printed in
J# Elliot, vol# 4 at 443, 455.
264# See note 246 supra #
265# See the constitutional discussions in The
Federalist. 19, 70-71, 93, 157, 256-257, 275, 417, 538,
548 (J# Cooke editor 1962)#
266# See the comments by then Justice Story on the
adoption of the Constitution in J-» Story, supra note 244,
at 210, part of which reads as followst
From hence, not only the body politic of
the several states, but all citizens thereof,
may be considered as parties to the compact,
and have bound themselves reciprocally to
each other for the due observance of it; and
also have bound themselves to the federal
government, whose authority has been thereby
created and established#
See also McCulloch v# Maryland. 17 U.S# (4 Wheat#) 316,
404 (1819).
267# Foreign affairs power is an inherent power of
the federal government as sovereign# C# Antieau, supra
note 245, at 192, 195# See United States v# Curtis-
Wright Export Corp#. 229 U#S« 304 (1936)#
268# See a discussion of resulting powers and implied
powers in C# Antieau, supra note 245, at 190-191#
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269. See the discussion of resulting powers in
connection with the Civil War monuments in United States
v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co.. 160 U.S. 668, 683 (1896)#
270* See Ruppert v. Caffery, 251 U.S. 264, 300 (1920).
For an analysis of sovereign powers of the national
government under the Constitution see M. Forkosh,
Constitutional Law. 116-128 (2d edition 1969).
271. See the discussion of concurrent non-conflicting
jurisdiction in C. Antieau, supra note 214, at 4, 6, 9,
81. See also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382
(1922); and M. Forkosh, supra note 270, at 78-80.
272. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation v. Board
of Health. 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
273. For the restriction on state enactment of
customs levies or taxes on goods in commerce through
preemption of the field by the national government see
Sanneborn Bros, v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923); and
Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
274. The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
was exclusive but did not preempt alternative state
remedies. See C. Antieau, supra note 214, at 28-32. Hie
only restriction was that state law could not conflict
with federal law. See also Cooley v. Port Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 314 (1851).
See the United States Constitution, Article III,
Section 2, and Article II, Section 8, for the admiralty
and maritime clause as well as the necessary and proper
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clause.
See also the 1789 Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73.
275. As an example of the removal of admiralty, but
not prize jurisdiction from national control prior to
adoption of the Constitution many states abolished
admiralty courts within their territory. See for example
An Act to prevent encroachments of the Court of Admiralty,
Feb. 14, 1787, printed in 2 Laws of New York, 294 (1886).
Because of the specialized body of law involved and the
need for national uniformity admiralty jurisdiction was
given to the federal government in the Constitution.
This new admiralty jurisdiction was so broad that it even
included jurisdiction over liens of suppliers and builders
of vessels which arose according to state law. See An Act
to secure the persons employed in the building and fitting
of ships..., March 27, 1784, printed in 2 Laws of
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 95 (1810).
As an example of the favorable light admiralty
jurisdiction came under just prior to adoption of the
Constitution see An Act for the Extending the Powers and
Authority of the Maritime Court in this State, June 12,
1787, printed in 5 The Laws of New Hampshire, 1679-1801,
229 (1917). See also L. Friedman, supra note 251, at 46.
See also G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty.
10n., 37 (1957)j and H. Hart & H. Weehsler, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System, 21 (1953).
See The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 636 (1868).
276. All maritime matters came within admiralty
jurisdiction under the Constitution. See E. Benedict, 1
The Law of American Admiralty. 14, 84, 359, 371 (1940).
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The jurisdiction of the admiralty law in the United States
under the Constitution became more broad than it was in
Great Britain in 1776. For a discussion of that
jurisdiction see The Constitution of the United States of
America; Analysis and Interpretations. 646 (published by
the United States Government Printing Office).
Admiralty jurisdiction extended throughout the
navigable waters of the United States. See The Montello.
78 U.S. 411 (1870); and The Daniel Ball. 77 U.S. 557
(1870).
The need for national jurisdiction over cases involving
matters of prize law are discussed in Chapter VII, infra.
277. For a discussion of American prize law #ee
Glass v. Sloop Betsey. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794). The
development of a three-mile belt of neutral waters through
prize law is evident in The Fame. 8 F. Cas. 948-985 (No.
4,634) (D. Me. 1822); and Soult v. b'Africaine, 22 F. Cas.
805-806 (No. 13,179) (D.C.S.C. 1804)
278. The United States Constitution, Article III,
Section 2.
For a discussion of the body of general maritime law
applied by the federal district courts sitting in admiralty
see D. Roberston, Admiralty and Federalism. 65, 136-151
(1970).
See the discussion of admiralty law and jurisdiction
in De Lovio v. Bolt, 7 F. Cas. 418, 442-444 (No. 3,776)
(D.C.C.D. D. 1815). See also Kynoch v. The S.C. Ives. 14
F. Cas. 888, 891-892 (No. 7,958) (D.C.N.D. Ohio 1856);
and Steele v. Thacher„ 22 F. Cas. 1204, 1206-1207 (No.
13,348) (D.C. D. Maine 1825).
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279. The supremacy clause is found in The United
States Constitution, Article VI.
For a discussion of the supremacy clause see
B. Schwartz, supra note 24f, at 37.
280. S. Morrison, supra note 241, at 331-335.
281. From 1789 until 1800 the various states with
historic claims to western lands out to the Mississippi
River relinquished their claims and ceded those areas
to the national government. For example see An Act
supplemental to the act intituled "An act for an
amicable settlement of limits with the State of Georgia;
and authorizing the establishment of a government in the
Mississippi territory, 2 Stat. 69 (1800); and An Act to
Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest
of the river Ohio, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
The federal government provided the local government
in these new territories until they became states. See
for example An Act respecting the government of the
territories of the United States northwest and south of
the river Ohio, 1 Stat. 285 (1792).
282. Defense of the coasts as well as commerce in
the adjacent sea is evidenced in a number of federal
statutes, two of which are cited here as examples: An
Act more effectively to protect the Coimnerce and Coasts
of the United States, 1 Stat. 561 (1798); and An Act to
provide for the Defense of Certain Ports and Harbors in
the United States, 1 Stat. 345 (1794).
283. See for example An Act for the establishment and
support of Lighthouses, Beacons, Bouys, and Public Piers,
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1 Stat* 53 (1789); and An Act authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to finish the Lighthouse on Portland
Head in the District of Maine, 1 Stat* 184 (1790)*
For the most part territory on which to erect
lighthouses was ceded to the federal government with
the provision that state jurisdiction for service of
legal process would not be excluded from the ceded land.
See An Act relative to Cessions of jurisdiction in places
where lighthouses, beacons, bouys, and public piers have
beea, or may hereafter be erected and fixed, 1 Stat* 426
(1795)*
Hie commerce clause gave the federal government
authority to take the action represented by the above
statutes* See Knox v* Lee, 78 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 537
(1870).
284. See for example An Act in addition to the act
for the punishment of certain crimes §gainst the United
States, 1 Stat. 381 (1794); An Act for the punishment of
certain crimes against the United States, 1 Stat. 112 §
8 (1790).
285. Coastal commerce was the main method of transport
for goods between cities. Coastal waters also provided an
easy entry for smuggled goods which required federal
legislation. For example see An Act providing Passports
for the ships and vessels of the United States, 1 Stat.
489 (1$96); An Act for enrollong and licensing ships or
vessels to be employed in the coasting and fisheries, and
for regulating the same, 1 Stat. 305 (1793); An Act to
explain an Act, intituled An Act for registering and
clearing Vessels, regulating the Coasting Trade, and for
(310)
other purposes, 1 Stat. 94 (1789); and An Act for
Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the
Coasting Trade, and for other purposes, 1 Stat# 55
(1789).
Hie admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district
courts was set out in the Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
Prize jurisdiction was exercised by the district court of
the first judicial district into which the prize was
brought. See The Abby# 1 F# Cas. 26-27 (No# 14) (C#C#
Mass# 1818)#
286# Taxing and commerce regulating authority are set
out in the Constitution, Article I, Section 8#
287# Customs jurisdiction extended one marine league
seaward of the coastline, except for vessels hovering
beyond that marine league# See The Antelope. 23 U#S«
(10 Wheat#) 66, 124-125 (1825); and Hie Appollon. 22
U.S. (9 Wheat#) 362, 370 (1824)#
The similarity of American customs law and that of
Great Britain is apparent in Woodruff v* The Levi
Dearborns. 30 F. Cas. 525, 527 (No# 17,988) (C.C.D. Ga#
1811).
288# Admiralty jurisdiction applied on all navigable
waters of the United States regardless of concurrent
state jurisdiction within state territorial boundaries#
See Gelson,v. Hoyt# 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 303, 311
(1818); Bains v. The James and Catherine. 2 F. Cas. 410,
412, 415-416 (No. 756) (C.C.D. Penn. 1832). See also
Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 363, 386, 389,
403-404 (1793).
(311)
289• Prize jurisdiction was always vested in the
Congress, then the Court of Capture Appeals and finally
the federal judiciary. See the Committee of Congress
for review of prize decision appeals from state courts,
J.C.C.« vol. 7, at 75. Later Congress created the
Court of Capture Appeals and finally the 1789 Judiciary
Act vested exclusive original prize jurisdiction in the
federal district courts. 1 Stat. 73.
The international nature of the body of prize law
adopted by the United States is apparent in the opinions
of Justice Story in De Lovio v. Boit, supra note 239, and
The Thomas Jefferson. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
See also The Resolution. 2 Dall. 1 (Fed. Ct. of
Capture Appeals 1781)»
290. For Jefferson^ views on this problem of neutral
waters and treaty obligations see letter of T. Jefferson
to George Hammond, dated September 5, 1793, annexed to,
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Between His
Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, ,
November 19, 1794, printed in 8 Stat. 116.
291. For Hamilton^ views on neutral waters in the
adjacent seas see letter of T. Jefferson to George
Hammond, British Minister, dated November 8, 1793, printed
in J. Moore, 1 Digest of International Law, 702-704 (1906).
In this letter Jefferson discussed the views of Hamilton.
292. In the November 8, 1793 letter by Jefferson to
George Hammond, Jefferson described instructions he had
received from President George Washington to consider one
marine league from the shoreline as neutral territory. Id.
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293. There could be no valid capture of prizes in
neutral waters. Johnson v. Twenty-one Bales. 13 F. Cas.
855, 861 (No. 7.417) (C.C.D. N.Y. 1814); and The
Joseph, 12 U.S. Cr.) 451, 455 (1814). When a vessel
illegally took a prize in neutral waters it could be
forced to make restitution. Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F.
Cas. 942, 946-947 (No. 9,895) (D.C.D. Penn. 1793).
Carriage of contraband was a violation of neutral water
status which vitiated the obligation of the neutral to
provide protection. See The Erstern. 1 Dall. 34 (Fed,
Ct. of Capture Appeals 1782); and Miller v. The Ship
Resolution, 2 Dall, 19, 21 (Fed. Ct, of Capture Appeals).
294. Violation of neutrality was an assault on the
integrity of the neutral sovereign's law. See Letter
of Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Vaughan, dated
February 18, 1828, printed in J. Moore, 2 Digest of
International Law, 4 (1906).
For municipal court jurisdiction over foreigners
see Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 105, 127-128
(1795), dealing with acts of piracy by citizens and
foreigners. See also United States v. Wiltberger, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 97, 104 (1820); and United
States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630 (1818),
295. Municipal courts had discretionary jurisdiction
over cases involving solely foreign parties and interests.
Public convenience was the standard employed to decide
whether to entertain the suit if no objection to jurisdiction
was made. See Mason v. Ship Balireau, 5-6 U.S. (2 Cr.)
177, 184-185 (1804).
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296. Suits by foreign seamen for wages were usually
entertained by American courts. See for example
Willendaon v. Forsoket. 29 F. Cas. 1283-1284 (No. 17,682)
(D.C.D. Penn. 1891); and The Jerusalem, 13 F. Cas. 559,
561-563 (No. 7,293) (C.C.D. Mass, 1814).
297. The states have territorial jurisdiction over
inland waters. See United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 336, 386 (1818); Vanhorne*s Lessee v.
Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304-305, 307 (1795).
298. A large portion of Lake Michigan was placed
within the boundaries of the State of Illinois. See
Schooner Norway v. Jensen, 52 111. 373, 380 (1869).
299. The state jurisdiction over inland waters was
concurrent with federal admiralty jurisdiction as well as
federal jurisdiction under the commerce clause. See for
example Bullock v. The Lamar, 4 F* Cas. 654, 658 (No,
2,129) (C.C.D. Ga. 1844); and The City of Panama, 101 U.S.
453, 460 (1880),
300. State extension of jurisdiction over coastal
fisheries was acceptable. See Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U.S. 240, 257-258, 263-264, 266 (1890). See also
The Martha Araae. 16 F. Cas. 868-870 (No. 9,146) (D.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1843); and Bennett v. Sokes, 3 F. Cas. 221, 228
(No. 1,319) (C.C.D. N.J. 1830).
301. See Special Session Message of President John
Adams, May 16, 1797, printed in J. Richardson, supra note
244, at 236,
(314)
302. Special Message of President John Adams,
February 5, 1798, printed in id. at 262.
303. Fourth Annual Address of President John Adams,
November 22, 1800, printed in id. at 307.
304. The foreign affairs power was exclusive in the
federal government. See United States v. Curtis-vJright
Export Corp.. supra note 267.
See also the United States Constitution, Article II,
Section 2, and Section 3. The exclusive power to enter
into treaties with foreign nations was given to the
federal government by the Constitution, id., Section 2.
305. See the following treaties for examples: Treaty
of Amity and Commerce, between the United States and the
Netherlands, the Hague, October 8, 1782, arts. 5, 16.
Printed in 2 Treaties and Other International Acts of the
United States of America, 59, 64, 73 (H. Miller editor
1931) (hereinafter cited as Treaties); and Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, between France and the United States, Paris,
February 6, 1778, art®.3, 7-13, 21. Printed in id. at
5-13, 17.
306. See Preliminary Articles of Peace, beteween Great
Britain and the United States of America, Paris,
November 30, 1782, arts. 2, 3. Printed in 2 Treaties.
97, 98| and Definite Treaty of Peace, between the United
States and Great Britain, Paris, September 3, 1783, art. 1.
Printed in id. at 151.
As between the states and the United States coastal
islands received under the 1783 Treaty of Peace became
territory of the states, but intervening waters were not
(315)
considered appurtenant to the states and thus there is
no basis for asserting that those waters were owned by
the states. See for example Keyser v. Coe, 142 F. Cas.
442 (No, 7,750) (C.C.D, Conn, 1871), The Treaty of
Peace did not grant ownership of adjacent coastal waters
to the United States either explicitly or implicitly,
307, See Treaty of Amity and Commerce, between
Sweden and the United States of Ametrica, Paris, April 3,
1783, art, 20, separate art. 2, Printed in 2 Treaties,
140, 145-146; and Treaty of Amity and Commerce, between
the United States and Prussia, the Hague, September 10,
1785, art, 2, Printed in id, at 163,
308# Treaty of Peace and Friendship, with additional
article, between the United States and Morocco, Morocco,
June 28, 1786, additional art. Printed in id, at 217,
309, Treaty of Peace and Friendship, between the
United States and Tripoli, January 3, 1797, art. 8#
Printed in id# at 365; Treaty of Peace and Friendship,
between the United States and Algiers, Algiers, January 3,
1797, art, 8. Printed in id, at 365,
310, Treaty of Peace and Friendship, between Tunis
and the United States of America, Tunis, August 28, 1797,
art, 10, Printed in id. at 406.
311, Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation,
between Great Britain and the United States, London,
November 19, 1794, arts. 1|, 23, Printed in id. at 256, 261,
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312. See Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation,
between the United States and Spain, San Lorenzo el Real,
October 27, 1795, art, 6. Printed in id. at 323; and
Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the
United States of America, Berlin, July 11, 1799, arts,
2, 3, 7. Printed in id. at 434-435, 438.
313. Convention, between France and the United States
of America, Paris, September 30, 1800, arts. 18, 27,
Printed in id. at 472, 478.
314. See the case of The Fame, supra note 238, which
dealt with the wafcers of Passamaquoddy Bay in the present
State of Maine, The waters of Delaware Bay were considered
to be historic inland waters within the State of Delaware,
See Opinion of the Attorney General to the Secretary of
State, dated May 14, 1793, printed in Opinions of
Attorneys General (1791*1838), 13-14 (1851).
315. The United States was the first nation to adopt
a three nautical mile belt of coastal waters in which the
obligation of neutral waters would be provided to other
nations. See Soult v. L'Africaine, supra note 277, at
806-807.
The concept of territorial sea, appurtenant to and
owned by the littoral nation was a nineteenth century
development. See H. Maine, International Law, 55 (1888).
The United States adopted the concept of territorial sea
in the nineteenth century. See Cunard S. S. Co. v.
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